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0 Synopsis
The traditional assumption that humans are perfect rational agents has been
challenged and many studies have shown that the cost-benefit analysis in
decision making cannot remain the only prerogative of the standard economic
model.
Simon (1947) was the pioneer to introduce bounded rationality in a model
of decision making. In his model, individuals are not able to evaluate the
consequences of every possibility because of limited cognitive resources or a
lack of information. Then, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) introduced the
concept of judgment heuristics and investigate rationality biases in the pro-
cess of decision making under uncertainty. Individuals use heuristic methods
to make decisions because of bounded rationality. My thesis presents three
studies in the field of decision making. Each study has a focus on a differ-
ent determinant of decision making. I illustrate these determinants with an
example.
Let’s consider the problem of picking chocolate from a choice of brands.
Although there are numerous reasons why someone chooses an option rather
than another, I will focus on aspects that relate to my thesis. Let’s assume
a consumer who has no strict preferences in his chocolate taste. He asks a
friend to advise him on this decision. The consumer’s friend wears glasses
and advises him to pick brand A instead of brand B. His main argument
is that brand A is of a higher ethical standard than brand B. Since, the
consumer values ethics, he decides to select brand A. When he goes to pick
the chocolate, he finds it easily, as the stores places chocolate A is at eye
level while chocolate B is located on a shelf that is not in the consumer’s
eye-line. For the consumer, all three reasons, i.e., stereotype that people
who wear glasses are knowledgeable, how choices are presented, and valuing
ethical practices, lead to brand A, thus he picks chocolate A.
This particular example of decision making involves three distinct ele-
ments, which I address in my thesis. First stereotypes (Chapter 1), second,
choice architecture (Chapter 2), and third values (Chapter 3). All these
factors influence decision making.
Chapter 1 investigates stereotypes. Stereotypes are category-based gen-
eralization (P. J. Grossman and Lugovskyy 2011). People predict and infer
behaviors of others based on their attributes. An attribute, in the above
example, wearing glasses, is used to categorize an individual into a certain
group. The person is part of the “group” that wears glasses as opposed to a
“group” that does not. In this particular example, the attribute is associated
with knowledge. In short, the consumer stereotypes people who wear glasses
as being smarter.
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Chapter 2 investigates choice architecture. In 2008, Thaler and Sunstein
published a book called “Nudge”. They developed a concept which states
that agents are sensitive to the presentation design of choices. A different
choice architecture induces different behaviors. These changes nudge (push)
individuals towards certain behaviors.
Chapter 3 investigates values. Values are fundamental beliefs, which state
preferred ways of living and thinking. Often people have stable values and
tend to live according to their values. This concept is rather close to the con-
cept of preferences, which implies that values predict and influence behaviors.
This concept encompasses a wide set of preferences, such as priorities, how
should the world be, how one should act, but also general beliefs about what
is good and what is bad.
Before I elaborate on the contents of my research, I shall mention some
elements of the methodology. Besides that all chapters are quantitative anal-
yses based on statistics, Chapters 1 and 2 differ from Chapter 3. The first
two chapters are based on experiments conducted using the standard exper-
imental economic methodology in a laboratory and an online setting. In
Chapter 1, we use a laboratory experiment to measure stereotypes as this
method offers maximum control over the environment. Moreover, since we
can incentivize participants based on their answers, we motivate participants
to answer truthfully. In Chapter 2, the experiment is used to draw causal
inferences of different treatments. Since we assume a random allocation of
the participants to treatments, we can infer that any systematic change on
average in behaviors can be attributed to the treatment. Thus, experiments
remain the gold standard to draw causal inferences. In Chapter 3, I use
archival data and econometric tools. Archival data have the advantage to be
easily accessible and usually offer large sample sizes. Furthermore, depend-
ing on the research question, like in this chapter, an experiment is hardly
feasible. Overall, these methodologies are complementary. While in exper-
iments, especially in the lab, we have great control of the environment, we
may lack some external validity. On the contrary, when using archival data,
the results can often be more generalized, but we have low control over the
data generating process.
My thesis chapters do not differ solely in terms of methodology but also
in the issue they relate to. Chapters 1 and 3 are both related to gender
studies, while Chapter 2 falls within the scope of charitable giving.
Issues related to gender are not only of academic interest but also to poli-
cymakers, since targeting gender equality has been on the political agenda of
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many countries, including Switzerland.1 I (i) elaborate on gender stereotypes
and how their impact is important for gender equality and (ii) develop on
the relevance of studying differences in values for gender equality policies.
The elicitation of gender stereotypes is certainly a first step when ad-
dressing gender differences. In line with the social role theory (Eagly and
Wood 1999; Wood and Eagly 2012), the reproduction of gender differences in
roles is partially sustained through self-categorization and self-stereotyping
(Guimond et al. 2006). These processes, although they are assumed to be
the consequence of the early division of labor, tend to maintain the actual
division of labor. In short, the belief about a gender difference in the labor
market enforces discrimination correspondingly.
The influence of stereotypes on behaviors, often termed the activation of
stereotypes, has been of scientific interest for many years, i.e., the activation
of a stereotype is when stereotypes influence behaviors in the corresponding
way (Boschini et al. 2012; Cohn et al. 2015; Krieglmeyer and Sherman 2012).
An active stereotype induces different behaviors as opposed to a passive one
that does not. Therefore, before we can measure the effect of a stereotype on
behaviors, we must be able to measure it with precision. Chapter 1 introduces
an experimental tool to measure stereotypes.
Chapter 3 addresses this issue with a different perspective. Since differ-
ences in economic outcomes are associated with values (Buser et al. 2014;
DeLeire and Levy 2004; Duflo 2012), it is of interest to policymakers to know
how these values evolve.
Gender equality is evolving almost everywhere in the world. An interest-
ing question is whether more gender equality in life-circumstances leads to
more or less differences in values. If gender differences in values tend to grow
with more gender equality in life-circumstances, then differences in economic
outcomes might grow. More precisely, this raises the question of whether
equal opportunity leads to equal outcomes. If women and men tend to differ
more and more in values, equal opportunity might lead to more differences
in the outcome. However, on the contrary, if the tendency is towards conver-
gence of values, then equal opportunity should lead to similar outcomes.
Chapter 2 addresses manipulations of choice architecture and its effects
on charitable giving. Donations are economically important and concern a
substantial fraction of the population. For instance, in the USA, 69% all the




research on this topic is fairly obvious and many studies focus on increasing
donations (Andreoni and Payne 2013; A. Gneezy et al. 2010; Karlan and List
2007), this study follows the general research on choice architecture.
While the effects of choice architecture are often used pragmatically to
nudge people towards certain behaviors3, studying choice architecture offers
insights into the underlying mechanisms of decision making. The process
is twofold. While nudges and choice architecture are the consequence of
research in behavioral economics, their everyday usability favor more research
to understand underlying mechanisms. Chapter 2 goes in that direction.
0.1 Chapter summaries
0.1.1 Chapter 1
This chapter is divided into two studies. While we investigate stereotypes
about cooperative behaviors in both studies, Study 1 focuses on gender and
Study 2 on political orientation. In both studies, we investigate whether
participants believe that being a woman/man or being left-leaning or right-
leaning will predict cooperative behavior.
Similar in both studies, we developed a mechanism to elicit stereotypes
about cooperative behaviors. The elicitation mechanism is as follows: we
gathered, from previous experiments, the average contribution of different
subgroups plus the overall average. We use these datasets as references for
our experiments. In Study 1, the two subgroups are males and females and
in Study 2, left-leaning and right-leaning subjects.
In our experiment, we provide subjects with the ratio in percent of each
subgroup in the reference dataset and the overall average contributions. Then,
we ask them to give us their guess about the average contribution of either
one or the other subgroup, i.e., in Study 1, we asked them to guess the av-
erage contribution of males or females with the given information about the
overall average contributions. Before ending the elicitation stage, we provide
them with the average contribution of both subgroups, i.e., the one for which
they provided a guess plus the average contribution of the other subgroup.
3It is nowadays well recognized and used, to the extent that countries, such as France,
Uk, and the USA have set in place special units dedicated to the implementation of theses
nudges in public policies. There is an interesting discussion about the legitimacy of using
nudges. The main argument is that the approach is libertarian paternalist (see: Sunstein
and Thaler 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2003). Although the concept seems paradoxical, it
combines two ideas, first that the choice is never restricted (libertarian) and second that
the influence one tries to make on behaviors is for the good of the choosers (paternalism).
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This latter one is conditional on the guess they provide.4 In this last stage,
they needed to confirm their guess plus the other computed average contri-
bution to complete the elicitation stage. We incentivized subjects, such that
their payoff was dependent on how close their guess was to the true value in
the reference dataset.
While, in Study 1, the gender attribute is not associated with a particular
cooperative behavior, in Study 2, being left-leaning is stereotyped with higher
cooperative behaviors. Given the reference dataset and the distribution of
the guesses, we are able to elaborate on the accuracy of the stereotypes
and to what extent the stereotypes are shared among the participants. In
Study 1, we find that gender stereotypes are on average accurate compared
to the reference dataset. On the other hand, in Study 2, we find that political
orientation stereotypes are inaccurate. While, in the reference dataset, right-
leanings contribute on average more, participants, in Study 2, think the
opposite. We finally compare the distribution of the stereotypes and find
that the shape is close to a normal distribution indicating that participants
by and large share the stereotypes.5
Nevertheless, the major contribution in this chapter is not particularly
the stereotype we elicit rather than the elicitation mechanism we propose,
which overcomes some biases of other mechanisms found in the literature.
As we incentivized participants for their guess, it is costly to respond in a
socially desirable way. Moreover, by providing a baseline, we reduce the
overestimation of a guess, i.e., reporting a very high or a very low average
contribution if a subject does not know the overall average contribution. And
finally, since we ask subjects to confirm the average contribution of both
subgroups, we render salient the difference between the two subgroups, which
likely reduces the overestimation of this difference.
0.1.2 Chapter 2
This chapter investigates the underlying mechanism in charitable giving. In a
previous experiment by Schulz et al. (2018), they provide a list of charities to
4The correct estimate of the other subgroup average contribution is dependent on the
ratio of each group in the reference dataset. Since this information is not obvious, we
compute the other average contribution and asked them to confirm both average contri-
butions.
5For instance, a bimodal distribution would indicate that participants have divided
stereotypes, i.e., half of the participants thinking that males average contribution is higher
than the females one and the other half thinking the opposite.
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participants and double the number of donors. The variation in outcomes was
substantial but the underlying mechanism that produced this shift remained
difficult to explain. This study is a follow-up.
I use the data from a large experiment based on the experimental tool
introduced by Kistler et al. (2017). I test two competing theories. One as-
sumes that the shift in the number of donors is caused by lower cognitive cost.
Having available options of charities require less cognitive effort than coming
up with a charity. The second hypothesis assumes that the list triggers an
emotional response that pushed participants towards donating.
The charity stage takes place at the end of an online experiment, where
participants go through a series of incentivized tasks. Thus, at the end of
the overall experiment, subjects are asked to indicate whether they would be
willing to give part of their potential earnings from the previous tasks to a
charitable organization. The decision is divided into three steps. First, the
willingness to donate, a binary decision (yes/no), second, what percentage
they are willing to donate, and third the choice of the charity. In the third
step, Kistler et al. (2017) manipulate two dimensions in the provision of a
list of charities: the length and whether the list was directly visible or with
a drop-down button. They end up with four different list treatments plus a
control group where no list was provided.
I find that the number of donors increases with the provision of the list
and does not decrease with a longer list. I also find that the drop-down
treatments mitigate the number of donors, albeit the effect is only marginally
significant. While, the cognitive cost theory assumes a choice overload with
the long list, which should dissuade some participants to donate (Gourville
and Soman 2005; Iyengar and Lepper 2000), the emotional arousal one does
not predict a lower number of donors in the long list (Kogut and Ritov
2005a; Kogut and Ritov 2005b; Small et al. 2007), and likely the opposite.
In the long list treatments, there is a higher probability that a participant is
presented with his favorite charity. This might induce a stronger emotional
arousal. Moreover, if participants want to avoid the emotional arousal, they
can strategically not click on the drop-down button (Andreoni, Rao, et al.
2017; Z. Grossman 2014). This mitigates the number of donors. In line with
the results, I find support for the emotional arousal theory.
Nevertheless, this is not the most surprising result. I also find that there
is a pitfall of changing the choice architecture in some situations. While the
number of donors increases with the provision of the list, the realized level of
donation remains unchanged. This result does not replicate the findings from
Schulz et al. (2018), as they find that the realized level of donation doubles
with the provision of a list. In my study, there are more donors in the list
treatments, but they donate less. The treatment variation likely withdraws
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their intrinsic motivation to donate summing up to no difference on the
realized level of donation. I finally speculate on the elements that decrease
intrinsic motivation. I posit that the impression of controls and the lower
opportunity cost to donate might explain the shift in intrinsic motivation.
0.1.3 Chapter 3
This chapter tackles a very controversial question in social science. Does
emancipation lead to the convergence of values between women and men or,
on the contrary, lead to more differences?
I contrast two hypotheses. While the social role theory predicts that gen-
der differences in values should decrease with more gender equality (Croson
and U. Gneezy 2009; Eagly and Wood 1999), the resource hypothesis predicts
the opposite (Almås et al. 2016; Haushofer and Fehr 2014). The former as-
sumes that gender differences in values reflect gender differences in the labor
market. Thus, a more balanced labor market should lead to less differences
in values. The latter assumes that gender differences are intrinsic and their
manifestation is a matter of opportunity. Gender differences in values are
expected to grow since more gender equality should be associated with more
equal opportunities.
I gathered longitudinal data from the World Value Survey and the Euro-
pean Value Survey and classify the items of these surveys into two dimensions:
life-situations and values. Then, I further subdivided both dimensions into
two, objective and subjective life-situations, and self-centered or general val-
ues, leaving me with four categories. Afterward, I computed the absolute
difference between male and female scores per item, per year, and country
of the surveys. Then, I regressed each category independently with indexes,
such as the Gender Equality Index, the GDP Index from the United Nations,
the Gender Equality Index from the World Economic Forum, ecological stress
indicators, and different cultural dimensions, such as religiousness, individu-
alism, and power distance.
While I find that more gender equality and economic growth are unam-
biguously associated with less gender differences in life-situations, as mea-
sured in the surveys, the effect on values is paradoxical. I end up with both
divergence and convergence of gender differences in values with emancipation
and economic growth depending on whether I run a cross-country analysis
or a within-country one, i.e., controlling for country fixed effects. Both evi-
dences are robust and significant. This suggests an endogeneity bias in the
model.
While endogeneity bias is inherent in econometrics, it is rather hard to
completely overcome (Antonakis et al. 2010). Thus, after testing many sub-
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sampling and restriction on the data, I test other sources of gender differences
in values. Kaiser (2019) find that ecological stress factors might explain the
differences in values. The assumed causal relationship is that societies that
had a high prevalence of pathogens tend to be more collectivist and display
lower gender differences in values. I find that ecological stress factors are
significantly correlated with differences in values. Along the same lines, the
different cultural dimensions correlate with gender differences. Nevertheless,
the paradox remains robust, even when I control for these additional factors,
suggesting that the country fixed effects is able to capture more variability
than these control variables and that the model still suffers from endogeneity.
Thus, finding the true underlying relationship between social/economic
evolution and values remains unsolved so far. The main contribution is to
show the robustness of this paradox, but I conclude that extensive research
on other possible causes is necessary to reveal the true relationship between
gender equality and gender differences in values.
0.2 Perspectives & concluding remarks
As my thesis chapters are substantially different, I address, in this section, the
different perspectives of each chapter for future research as well as concluding
remarks.
0.2.1 Chapter 1
Although we present a stereotype elicitation mechanism that partially over-
come some biases identified in previous findings, such as social desirability
or the overestimation due to unknown baselines, we cannot deduct to what
extent participants think the stereotype is informative. This informative com-
ponent matters when eliciting a stereotype, because the more a stereotype
is believed to inform or predict the behaviors of a group the higher is the
probability of statistical discrimination.
In our experiment, when participants indicate the average difference be-
tween two groups6, we do not know whether they have in mind a distribution
of contributions. It might well be that they indicate a difference of average
contributions between two groups but at the same time, think that this dif-
ference is not useful if they have to predict the contribution of the members
6The two groups are distinguished by an attribute. Either both groups possess an
opposite attribute (e.g. male/female) or one has an attribute, while the other group does
not (e.g. wearing glasses).
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of a given group.
Let’s assume the following regression: bij = α + β1G + ϵ, where i repre-
sents the belief about j’s contribution; α is the average contribution of the
subjects in the baseline group (say, people not wearing glasses), and β is the
expected difference between the two groups (say, the glasses effect). Whether
a stereotype is informative depends on the R2 of this regression. If partici-
pants estimate a low epsilon, it indicates that they think that the stereotype
is informative. Overall, if their estimate about the difference between the
two groups is different from 0 (β ̸= 0), and if they think the stereotype is
informative, they might well use this attribute to predict behaviors which
leads to statistical discrimination.
Therefore, a future experiment should try to combine our stereotype elic-
itation mechanism with another stage which would elicit how informative
subjects think their stereotype is. I suggest the following way: suppose you
wish to elicit gender stereotypes about cooperative behaviors. After partici-
pants passed the elicitation mechanism, we tell them that we randomly pick
one male and one female participant a hundred times from a large population.
We, then, ask them to indicate how many times they think that the randomly
picked male has a higher contribution than the randomly picked female. For
instance, a subject thinks that the female average contribution is higher than
the male one in a similar elicitation mechanism as in Chapter 1; how many
times, in the random selection, she thinks the contribution of the randomly
picked female is above the contribution of the randomly picked male.
The proposed design might overcome some limitations of Chapter 1 but
is only one step ahead in the study of stereotypes. I think that the elicitation
of stereotypes is still a necessary step to increase the validity of research on
stereotype activation and their everyday implications.7
0.2.2 Chapter 2
This experiment has an interesting external validity since it reproduces closely
the donation decision present on some websites. Nevertheless, it remains dif-
ficult to completely disentangle the underlying mechanism in the nudge. Al-
7The activation of a stereotype is likely mediated by how informative a stereotype is
believed to be and to what extent a group behavior is believed to differ from the average
behavior of the other group, i.e., if a person thinks that gender is a very good predictor of
performance outcomes in a certain job (informative stereotypes where one gender differs
substantially from the other gender), the person will likely discriminate based on gender
when hiring someone.
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though, I find evidence that the main mechanism that increased the number
of donors is the emotional arousal, a possible effect produced by a cognitive
cost is not completely discarded. While a body of literature reports the rel-
ative importance of external changes in mediating the intrinsic motivation
(Deci 1976; Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Frey and Jegen 2001), I assume that the
provision of the list undermines the intrinsic motivation. Following this logic,
since participants do not need to commit the same cognitive effort to give to
a charity, it likely withdraws their intrinsic motivation. Therefore, although
the lower cognitive cost does not seem to be the main mechanism to nudge
participants into donating, it might still play an important role.
As the decision to donate seems to be multi-dimensional and fairly com-
plex, I identified at least two possibilities for future research. First, investigat-
ing the relative importance of extrinsic motivation in the donation decision.
In my study, I assumed that the intrinsic motivation is crowded out, which
would explain the lower amount participants are willing to donate. I suppose
this is a consequence of a change in extrinsic motivation. Since DellaVigna
et al. (2012) and Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2013) find that the donation deci-
sion is also influenced by the extrinsic motivation to enhance one’s self image,
future research could replicate the treatment variation of the provision of a
list, but mitigate the extrinsic motivation of the participants. I would suggest
to add a treatment variation where the donation decision is not anonymous.
In sum, the experiment would contain four treatments: a control treatment
with no list, a treatment with a list, and two other similar treatments where
participants are not anonymous. This experiment might shed light on the
possible interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation with nudges
in donation decisions.
A second perspective would be to mitigate the intrinsic motivation, which
I think is rather complex since we can only suppose that a treatment vari-
ation would increase or decrease the intrinsic motivation.8 As I assume in
Chapter 2, that the lower cognitive cost in the donation decision decreases
the intrinsic motivation, I suggest to replicate the treatment variation of the
provision of a list but add a treatment variation, where participants have to
provide some effort if they are willing to donate. How much extra effort is
required is hard to estimate, however, if the effort becomes too consequent, it
might completely take over the first effect of the provision of a list. Therefore,
a simple treatment would be that participants need to copy the name of the
8The intrinsic motivation of participants is a latent variable. Intrinsic motivation is
usually inferred from the behaviors of the participants.
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charity on another screen to confirm their willingness to donate. This exper-
iment would possibly confirm the withdrawal of intrinsic motivation when
participants are nudged to donate.
This study was at first an extension of Schulz et al. (2018) but failed to
replicate their main finding. I believe this shows the complexity of donation
decisions and suggests the possibility of many interferences in these processes.
I finally think that this shows the necessity to replicate studies before claim-
ing a definite conclusion and that even robust findings in one context, such as
in face-to-face interaction, might not be applicable in another context, such
as in an online setting.
0.2.3 Chapter 3
My investigation ends on a puzzle and therefore asks more questions than it
solves. Although many studies find support for divergence (Falk and Hermle
2018; Mac Giolla and Kajonius 2019) and others for convergence (Donnelly
and Twenge 2017; Konrad et al. 2000) of gender differences in values with
respect to emancipation, I argue, in line with the findings from Connolly
et al. (2019), that this relationship likely suffer an endogeneity bias.
The endogeneity bias is almost omnipresent in econometrics and well
documented (Antonakis et al. 2014; Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). However,
in some cases, inconsistent estimates will not lead to completely different
conclusions when they are corrected, i.e., a positive correlation that remains
positive even after correction. Even if this is deleterious for scientific research,
the possible negative impact on public policies is contained. However, in
cases such as in Chapter 3, the correlation changes sign, which might lead to
harmful public policies.
Therefore, even if the topic is already well studied, I would still favor more
research. Since experiments on this topic are likely inconceivable. I suggest
two different perspectives. On one hand, some statistical tools might help
uncover the true relationship between gender equality and gender differences
in values, such as the regression discontinuity approach. However, the most
promising one remains the instrumental variable. For the instrument to be
viable, one must find an instrument that satisfies the exclusion restriction,
namely one that does not correlate with the error term. Nevertheless, finding
such an instrumental variable is very challenging since the dependent variable
I use contains a very large set of values. One should probably restrict the
number of values to a smaller sub-sample. Moreover, I guess that the often
used ones, such as climate change or which country has been colonized are
likely to not satisfy the exclusion restriction criterion for the actual set of
values.
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Although I think the instrument is the most promising tool, one can also
try to find other variables that would explain gender differences in values
(statistical adjustment). While in Chapter 3, I replicate some of the findings
from Kaiser (2019) and confirm that ecological stress and cultural differences
could be the cause of gender differences in values, the recent evolution of
gender differences remains puzzling. Since there seems to be an important
correlation between individualism and gender differences in values, I suggest
looking for the determinants of individualism and also tracking the evolution
of individualism over time. Kaiser (2019) find that a very important predictor
of individualism was the prevalence of pathogens. Therefore, if this causal
relationship is robust, it might well be that the countries that were highly
affected by the coronavirus would display, with a certain latency, less gender
differences in values.
Overall, the puzzle seems to be far from solved yet. As research tends to
confirm the relationship between preferences/values and economic outcome,
it increases the necessity to know if the difference in values between women
and men tends to converge or diverge. Moreover, in terms of policy implica-
tion, it begs the question, as mentioned above, of whether reaching equality
of opportunity will lead to equality in the outcome. Due to the possible
consequences of such findings, I think this topic should remain a research
priority in the future years.
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1 Chapter 1
Who is cooperative? Stereotypes in
gender and political orientation
Christian Thöni & Jason Wettstein
Abstract
We present two studies that elicit explicit stereotypes about co-
operative behavior in a laboratory setting. Like in a normal public
goods game, subjects are introduced to the procedures and solve con-
trol questions. Before they actually play the public goods game, we
elicit incentivized estimates about the contributions of subgroups of
the population. In Study 1, we elicit gender stereotypes by asking
subjects to guess the average contributions of male and female partic-
ipants from a reference data set. In Study 2, we use the same design to
elicit stereotypes in political orientation. We find no systematic gen-
der stereotype, whereas subjects systematically overestimate contribu-
tions of the left-leaning subjects relative to the right-leaning subjects.
In both studies, the distribution of the guesses are not significantly
different from a normal distribution suggesting that participants do
not have opposite stereotypes.
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1.1 Introduction
Understanding how stereotypes arise, whether they are accurate, and how
they influence behavior has been of academic interests for more than 80 years
(see e.g. Katz and Braly 1933). Stereotypes can affect choices, when agents
or firms deploy statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972). While
one can debate the fairness implications of statistical discrimination under
accurate stereotypes (Fiss 1976; Lippert-Rasmussen 2006; Cass R Sunstein
1994), it seems obvious that statistical discrimination based on inaccurate
stereotypes is undesirable if not harmful. The goal of our research is to
measure stereotypes along two dimensions, gender, and political orientation.
While there are countless behaviors for which stereotypes might be found,
we focus on stereotypes in cooperative behavior. Cooperative behavior is
particularly important, because it is likely one of the strong determinants of
whether people are willing to invest in productive teamwork. Strong stereo-
types with respect to cooperative behavior might have adverse consequences
for those involved. If, e.g., people falsely hold a strong stereotype that women
are uncooperative, then they may refrain from entering collaborative relations
and fail to realize potential gains from cooperation. Our goal is to elicit
beliefs about average behavior of sub-populations in a well-defined strategic
environment. Our workhorse to measure cooperation is the tried and tested
linear public goods game (henceforth PGG, Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003). We
use data from previous studies as reference data sets. We ask participants
of the current study to guess the average behavior of either male/female
participants or left/right-leaning participants in the reference data sets.
Our primary focus was on gender stereotypes in cooperation. In the PGG,
individuals’ payoffs are highly dependent on the other members of the group.
This strategic situation might favor statistical discrimination. We focus on
gender stereotypes, as, in principle, gender is an identifiable and static at-
tribute. Therefore, gender stereotypes in cooperation may lead to discrimi-
nation. Gender stereotypes would be difficult to counter, because the trigger
(gender) is almost perfectly observable. To our surprise, we did not find
evidence for a gender stereotype in our data. We ran a second study to in-
vestigate whether this lack of stereotype is due to (i) subjects anticipating
gender differences correctly, or (ii) because our measurement tool is unable
to capture a stereotype. To control for the latter we apply our stereotypes
elicitation mechanism to another characteristic. In our choice of character-
istics we were restricted by what was available in our data from previous
experiments. Among the available variables, such as age, study, national-
ity, or religious beliefs, stereotypes in political orientation seemed the most
promising to us, especially, since these stereotypes are often found to be
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exaggerated (Bordalo et al. 2016).9
Following Grossman and Lugovskyy (2011) we define stereotyping as “the
act of assigning to a member of a particular group a characteristic or trait
based solely on the individuals membership in that group”. Research in
psychology and sociology offer similar definitions. According to Correll et al.
(2010), stereotypes are category-based generalizations that predict or explain
the behavior of others. Based on certain attributes, we infer the behaviors of
others. This definition also implies that stereotypes do not have an affective
nature per se; they could be either positive, neutral or negative.
Krieglmeyer and Sherman (2012) point out that a stereotype is the result
of a heuristic process. They explain that due to limited information or cog-
nitive abilities we rely on shortcuts to make sense of the social environment.
Hence, we link certain types of behaviors to certain attributes. Bordalo et al.
(2016) investigated the formation of stereotypes and highlighted the role of
the context and the representativeness of the group. The fabrication of a
stereotype lies in the comparison of at least two groups implying that only
the difference between the groups matters.10
Finally, Madon et al. (2006) and Lee et al. (2013) investigate the accu-
racy of stereotypes. Whenever they are accurate, they are good predictors
of average behaviors; when they are biased, the social group can behave in a
different way versus the stipulated stereotype or they are simply unrelated.
Therefore, belonging to a group might not predict your social behavior. For
instance, being an academic might not predict your cooperative behavior.
The accuracy of a stereotype can be assessed on two different levels: qualita-
tively and the intensity. The former refers to the direction of the stereotype,
such as whether men or women are more risk averse, and the latter to which
extent the stereotype predicts the behaviors, for example, the extent to which
women are more risk averse than men. The second level investigates how in-
formative a stereotype can be. To be informative, the stereotype needs to
differ sufficiently from the pooled average of all subgroups. If the behavior of
the subgroup is too close to the other groups, then the stereotype is uninfor-
mative.11 Overall, these definitions stand in favor of an inclusive approach,
in contrast to the common understanding of stereotypes, which is closer to
9See the discussion on representative types in the result section of Study 2 on page 43.
10E.g. the gender attribute is often linked with a type of behavior, such as women being
more conscientious or more risk averse compared to men. Whether men and women are
in the absolute risk seeker or risk averse does not matter, the relative difference does.
11The informative component is a relative notion. One can consider that it is informative
as soon as it helps predict better than chance the behaviors.
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the concept of prejudice.12
1.2 Related Literature
The literature on stereotypes distinguishes two main categories: implicit and
explicit stereotypes. Both types are category-based generalizations but they
differ in their awareness. Implicit stereotypes affect behavior, but people are
not aware of them, while people are aware of their explicit stereotypes and can
verbalize them. According to Arendt (2013), implicit stereotypes will lead
to explicit stereotypes when the person has enough introspective capacities.
In contrast, a dissociation between these two kinds of stereotypes may be
induced by coercive social norms, which may provoke a social desirability
bias. Nevertheless, this is still open to debate in the literature (Arendt 2013).
While implicit and explicit stereotypes are distinguished by their aware-
ness, the measurement of implicit stereotypes often overlay the measurement
of explicit stereotypes, such that any methods measuring implicit stereotypes
might also measure explicit stereotypes. A typical example of an implicit
method is when participants have to infer the behaviors of other people by
their physical appearance. In this example, it is not made salient to par-
ticipants which stereotypes they should use to infer behaviors. Participants
might use hair color, height, or gender to make their predictions. While they
might think that gender is a good predictor of a certain behavior, they might
also implicitly - without being aware of this stereotype - think that the hair
color indicates the same behavior. In this case, this method might target a
stereotype participants are aware of: gender, and an implicit one, they are not
aware of: hair color. Overall, many methods are neither completely implicit,
nor completely explicit, but rather in-between. Therefore, we make the dis-
tinction, that explicit methods focus on one stereotype which is made salient
to participants and implicit methods do not make salient which stereotypes
are elicited.
Eckel and Grossman (2002) used an incentivized implicit mechanism to
measure stereotypes in risk preferences. Participants play a lottery game,
with two choices, one riskier than the other one. After playing the lottery,
subjects had to guess the decisions of other participants. In order to trigger
implicit or explicit stereotypes, each participant had to stand up, such as
to be seen by all the other participants. The authors found that the gender
of a person standing up was significantly correlated with the guesses of the
12For the early study of stereotypes, see Katz and Braly (1933).
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lottery choices. Participants assumed that women are more risk averse than
men. In their experiment, the stereotype is accurate, i.e., it predicts behavior
better than chance.
Daruvala (2007) used a similar design in which participants could see
each other without standing up. They confirmed that participants predicted
lottery choices based on gender (women are again assumed to be more risk
averse than men). Ball et al. (2010) confirmed these observations and added
the physical prowess with attributes such as height, strength, and attrac-
tiveness, as predictors for the guesses. Taller, stronger, and more attractive
people were stereotyped as more risk-tolerant. Overall, stereotypes are qual-
itatively accurate, as they tend to predict risk choices better than chance in
these experiments. On the other hand, the differences between the subgroups
are often overestimated. For instance, participants assume women to be risk
averse, but to a greater extent than what they actually are.
Grossman and Lugovskyy (2011) investigated the robustness of gender
stereotypes. For this purpose, each participant had to complete a risk atti-
tude elicitation survey before playing a lottery. Later on, participants who
had to guess the choices of other subjects received a part of the risk survey,
with which one can infer risk preferences, in addition to the visual informa-
tion. Survey answers are individual information, presumably more accurate
than group attributes; however, the authors find that the stereotypes domi-
nate in the prediction process. In particular, the gender stereotype is shown
to be robust to the additional information. The robustness was also con-
firmed by Grossman (2013) who varied the sequence of information. In a
random order, participants were either shown the survey answers first, or
they saw the person first.
Castillo and Petrie (2010) study social preferences. In their study, par-
ticipants played 20 rounds of a public goods game and then had to rank
other participants from the one they would like to interact with the most to
the one they would like to interact with the least for the upcoming rounds.
They implemented three different treatments, one with information about the
previous contributions, one with a photo of the participants, and one with
both. Beliefs about cooperation were elicited with the participants’ prefer-
ences for their future group members. They found that race was used to
predict behavior. However, this did not hold with the information about pre-
vious contributions. Furthermore, gender was not used as a predictor even
without the contribution information. This suggests that stereotypes take
over the individual information only in some situations, possibly depending
on the intensity of the stereotype.
The above examples do not allow us to infer whether participants were
aware of the stereotypes they use to educate their guess. As it was not made
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salient to participants which stereotype to focus on, these methods are rather
implicit. In such studies it is difficult to disentangle stereotypes based on gen-
eral group characteristics from the influence of individual characteristics. If,
for example, subjects can infer risk preferences from the physical appearance
of other subjects, then differences in average risk-taking might not reflect a
general gender stereotype.13 These designs might also provide an incentive
to overvalue the information14, artificially increase the effect by using binary
choice sets15, and might be sensitive to intentions16.
Before we discuss explicit methods, it is worth noting that there exist
some approaches in-between explicit and implicit methods. Vyrastekova et
al. (2015) investigated gender beliefs in cooperation. Although their topic
is highly similar to ours, they investigate the beliefs using a rather implicit
method. In their experiment, participants indicated their contribution con-
ditional on the gender composition of their group. In this elicitation mecha-
nism, factors, such as appearance does not play a role. However, differences
in conditional contributions cannot be uniquely attributed to stereotypes
about cooperation, as there may be other reasons why subjects would want
to differentiate their contribution in response to the gender composition in
the group.
In our study, we focus on explicit stereotypes in cooperative behavior
by using an explicit method. So far, most of the research done on explicit
stereotypes comes from psychology and sociology, mainly using surveys.17
13For instance, the gender attribute can superimpose with other attributes such as height
or physical strength (Ball et al. 2010). It could be that height is main stereotype people
use when predicting risk preferences, but since it correlates with gender, the researcher
might misinterpret this as gender stereotype. Consequently, the gender stereotype might
vanish if one could control for all other factors.
14In the mentioned experiments, there are incentives to seek for information. Partici-
pants look for clues to make their guesses and this might overvalue the prevalence of the
stereotype.
15In the literature on risk preferences, participants often face a binary choice. They
choose between two options, a risky and a comparatively less risky. The same holds for
Aguiar et al. (2009), where they investigate gender stereotype and altruism, but only allow
binary decisions. The framing forces a decision between two extremes, which is likely to
amplify reported stereotypes.
16According to Fiedler and Bluemke (2005) and Steffens (2004) implicit responses (sig-
nals) can be faked, and especially if participants are incentivized to do so. Their studies
use implicit association tests (IAT), where they measure the response time after a stimulus.
Participants were able to speed up their response time if they received instructions to fake
the IAT.
17Researchers use various questionnaire items: unipolar (e.g. how much do you agree
28
There is some concern that these research underestimate stereotypes due to
social desirability (Schuman 1997), misunderstanding of the context, a lack of
precision18, or a lack of introspective access19. Intuitively, implicit methods
should have a higher risk of false positives20, while explicit methods should
have a higher risk of false negative21.
Our design for Studies 1 and 2 follows recent work in experimental eco-
nomics on explicit stereotypes. Brañas-Garza et al. (2018) study explicit
gender stereotypes in a dictator game. Subjects, informed about the gender
of the dictator, gave guesses about the amount given. Closer to our design,
Dieckmann et al. (2016) asked participants to guess the average score of other
nationalities in an effort task and in an honesty game. In both experiments,
participants earned money depending on how close their guesses were to the
true average as observed in previous experiments with the respective popu-
lation. In our work, we ask participants to guess the average contribution
of subgroups from a reference data set in a public goods game, but unlike
the previous experiments, we inform subjects about the overall average and
of the proportion of each subgroup. We use strong incentives, which should
reduce the social desirability bias, as it is costly to express a socially desirable
guess when it deviates from the true guess. We also kept the design simple
to avoid noise due to complexity and misunderstanding (Dave et al. 2010).
We argue that our method is explicit as we make salient which stereotype we
aim to elicit. Even if subjects in our experiment have a priori no informative
stereotypes, we incentivize them to form an explicit stereotype.
with this trait), bipolar (e.g. rate this group between rude or polite), with percentage
points (e.g. how much of this trait do you believe characterizes this group) or similarity
ones (e.g. rate these two groups in terms of abilities).
18E.g. when asked to rate the driving skills of old and young drivers, participants might
think of different aspects, such as parking skills, accident rates, or driving skills to different
weather conditions.
19Participants might not be aware of their own perceptions, due to a lack of introspec-
tive access (Arendt 2013). Stereotypes exist, they are used to predict the other’s behavior
but when we ask about it, participants are not able to express them. For instance, dis-
criminating when hiring people even though when asked about any preliminary belief that
certain attributes will predict the performance, people think they do not have any.
20Detecting a stereotype even though it does not exist; e.g. a stereotype channeled
through an omitted variable.
21Not detecting a stereotype, even though it exists; e.g. strong social norms preventing
its elicitation.
29
1.3 Conceptual framework & experimental procedures
We measure explicit stereotypes about cooperative behavior by letting sub-
jects guess the average contributions of sub-populations in previous experi-
ments (the reference data). We focus on the contribution in the first period
of a repeated game because that is where we expect sub-populations to differ
most clearly. Before we elicit the guess, subjects of the current study run
through the exact same procedures (instructions, control questions) as the
subjects that produced the reference data. The elicitation of the stereotypes
occurs in the same moment, in which subjects in the reference data studies
chose their first contribution.
Why should stereotypes matter? Under standard assumptions, the Nash
equilibrium of the PGG is zero contributions for all players. In such an envi-
ronment stereotypes would be irrelevant, as the game is dominance solvable.
However, this is not an empirically accurate prediction of human behavior,
as demonstrated in countless experimental PGG studies. It has been shown
that the predominant behavioral pattern in PGGs is conditional cooperation,
i.e., the willingness to cooperate if others cooperate as well (Fischbacher et al.
2001; Thöni and Volk 2018). For a group of conditionally cooperative players,
the PGG has multiple equilibria, which means that beliefs importantly influ-
ence actions. Consequently, if players have stereotypes about other players’
actions, then they adjust their behavior when interacting with a player of
the respective group. Fortunately for our purpose, our reference data shows
a large variance in first period contributions, such that there is ample room
for stereotypes.
How do subjects form beliefs? While we may not understand the exact
process, we can posit that beliefs arise from at least three sources of infor-
mation. Consider a player i who has to form a belief about player j’s con-
tribution. We assume that beliefs are formed based on previously observed
behavior in the respective strategic situation (the PGG in our case), individ-
ual and group characteristics of player j. We define group characteristics as
common identifiable individual characteristics. This implies that individuals
have the characteristics of the group they belong to, in addition to individual
characteristics that the group does not have.
bij(c
t−1
j , Ij, Gj)
When individual information regarding j’s past contributions is available
(ct−1j ), then a player presumably uses this to predict contributions in the cur-
rent situation. This is particularly evident in repeated games, where past
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contributions strongly affect beliefs in the current period.22 In the absence
of information about past behavior in the respective strategic situation, sub-
jects might use other individual information Ij if available, like e.g., physi-
cal appearance, observed behavior in other environments etc. A number of
studies discussed above study implicit and explicit stereotypes by providing
individual information.23
Our approach is to eliminate the effect of individual information and to
focus on the effect of group information (Gj). We provide our subjects with
nothing else than a group distinction (male/female, or left/right-leaning) to
base their estimates on. Any stereotype we measure is therefore explicit, i.e.,
it is fully transparent to the subjects that they are asked to use the group
affiliation as the determinant for their guesses.
A stereotype might be accurate but uninformative. We can illustrate
this in terms of a simple regression analysis. Let bij = α + β1G + ϵ be the
function that represents i’s belief about j’s contribution; α is the average of
the subjects in the baseline group (say, males), and β measures the expected
difference between the two groups (the gender effect). In our experiment, we
will elicit β̂i, while we will use our reference data set to calculate the true β.
We will say that subjects have accurate stereotypes if their β̂i is reasonably
close to β. Whether they consider the stereotype to be informative depends
on both the slope (β̂i) and their estimate about the variance of the error
term (ϵ). A very low variance means that a subject expects beliefs to be on
average very close to the true value. As a metric for the degree to which
subjects think their stereotype is informative we could use their belief about
the R2 of the above-mentioned regression.
1.3.1 Experimental procedures
Our experiment starts like a normal PGG experiment with the subjects read-
ing the instructions of the standard PGG game and answering the control
questions. For the control question, they had to calculate their payoff and the
payoffs of the other group members for various combinations of contributions.
22This begs the question of whether past behavior is in fact a reasonable predictor for
future behavior in PGGs. The results of Volk et al. (2012) suggest that in fact there is a
lot of predictive power in the information about past behavior.
23This point is related to the green beard hypothesis discussed in evolutionary biology
(Dawkins 1976). It asks the question of whether some physical attributes (like a green
beard) might evolve to credibly signal a type and help cooperative actors to cooperate
only among themselves (see also Fehr and Fischbacher 2005; Frank 2005).
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We checked their answers and their understanding before we started the ex-
periment. Up to the point where the experiment starts, we do not inform
them about the stereotype elicitation. This procedure was chosen to ensure
that subjects had the same information about the game as the experimental
subjects that produced the reference data.
The PGG was played following the protocol of Herrmann et al. (2008):
participants are matched in groups of four. Group composition remained the
same during the whole experiment (partner matching). In each period, par-
ticipants received an endowment of 20 ECU (Experimental Currency Units)
and had to decide how many ECU to allocate to a public good. The monetary
payoff of the stage game is:






where gi is player i’s contribution and 25 is the marginal per capita return.
Under standard assumptions, this game has a unique Nash equilibrium, in
which nobody contributes. Every ECU contributed pays back 0.4 to the
contributor, and 1.6 to the group, thus constituting a social dilemma where
contributing is costly to the individual but beneficial for the group.
1.3.2 Stereotype elicitation
After instructions and control questions subjects proceeded to the stage
where we elicited stereotypes. We asked participants to guess the average
contributions of sub-populations 0 and 1 (men/women or left/right-leaning
subjects) in the first period of a standard public goods game from a ref-
erence data. All instructions for this stage were presented on the screen.
Participants went through three steps to enter their guess of the average con-
tribution by sub-population. The first screen explained that they would have
to guess the average contribution of the two groups in the first period of the
public goods game from the reference data (Element 1 in Figure 1.1, hence-
forth: E1.1.1).24 The monetary profit function of the stereotype elicitation
stage follows πi(β̂i) = max{0, 100 − 500|β̂i − β|}, rounded up to multiples
24We asked to guess the average contribution in the first period only because this is
arguably the moment where differences between subgroups of the subject pool are most
pronounces. Over the course of a repeated interaction, things get much more complicated,
as the subgroups might display differences in their strategic reaction to the behavior of
other subjects.
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of 10. We communicated the incentives in the instructions using a table,
indicating that an absolute deviation of .02 or less would pay 100, and for
any increase in the deviation of .02 the payoff would be reduced by 10 units,
such that deviations larger than 0.2 would not be rewarded (E1.1.2). The
first screen also contained information about the reference data we used to
calculate β, We emphasized that the data was generated under highly similar
circumstances, with a similar subject pool, i.e., students, the same age, and
under similar experimental conditions (E1.1.3). Participants had to press a
button to move to the next screen (E1.1.4). No time limit was imposed at
this stage. Figure 1.1 is a translated screenshot of the first step from Study 1,
which investigates gender stereotypes in contribution. From the top to the
bottom of the screen, participants had access to the general matter of these
stages, i.e, what question participants will have to answer (E1.1.1), the profit
function (E1.1.2), information regarding the reference data (E1.1.3), and the
button to get to next step (E1.1.4, see Figure A1.1 in the Appendix for the
original screenshot and its translation).
Stereotype elicitation: Step 1 - Gender stereotype
Figure 1.1: Translated screenshot - Study 1 - Screen 1
In the second screen, participants were provided with the information
about the overall average contribution in the first period of the reference
data set and were given the percentages of subjects in group 0 and 1, f0
and f1, respectively (Element 1 in Figure 1.2, henceforth: E1.2.1). Formally
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the overall average corresponds to f0α + f1(α + β). We then asked them to
indicate their guess. We randomized the order of group 0 and 1 to control
for order effects, i.e., subjects either enter α̂i, or α̂i + β̂i. Subjects were
randomly assigned to one of two questions. At the bottom of the screen in
the second step we repeated the information about the reference data set
(E1.2.2). When subject entered a number they hat to press a “calculate”
button (E1.2.3). Figure 1.2 is a translated screenshot of Study 1, from the
second step in the elicitation mechanism of gender stereotypes in cooperation.
On the left part of the screen, participants had information about the overall
average contribution and the percentage of females and males in the reference
data set (E1.2.1). On the right side, they had to indicate their guess about
the females or males average contribution. Here, the question is the following:
“What do you think is the mean contribution of female participants in this
kind of experiment?”. Underneath this question, they have the calculate
button (E1.2.3), which would make appear the confirmation step (Figure
1.3). On the bottom of the screen, participants still see the information
about the reference data set (E1.2.2, see Figure A1.2 in the Appendix for the
original screenshot and its translation).
Stereotype elicitation: Step 2 - Gender stereotype
Figure 1.2: Translated screenshot - Study 1 - Screen 2
As we wanted to minimize confusion in the elicitation of the stereotypes
we added a third step, in which subjects were asked to confirm their entry.
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We used their guess about the average contribution of group 0 (1) to calculate
the respective average of the other group, such that the values are consistent
with the overall weighted average. Figure 1.3 shows an example for the gender
stereotype elicitation. Given this information, subjects could either confirm
the values or press the “change” button to return to the previous screen and
enter a new value. Upon pressing calculate they would again be presented
the screen in Figure 1.3. Subjects could change their entries as often as they
wanted.
Confirmation of the guesses - Step 3
Figure 1.3: Screenshot Screen 3
After all subjects had finished the stereotype elicitation, the experiment
proceeded with the 10-period public goods game, followed by a post-experimental
questionnaire.
1.4 Hypotheses
The null hypothesis for both stereotype elicitation experiments is that sub-
jects’ estimations about the average differences between the two genders and
political leanings are not systematically different from zero (β̂i ∼ 0)
While the literature on gender effects suggests no gender differences in
cooperation (Balliet et al. 2011), we expect to observe systematic gender
stereotypes in cooperation. We expect our subjects to overestimate female
cooperation relative to male cooperation.
We think it is safe to assume that our subjects are not familiar with
the meta-analytic literature on gender differences in cooperation. Therefore,
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when trying to estimate the average contribution of a sub-group, participants
likely use other sources than the scientific literature to make their guess. An
obvious one is through personality traits, especially agreeableness. Agreeable-
ness is one of the five major personality traits and refers to behaviors that
are generally perceived as kind, sympathetic, and cooperative (Graziano and
Eisenberg 1997; Thompson 2008). Gender differences in agreeableness are
suggested by social role theory. The social role theory posits that sex differ-
ences have their origin in different social experiences (Eagly and Wood 1999;
Wood and Eagly 2012). Due to biological differences, such as pregnancy,
or average strength and height, women and men have historically taken on
different roles (Balliet et al. 2011). These differences have raised different
expectations by gender. While men are expected to be more agentic, that
is assertive and competitive, women are expected to be more communal in
orientation, less selfish, and more friendly (Eagly 2009). In other words,
women are expected to be more agreeable. In the same vein, in a large study
in 25 countries, Williams et al. (1999) find that women are expected to be
more agreeable than men. This suggests that these historical different ex-
pectations still prevails. While the reproduction of these differences happens
through different channels, such as self-categorization and self-stereotyping
(Guimond et al. 2006), many research bring evidence that women display a
higher level of agreeableness (Costa Jr et al. 2001; McCrae and Terracciano
2005). Finally, as agreeableness is associated with higher contributions in
public goods game (Volk et al. 2011), we expect participants to stereotype
women as more agreeable and thus to contribute more.
Hypothesis 1 Subjects expect female average contribution to be higher than
male average contribution, i.e., β̂i > 0
For the political stereotype in cooperation, the scientific literature reports
some correlations between political orientation and trust or cooperative be-
haviors (Fehr, Fischbacher, et al. 2002). However, others find that these
correlations are not robust (Anderson et al. 2005). But again, how people
stereotype parties might not be solely derived, if at all, from the scientific
literature.
The left-right continuum is indeed a construct that has its limitations
when trying to capture political attitudes. Nevertheless, some general ten-
dencies are fairly uncontroversial. For instance, left-leaning people tend to
favor more involvement of the government and more redistribution than the
right-leaning people.
According to Wilson et al. (2013), the left-wing is associated with higher
spending on social programs and public spending. As the public goods game
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mimics some features of governmental redistribution schemes, such as the
presence of a public good and the equal redistribution of this public good,
participants likely stereotype left-leaning individuals to be more cooperative.
Therefore, we expect participants to associate left-leanings with a higher level
of contribution.
Hypothesis 2 Subjects expect left-leaning individuals’ average contribution
to be higher than right-leaning individuals’ average contribution, i.e., β̂i > 0
1.5 Study 1
1.5.1 Experimental Design
For Study 1 we conducted two sessions with a total of 48 subjects. Most of
the participants were first-year bachelor students from various fields of study.
The sessions lasted for 90 minutes. The mean age was 20 years. Participants
received 10 CHF (Swiss francs) as a show-up fee in addition to the earnings
from the experimental tasks. We conducted our laboratory experiment at the
LABEX (HEC Lausanne). We recruited participants via ORSEE (Greiner
2015) and ran the experiment using zTree (Fischbacher 2007).
As reference data set for the “true” gender effect we use a subset of the
cross-cultural PGG data reported in Herrmann et al. (2008). We use only
the observations from subject pools that are culturally close to the subjects
in our laboratory.25 The observations in the reference data set stem from
subject pools with very similar socio-economic characteristics as the subject
pool in Lausanne. We will refer to this data set as RD1.
1.5.2 Results
In RD1, the average contribution of female participants in the first period of
the PGG was 11.99 (SD=6.27), and 12.23 (SD=7.07) for male participants.
Thus, the “true” gender effect for our experiment is β1 = −0.24, indicating
that males contribute slightly more than females. Relative to the possible
range of [−20, 20] the difference is small and, despite the large sample, does
not reach significance (p = 0.379, Wilcoxon rank-sum). This is in line with
the literature on gender effects in cooperation (Balliet et al. 2011; Thöni,
Volk, and Cortina 2020). Moreover, the predictive power of gender on the
25Overall, we have 688 observations: from Austria (68), Denmark (68), France (48),
Germany (156), Netherlands (84), Sweden (56) and Switzerland (208).
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contribution in the first period of the PGG is virtually zero (R2 = 0.0003) in
RD1. This means that an accurate stereotype is uninformative.
In Study 1, participants reported on average 11.64 for the female contri-
bution (SD = 2.19) and 12.48 for the male contribution (SD = 1.54).26 To
our surprise, we find no support for Hypothesis 1: Our point estimate for the
average stereotype between female and male contributions is close to zero
(−0.84). Qualitatively we find that 44.7 percent of the subjects think that
the female average contribution is higher than the male average, while 51.1
percent think the opposite, and 3.1 percent guess that the two are exactly
equal, which is very close to the true value of −0.24. We use a one sample
student t-test to test whether the distribution of the difference between the
female guess and the male guess (β̂i) is systematically different from zero.
The result indicates that the difference of guesses is not statistically different
from zero (t(46) = −0.27, p = 0.129).
Finding similar averages does, however, not necessarily mean that subjects
have accurate stereotypes. It could be that half of the subjects believe that
women are far more cooperative than men and half of the subjects think the
opposite is true.
Figure 1.4 shows a kernel density plot of the guesses and the true β1 as
observed in RD1 (vertical line).27 The density ranges from the lowest guess
(−7.04) to the highest guess observed in the data (6.37). The plot shows
that the guesses about the gender differences are approximately normally
distributed around the true value.
Given that the true β1 for gender differences is close to zero it is not
surprising that we do also not find significant differences between the guesses
and the true gender effect in cooperation. A t-test comparing the guesses to
the true gender effect results in t(46) = −1.104, p = 0.275.
While there is no systematic effect in gender stereotypes, there are still
stereotypes that are far off the true values to be found in the data. In order
to interpret the accuracy of the stereotypes, we compute the percentage
of participants within one standard deviation of the gender effect in the
26One subject entered a guess for the averages which is led to values of the opposite
gender outside of the admissible range (0 − 20). We dropped this outlier from the main
analysis. None of the qualitative results change if we include the outlier.
27All kernel density figures have the same bandwidth to facilitate comparisons between
the distributions. We choose a slightly smaller bandwidth than the one given by the Silver-
man’s rule of thumb (Silverman 1986) in Study 1 to equal the one in Study 2. Therefore,
our figures tend to be slightly under-smoothed.
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Distribution of gender stereotypes in cooperation
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Gender stereotype elicitation: guesses about the difference in contribution between female
and male subjects, the true difference (female contribution minus male one) from the
reference data (vertical line). Standard deviation from the reference data (vertical lighter
line). True β1 is the value from RD1. Mean β̂i and the percentages, above, equal, and
below 0, are statistics from Study 1. On the right side, the percentage of guesses within
the standard deviation of the reference data set.
Figure 1.4: Kernel Density - β̂i
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reference data set RD1 (shaded area in Figure 1.4).28 We find that a small
majority, 52%, of the subjects are within one standard deviation of the true
value.
To conclude, we find no evidence for our hypothesis that females are
expected to be more cooperative than males. Subjects’ guesses are on average
highly accurate, and a small majority of the subjects indicates a guess which
is very close to the true values (±1 SD).
We expected a gender stereotype in cooperation based on two premises:
participants associate women with “agreeableness”, and they associate agree-
ableness with higher cooperation. As we did not find support for a systematic
gender stereotype, we suppose that participants did not make one or both
of these associations. More precisely, they may not associate cooperative be-
haviors with personality traits, or they think that personality traits predict
better economic behaviors than gender and do not make assumptions regard-
ing the distribution of these personality traits among genders, i.e., they do
not think that females are more agreeable than males. This latter explanation
would be in line with Heckman et al. (2019) and Jagelka (2020), who show




Similar to Study 1, we recruited 48 student participants, all of which were
students of the University of Lausanne, mainly in the first year of a bachelor’s
degree. We ran two sessions of 90 minutes. The mean age was 19.6 years,
they received 10 CHF each as a show-up fee, and an extra payment depending
on their performance.
In Study 2, we (i) replicate the elicitation of gender stereotypes from
Study 1 and (ii) we investigate cooperation stereotypes in political orienta-
tion. For the latter, we use a new reference data set, which was generated
with the exact same subject pool at the University of Lausanne. The data
stems from the study of Kistler et al. (2016), who conducted a series of re-
peated public goods games. The reason for using a different reference data
28As the sample in reference data set is not balanced for gender, we compute the standard
deviation by bootstrapping one male and one female and matching them with each other
to obtain the standard deviation of their contribution for the first period of the public
goods game. We repeated the operation 100,000 times.
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set as for the gender stereotypes is twofold. First, the reference data set RD1
does not contain the variables for political leaning in all locations. Second,
as opposed to gender, political leaning is a much more elusive concept. The
notion of what constitutes left- and right-leaning depends importantly on
the political landscape of the country the subjects live in.29 They ran the
experiment in 2016 in the same location under very similar circumstances,
with a similar subject pool (we will refer to this as the reference data set
RD2, see Table A1.2 in the Appendix for summary statistics). As for the
experimental design, we kept the exact same setting as in Study 1 and added
extra stages to elicit the political stereotype. We elicit the political stereo-
type as follows: we ask subjects to indicate the average total contribution
of left-leaning or right-leaning individuals given the total average contribu-
tion. In our reference data, political orientation was measured on a 10-point
scale. Participants, in the reference experiment, were asked to indicate their
position on this 10 point left-right scale. Subsequently, we explained that
we classified subjects who entered a value between 1 and 5 as left-leaning,
and those who were between 6 and 10 as right-leaning. Similar to Study 1
the elicitation of political orientation stereotypes takes place in three steps.
In addition to the information about the reference data set, we provided a
screenshot of the exact political orientation question that participants of the
experiment for the reference data answered.
Furthermore, in Study 2 we asked participants to indicate what they be-
lieved was the morally fair contribution for the first period before starting to
play the actual public goods game. We mentioned that this question would
not earn them any ECU. We wanted to elicit the moral contribution to be
able to contrast the stereotype to a moral benchmark afterwards. The rest
is ceteris paribus as in Study 1.
1.6.2 Results
In Study 2, participants reported on average 11.81 for the female contribution
(SD = 2.64) and 12.36 for the male contribution (SD = 1.86). Our point
estimate for the average stereotype between female and male contributions
is −0.55. The difference between the guess for female and the guess for
male is not different from zero (t(47) = −0.84, p = 0.400) nor to the true
29In Lausanne at the time of the experiment, the executive was more left-wing, and
the same holds for the executive part at the cantonal level. For the legislative part,
the communal council was left-leaning whereas there was a right-leaning majority at the
cantonal level.
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value from RD1 (t(47) = −0.48, p = 0.631). We confirm the results from
Study 1. Qualitatively, we find that 39.6 percent think that female average
contribution is higher than the male average contribution, while 58.3 percent
think the opposite and 2.1 percent think that both genders contribute equally
(see Figure A1.5 in the Appendix for the distribution of the gender stereotype
in Study 2).
While we confirm the lack of systematic gender stereotypes, we find dif-
ferences with respect to political orientation. In RD2, left-leaning subjects
contributed on average 10.69 (SD = 6.78) in the first period of the PGG
whereas right-leaning subjects contributed 12.32 (SD = 7.15). Thus, the
“true” political effect for our experiment is β2 = −1.64 The difference be-
tween the two subgroups is significant (p = 0.023, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
In the same vein, the predicting power - R2 - of political orientation on the
contribution in the first period of the PGG is 0.0133 in RD2. Therefore, as-
suming the information about the members’ political orientation in a group is
available, an accurate stereotype will predict contributions somewhat better
than chance.
Participants reported on average 12.07 for left-leaning (SD = 1.98) and
10.25 for right-leaning subjects (SD = 3.62). We find support for Hypothe-
sis 2: our point estimate for the average political stereotypes is 1.82. Qualita-
tively, we find that 68.8% of the subjects think that the left-leaning average
is higher than the right-leaning average, 27.1% think the opposite, and 4.2%
think that right and left-leaning subjects contribute on average the same
amount.
We use a one sample student t-test to compare the distribution of the
difference between the left- and right-leaning subjects to zero.30 The result
indicate that the difference of guesses is statistically different from 0 (t(47)
= 2.25, p = 0.029). As the guesses systematically deviate from zero, we
can infer that on average, the left-leaning individuals are perceived as more
cooperative. Figure 1.5 shows a kernel density plot of the guesses and the
true β2 as observed in RD2 (vertical line). The guesses range from −13.26
to 12.90 in the data.
As in Study 1, we estimate the accuracy of the stereotypes. We find
that only 25.0% of the subjects reported a value close to the true value.31
30β̂2 is the parameter for the difference between the guess for the average left-leaning
contribution minus the guess for the average right-leaning contribution.
31The sample in the reference data set is politically unbalanced, therefore, we use the
same procedure as in Study 1 by bootstrapping one left-leaning subject and one right-
leaning subject. We repeated the operation 100,000 times.
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The cooperation stereotype about political orientation is fairly inaccurate
compared to our RD2 (t(47) = 3.71, p = 0.000). Bordalo et al. (2016) inves-
tigated political stereotypes and found that political stereotypes are exagger-
ated compared to true means and that they are mostly the consequence of
representative types. In politics, there is often an opposition of ideas, where
one group defends one idea and another one defends the opposite idea. In a
debate of ideas, the focus is on contradictions, which might exacerbate the
opposition. This could explain the systematic deviation in our data about
political stereotypes.
Distribution of political orientation stereotypes in cooperation
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Political stereotype elicitation: guesses about the difference (left-leaning contribution
minus right-leaning contribution) in contribution between left-leaning subjects and
right-leaning ones, the true difference from the reference data (vertical line). Standard
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Mean β̂i and the percentages, above, equal, and below 0, are statistics from Study 2. On
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data set.
Figure 1.5: Kernel Density - β̂i
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1.7 Additional analyses
In this section, we (i) explore the self-serving bias, (ii) elaborate on the
distribution of the stereotypes, and (iii) investigate priming effects of the
elicitation stages. For the following analysis we combine the data from Study
1 and 2.
1.7.1 Self-serving bias
We use our subject’s gender and political orientation as explanatory variables
for the stereotypes. A self-serving bias would occur if more participants rate
their in-group as more cooperative than their out-group, i.e., being a male
and thinking that males contribute more than females or being a female
and thinking that females contribute more than males. In Table 1.1 we
split the samples by gender and by which gender is believed to contribute
more. We find that gender and stereotypes about the gender contribution
are independent (p = 0.677, Fisher’s exact), suggesting that self-serving bias
is not an important determinant of gender stereotypes.
In group self-serving bias - Gender stereotypes
Self-serving bias Male Female
contribute more contribute more
Male participants 24 20
Female participants 30 20
Pearson chi2(1) = 4.69 Pr = 0.594
Fisher’s exact = 0.677.
Table 1.1: Contingency table
While neither male nor female participants rate their in-group systemati-
cally as more cooperative than the other group, we observe a self-serving bias
for the political orientation stereotypes (p = 0.044, Fisher’s exact). Table 1.2
reports the frequency distribution of the self-assessed political orientation of
the participants and the stereotypes about which group, between the left-
and the right-leaning, contributes more. While right-leaning participants
are balanced in who they think contributes more, left-leaning participants
tend to think that left-leaning people contribute on average more than the
right-leaning ones.
Next we investigate subjects’ views about the morally right contribution.
To our surprise, participants reported on average only 12.16 (SD= 6.30) as
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the moral contribution. This challenges the general assumption that coop-
erating is positively valued and thus also that rating your in-group as more
cooperative enhances your self-esteem. The moral reported contribution is
also a very significant predictor of the first period’s contribution (p = 0.000),
suggesting that participants play according to what they believe is the moral
contribution. The coefficient of correlation - R - between the moral bench-
mark and the contribution in the first period is 0.54. While these R co-
efficients differ slightly between left-leaning subjects and right-leaning ones
with 0.49 and 0.59 respectively, they differ much more across gender. While
the R coefficient for males reaches 0.70, it reaches only 0.32 for females.
Females/males or left/right-leanings moral benchmarks are not statistically
different. While we find that 41.67% of the participants contribute less than
their moral benchmark, 43.75% contribute the same amount, and 14.58%
contribute more than their moral benchmark. Interestingly, females and left-
leanings have the most important decrease between their moral benchmark
and their contribution in Period 1 with on average a decrease of 2.62 ECU
for females and 3.53 for left-leanings. This result is not explained by fe-
males or left-leanings reporting a systematic higher number than males or
right-leanings in the moral benchmark. For instance, left-leaning subjects
report a higher number for the moral benchmark and contribute less com-
pared to right-leanings, but females report a lower number and contribute
less compared to males. Finally, there is conflicting evidence regarding how
contribution is morally perceived. On one hand, the moral benchmark is on
average for each group higher than the contribution in Period 1. This sug-
gests that participants think that they should morally contribute more than
they do. However, on the other hand, the overall average moral benchmark
is far from the maximum possible contribution.
In group self-serving bias - Political orientation stereotypes
Self-serving bias Left leaning Right leaning
contribute more contribute more
Right-leaning participants 9 8
Left-leaning participants 24 5
Pearson chi2(1) = 4.69 Pr = 0.030
Fisher’s exact = 0.044.
Table 1.2: Contingency table
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1.7.2 Distributions of the stereotypes
The elicitation mechanism allows us to investigate the distribution of a stereo-
type on a group level. Aside from the graphical interpretation, the measures
from the normalized third, the skewness, and fourth, the kurtosis, moments
provide tools to study the group stereotype. Table 1.3 reports the kurtosis
and the skewness coefficients. We find that both guesses have a very similar
shape to a normal distribution and that they are relatively symmetric. The
skewness and the kurtosis coefficients for the normal distribution are 0 and
3, respectively. The first is a measure of symmetry and the second of the
distribution of probability mass around the center. Skewness and kurtosis
test for normality returns a p-value of 0.480 for the gender guesses and 0.067
for the political guesses, both above the 5% level that would allow us to
reject that they are normally distributed. On the other hand, we obtain a
p-value of 0.03 for moral reported contributions, thus rejecting the normal
distribution. In other words, participants reported guesses that are close to
each other possibly indicating that individual stereotypes might derive from
group stereotypes (Gilmour 2015; Le Pelley et al. 2010).
As observable in the density figures, the narrow shape and the symmetry
lead us to believe that these stereotypes do not have contradictory compo-
nents. An example of this would be that half of the participants highly
overestimate the level of cooperation of females, while the other half highly
underestimate it. However, we observe, that for the gender stereotype, most
of the participants indicated a very small either positive or negative stereo-
type. Participants assumed that the contribution rate of men and women
were almost equal. The distribution for the political stereotype also indi-
cates a shared stereotype even if this latter stereotype is mostly exaggerated
positively compared to the reference data value. As we did not provide any
baseline in the moral stage, the comparison with the stereotypes is rather spu-
rious. Nevertheless, we observe that what constitutes a moral contribution
is not shared among the participants.
1.7.3 Priming
Because participants played the public goods game after either only the gen-
der stereotype elicitation stage or the gender stereotype elicitation stage, the
political one, and the moral one, we investigate the effect of these stages on
the contributions in Period 1. These stages are unusual because we provide
participants with more information, i.e., we give them the average contribu-
tion amounts from previous experiments.
There is a vast literature related to the social identity theory, that in-
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Distribution statistics - Kurtosis and Skewness
Dispersion of N Skewness Kurtosis
Gender guesses 95 0.10 3.43
Political guesses 48 −0.66 3.70
Moral contribution 48 −0.11 1.89
We aggregated the data from both Study 1 and 2 for the gender kurtosis and skewness
coefficient.32
Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics
vestigates the salience of stereotypes and their influence on actual behavior
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Guimond et al. (2006) show that the identi-
fication to a social group leads to stereotyped behaviors attributed to this
group. Boschini et al. (2012) show that rendering a stereotype salient ac-
tivates behaviors accordingly, i.e., subjects, who identify themselves with a
social group comply with the stereotyped identity of the group. In a dictator
game experiment, they render salient the stereotype that females are more
altruistic than males and find that it increases gender differences in generos-
ity in the direction of the stereotype in a gender-mixed environment. More
recently, Cohn et al. (2015) show that the reinforcement of social identity
leads to stereotyped behavior. In their experiment, they show that rendering
salient the criminal identity triggers more stealing. They distinguish between
priming effects and social identity as participants that did not have the “crim-
inal identity”, i.e., who were not convicted, did not steal more after being
primed by stereotypes related to crime. This literature shows the interest in
investigating the activation of stereotypes in social interaction.
We test if women/men or left/right-leaning participants would contribute
in line with their guesses in Table 1.4. We use their reported guesses, their
gender, and their reported political orientation as explanatory variables for
their contribution in the first period. We classify participants according to
their belief about their average group contribution. If they think that their
group is on average a higher contributor than the opposite group, i.e., males
think males contribute more, we identify them as better contributors (BC).
On the contrary, if they think that their group contributes on average a
lower amount, we classify them as lower contributors (LC). In the current
experiment, participants had to indicate their gender and if they identify
themselves as left- or right-leaning, such that no option in between was pos-
sible. Therefore, BC and LC are mutually exclusive categories, but they are
also close to exhaustive unless the participant provided an equal value either
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for both gender or both political orientations.
If the activation of the stereotype is effective, we should observe that the
ones that believe they are better contributors to have a positive coefficient
and the ones that believe their in-group is a lower contributor to have a
negative coefficient. Therefore, the values of interests here are the signs of
the coefficients and their significance rather than the effect sizes. We observe
a significant coefficient for the political orientation but the sign does not go
in the expected direction for the BC. Therefore, unless the activation of the
stereotype is effective only for lower contributors, which is not supported by
other empirical findings as cited above, we do not find any evidence for the
activation of the stereotypes.
The lack of stereotype activation might be attributed to a low identifica-
tion with the group. In our experiment, participants knew neither the gender
nor the political orientation of the other members of their group. This has
two implications: the utility derived from identifying yourself to a group
might be lower and you might identify yourself less easily since you do not
know which attributes are present in your group. Furthermore, participants
might have imperfect self-knowledge regarding their political orientation, i.e.,
participants face uncertainty regarding either their preferences or how these
preferences are distributed on the left-right political continuum (Bénabou
and Tirole 2003). Since participants do not strongly identify with a political
group, they might comply less with the stereotyped behavior of this group.
We find support for this hypothesis as we observe that a substantial part of
the participants think they are politically close to the center, i.e., we find
that 39.6% of the participants chose either 5 or 6 on the 10-points Likert
scale left-right continuum. This suggests that some participants would not
fully self-identify as being left-leaning or right-leaning.
Still in line with the social identity theory, individuals gain utility from
behaving in a way to fit in or be accepted by other individuals. This often
results in behaviors close to the norms (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). We find
a significant lower mean contribution in Study 2 compared to RD1, from 12.1
on average to 9.56 (p = 0.011, Student’s t-test) and a marginally significant
lower contribution compared to RD2 from 11.3 to 9.56 (p = 0.095, Student’s
t-test).
As the subject pool is virtually the same between the current studies and
RD2, we compare the occurrence of high contributions (18 or more, 19 or
more, and 20) and low contributions (1 or lower, and 0) in the first period to
RD2 in Table 1.5. We find a decrease in the number of high contributions,
but no decrease in the number of low contributions. The coefficients are
already negative in Study 1, but become significant (p < 0.05) in Study 2. In
line with Fischbacher et al. (2001), most of the participants are conditional
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Investigation of priming effects on contribution amount in Period 1 from
the elicitation stages
Dependent variable: Contribution in Period 1
Study 1 Pooled Study 2 Pooled
In Group BC - Gender 3.690 −1.485
(2.387) (3.793)
In Group LC - Gender 4.180+ −1.095
(2.267) (3.781)
In Group BC - Political −10.469∗∗
(1.403)
In Group LC - Political −8.429∗∗
(1.612)
In Group BC - Both −0.761
(1.603)
In Group LC - Both 1.517
(1.622)
Constant 7.500∗∗ 11.667∗∗ 19.000∗∗ 10.310∗∗
(1.826) (3.658) (0.730) (1.111)
F -test 1.8 0.1 34.2 1.0
Prob > F 0.171 0.906 0.000 0.378
R2 0.016 0.002 0.114 0.017
N 48 96 48 96
Notes: OLS estimates. In-group BC refers always to participants that are members of the
group, either gender or political orientation and rated their in-group as better contributors.
In-group LC refers to participants that are members of the group and rated their in-group as
lower contributors. Both BC refers to participants who are in both groups: political and gender
and who rated their in-group as better contributors. Both LC refers to participants who are in
both groups: political and gender and who rated their in-group as lower contributors. All LC
and BC categories are dummy variables. Pooled indicates that data from Study 1 and Study 2
are combined. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001
Table 1.4: Priming for the 1st period
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cooperators, i.e., their contributions are based on others’ contributions. In
general, in the first period, there is normally no baseline. However, in our
experiment, we inform subjects about the average contribution in RD1 or
RD2. This likely serves as a reference point for the first period and may
trigger conditional behaviors. It also seems that displaying one baseline does
not shift significantly behaviors but two baselines do.
Investigation occurrences of extreme contributions
Contribution amount 20 19-20 18-20 0-1 0
Study 1 −0.018 −0.021 −0.043 −0.006 −0.022
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.004) (0.043)
Study 2 −0.122∗ −0.125∗ −0.126∗ 0.015 −0.001
(0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.021) (0.047)
Constant 0.289∗∗ 0.292∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.006 0.106∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.004) (0.016)
F -test 2.1 2.2 2.2 . 0.1
Prob > F 0.119 0.108 0.116 . 0.875
R2 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.000
N 456 456 456 456 456
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variables are dummies, 20 represent the occurrence of a contribution
of 20 tokens in the first period, 19-20 represent either 19 or 20, etc. Study 1 and Study 2 are also dummy
variables, they are compared to the dataset from Kistler et al. (2016). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 1.5: Contribution in the 1st period
Other possible channels can, as well, explain this shift, such as compliance
to norms33 or experimenter demand effect34 (see Zizzo 2010). Overall, our
experiment shows the implication of displaying a baseline to participants on
the cooperation level.
The presence of the moral elicitation stage in between might possibly
bias the contribution in the first period or at least bring noise. Therefore, we
cannot make strong inferences with respect to the shift we observe and the
provision of baselines.
33In the case study of organ donation, displaying that an important number of people are
already registered to donate their organs triggers more compliance. This effect is attributed
to the desirability to comply with the majority (see Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein (2008))
34By displaying the norm, we emphasize the experimenter expected behavior and par-
ticipants comply to it
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1.8 Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, our design differs from previous studies as we
provide participants with the combined average of both subgroups. Subjects
have information about the exact average and indicate a difference between
two subgroups rather than an absolute value. This information reduces the
possible overestimation bias that may occur when participants are not aware
of average contributions. As the kurtosis and skewness show, most of the
guesses are close to each other supporting this assumption. Nevertheless, the
presence of the confirmation stage, which highlights the guessed difference
of contribution between the groups, might reduce stereotypes, thus leading
to an underestimation of the stereotypes. Firstly, whenever we ask partici-
pants to quantify differences as opposed to asking them merely which group
contributes more, we complicate their task and this might affect their cogni-
tive process. Secondly, it is probably rare to be presented with both groups
estimated mean contributions at the same time, such that participants can
directly compare the two numbers.
Finally, our design allows us to compute the difference between the guesses
to quantify the size of the stereotype. As mentioned above, these numbers
are more likely to be underestimated. We observe that left-leaning individ-
uals are expected to contribute on average 9.10% more than right-leaning
ones and men are expected to contribute only 3.47% more than women.35
As mentioned in the introduction, the accuracy of a stereotype is composed
of two dimensions: the direction, qualitatively, and the intensity, quantita-
tively. In the literature, stereotypes are often accurate for the direction but
overestimated in the value, however, in Study 2 we observe both inaccuracies.
1.9 Conclusion
Investigating stereotypes is a useful proxy to understand our environment
and behaviors. For policymakers, the interest is twofold. Firstly, eliciting
stereotypes might help design more adequate public policies. Secondly, since
some stereotypes are socially undesirable, knowing their extent might help
policymakers to choose, which stereotype to focus on. In our experiment,
we introduce a novel design to elicit stereotypes. Our elicitation mechanism
35As shown by our analysis, this difference is significantly different from zero, which is
not the case for the gender stereotype. These percentages are the results of the differences
between the subgroups divided by the maximum contribution amount (20 in this public
goods game).
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allows us to infer the accuracy of the stereotype, qualitatively and quantita-
tively, but also to what extent do participants share this stereotype.
In this paper, we elicited different cooperation stereotypes and find that
gender is on average not associated with a higher or lower level of cooperation,
however, we find a perception gap between the political orientation and the
cooperation rate. We find that participants overestimate the contribution of
left-leaning individuals compared to the right-leaning ones. On top of that,
we find that gender and political stereotype in cooperation are on average
shared, as suggested by the distribution of the stereotypes.
In practice, individuals might choose their relationships based on these
stereotypes. The selection of the other members of your group is a relevant
factor in the public goods game since individual outcomes will depend highly
on other’s contributions. Therefore, if someone wants to maximize her profit
from cooperation, she will try to target the best cooperators. The observable
attributes of a group can have implications, such as leading to statistical
discrimination (Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972).
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1.10 Appendices
Summary statistics - The European data set - RD1
Country N % female Mean age Average contribution
Austria 68 45.6 24.4 13.5
Denmark 68 27.9 24.4 14.1
France 48 39.6 21.2 9.3
Germany 156 53.8 21.8 12.2
Netherlands 84 48.8 21.8 11.3
Sweden 56 26.8 24.3 14.9
Switzerland 208 36.1 21.1 11.2
Table A1.1: Descriptive statistics







Median split % right-leaning 60.4
Table A1.2: Descriptive statistics
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Stereotype elicitation: Stage 1 (gender stereotype)
[Translation from top to bottom :]
What do you think is the mean contribution of men and women in the first period
in the same experiment as the one explained in the instructions?
Before starting the experiment, we will ask you to answer questions. These are
estimations, no calculation is needed. In each one, you can gain up to 100 additional
points.
The closer you are to our data value, the more points you get. This value has been
collected by grouping the data of several European countries (detailed information are
present at the bottom of this page)
The payoff function is as follows:
If your answer equals the true value +/− 0.2, you get 10 points
If your answer equals the true value +/− 0.18, you get 20 points
...
...
And so on, if your answer equals the true value +/− 0.04, you get 90 points
Therefore if your answer equals the true value +/− 0.02, you get 100 points
If however, your answer is further than 0.2 units you will not gain any gain
Detailed information about our data
Total: 688 observations, Austria (68), Denmark (68), France(48), Germany(156),
Netherlands(56), Sweden(56), Switzerland (208)
All the data come from similar experiments to this one with students usually between 20
and 25 years.
go to the first question
Figure A1.1: Screenshot - Study 1 - Stage 1
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Stereotype elicitation: Stage 2 (gender stereotype)
[Translation from top to bottom]
Here is the mean contribution of women and men together from the data we collected in
several European countries:
The percent of men is the following:
The percent of women is the following:
The right side : with the information you will provide, we will be able to calculate the
other number according to the ration male/female
What do you think is the mean contribution of women in this kind of experiment?
the bottom: same as the page before with the detailed information about our data.
calculate
Figure A1.2: Screenshot - Study 1 - Stage 2
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Third step: confirmation to elicit the gender stereotype
Translation from top to bottom (only the dark grey part): Your
estimations are as follows:
13.00 for the women and
11.52 for the men. Do these values seem correct for you?
Red button: Change
Green button: OK
Figure A1.3: Screenshot - Study 1 - Step 3
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First step to elicit the political stereotype
Translation from top to bottom: what do you think is the mean
contribution of individuals leaning more towards the left and individuals
leaning more towards the right for the first period in the same experiment
as the one explained in the instructions.
The students had to answer the following question that you can see below.
Therefore if the person was between 1 and 5 we considered her left-leaning
and if she answered between 6 and 10 as right-leaning.
Like before you can gain up to 100 additional points for this question.
The closer you are to our data value, the more points you get. This value has
been collected by grouping the data of several experiments at the University
of Lausanne (detailed information are present at the bottom of this page)
The gain function is the following:
If your answer equals the true value +/− 0.2, you get 10 points
If your answer equals the true value +/− 0.18, you get 20 points
...
...
And so on, if your answer equals the true value +/− 0.04, you get 90 points
Therefore if your answer equals the true value +/− 0.02, you get 100 points
If however, your answer is further than 0.2 units you will not gain any gain
Detailed information about our data
Total: 336 observations from the University of Lausanne (students from the
UNIL and EPFL). All the data comes from similar experiments to this one
with students usually between 20 and 25 years in this LABEX.
The button: go to the second question
Figure A1.4: Screenshot - Study 2 - Step 1
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Distribution of gender stereotypes in cooperation - Study 2
true β1 = -0.24
 
mean βi = -0.55       
 
βi < 0,  58.3%
 
βi = 0,   2.1%
 
βi > 0,  39.6%
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Difference in contribution (female-male)
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.5000
Gender stereotype elicitation: guesses about the difference in contribution between female
and male subjects, the true difference (female contribution minus male one) from the
reference data (vertical line). Standard deviation from the reference data (vertical
lighter line). True β1 is the value from the European data set (RD1). Mean β̂i and the
percentages, above, equal, and below 0, are statistics from Study 2. On the right side,
the percentage of guesses within the standard deviation of the reference data set.
Figure A1.5: Kernel Density - β̂i
1.11 Supplementary material
The supplementary material includes additional analyses on data from non-
controlled environments.
We ran part of the experiment in classrooms once with Master and Ph.D.
students and once with Bachelor students. Therefore, the data could not
be used in the main paper but we still use it as a robustness check for our
stereotype elicitation mechanism. Both Figures S1.1 and S1.2 report data
taken in classrooms. We did not control for the understanding of the public
goods game but still explained the game and provided an incentive for the
answer. We paid 10 CHF (approximately 10 US dollars) to the person who
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provided the closest guess to the true average from our European reference
data set (RD1).
We find similar results as in Study 1. In both groups, the guesses are not
statistically different from 0 (t(48) = −0.48, p = 0.631 for Master and PhD
students, t(78) = −0.03, p = 0.975 for Bachelor students) nor to the true
value from RD1 (t(48) = −0.12, p = 0.904 for Master and PhD students,
t(78) = −0.41, p = 0.679 for Bachelor students). As we can observe, there
are some individual gender stereotypes. For instance, a difference in gender
contribution of more than 10 ECU denotes a belief that gender is rather a
good predictor of contribution. Nonetheless, we still end up, with an average
gender stereotype close to the true mean from our reference data, perhaps, a
brief illustration of the wisdom of the crowds (Surowiecki 2005).
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true β1 = -0.24
 
mean β1 = -0.02       
 
β1 < 0,  49.4%
 
β1 = 0,   0.0%
 
β1 > 0,  50.6%
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Difference in contribution
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.5000
Stereotype about a gender average contribution
Stereotype in contribution - N = 79
Gender stereotype elicitation: guesses about the difference in contribution between female
and male subjects, the true difference (female contribution minus male one) from the
reference data (vertical line). Standard deviation from the reference data (vertical lighter
line). Female, male, and true β1 are the values from RD1. Mean β̂1 and the percentages,
above, equal, and below 0, are statistics from Bachelor students in Lausanne. On the
right side, the percentage of guesses within the standard deviation of the reference data
set.
Figure S1.1: Kernel Density
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true β1 = -0.24
 
mean β1 = -0.32       
 
β1 < 0,  53.1%
 
β1 = 0,   2.0%
 
β1 > 0,  44.9%
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Difference in contribution
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.5000
Stereotype about a gender average contribution
Stereotype in contribution - N = 49
Gender stereotype elicitation: guesses about the difference in contribution between female
and male subjects, the true difference (female contribution minus male one) from the
reference data (vertical line). Standard deviation from the reference data (vertical lighter
line). Female, male, and true β1 are the values from RD1. Mean β̂1 and the percentages,
above, equal, and below 0, are statistics from Master and PhD students in Lausanne. On
the right side, the percentage of guesses within the standard deviation of the reference
data set.
Figure S1.2: Kernel density
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2 Chapter 2
Choice architecture in charitable
giving:
An experiment on nudging
Jason Wettstein
Abstract
I study the effect of changes in the choice architecture in charitable
giving. In an online experiment with 1,338 participants, respondents
decide if they want to donate a part of their experimental earnings to a
charity. Subjects are presented with a list of charitable organizations
to choose from. I investigate the effect of providing a short or long
list of charities to participants, either directly visible or with a drop-
down button, and compare donations to a control group where no list
was provided. I find that providing a list increases the proportion
of donors, but in contrast to previous research, attracts only small
donations. The list works as a nudge to increase donations at the
extensive margin, but crowds out the intrinsic motivation at the in-
tensive margin, resulting in no systematic change on the realized level
of donation. The comparison between the different list treatments
enables me to investigate the underlying process in the donation deci-
sion and I find that the shift in the propensity to donate is channeled
through emotions rather than by cognitive costs.
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2.1 Introduction
Charitable giving is a widespread phenomenon. In the USA, approximately
69% of the population donate or have donated to a charity at some point
in time.36 While this number reflects the popularity of this behavior, the
question of why people donate remains a subject of an academic debate.
Particularly puzzling are the underlying mechanisms that govern the decision
to donate.
This study investigates the influence of the choice architecture on the
donation decision. Choice architecture is a term introduced by Thaler and
Sunstein (2008) and refers to the different possible presentations of choices
to individuals and their influences on decision-making. First, I investigate
whether the provision of a list of charities increases donations. Second, if
the list increases donations, is the increase due to a lower cognitive cost or
by emotional arousal. I investigate this change in the choice architecture,
because previous results suggest that this change, while being close to a free
lunch for charities, may have substantial effects on donations. The previous
literature (Schulz et al. 2018) is, however, unable of identifying the causes of
the treatment effect.
In the experiment, participants decide whether they are willing to donate
part of their potential earnings from a set of previous tasks to a charity. In
the donation decision, they either have no charity proposed, a short or a long
list of charities, or a short or long list available using a drop-down button.
In this study, I investigate the effect of the treatment variations on three
dependent variables: (i) the propensity to donate (the extensive margin); (ii)
the amount donated (the intensive margin); (iii) and the realized level of
donation (the propensity times the amount).
According to the choice overload literature, a longer list, of 20 charities,
in contrast to a shorter list, of 4 charities, should lead to less donations. Ac-
cording to the strategic ignorance literature, the drop-down treatment should
mitigate the donation decision, as participants who do not want to donate
do not press the drop-down, such that they avoid the emotional arousal.
I find that the number of donors increases with the provision of a list.
However, the long list does not decrease the number of donors compared to
the short list of charities. Furthermore, the drop-down is only marginally
significant in mitigating the donation decision. Surprisingly the increase in
the number of donors with the provision of the list does not increase the re-
36See https://nonprofitssource.com/online-giving-statistics/
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alized level of donation. The explanation lies in the donation amount, which
decreases with the provision of the list. The results suggest that emotional
arousal plays a bigger role than the cognitive cost in explaining the treatment
differences on the propensity to donate. I also discuss the possibility that
the provision of the list may crowd out the intrinsic motivation to donate by
rendering the donation cognitively less demanding.
This research complements a growing literature with a focus on increasing
donations from individuals (A. Gneezy et al. 2010; Karlan and List 2007;
Meier 2007; Morgan and Sefton 2000). It also complements research linked
to charitable giving in online settings, either in connection with purchasing
behavior (McManus and Bennet 2011) or when effort provision was associated
with donation (Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2015). However, this study contrasts
a study by Schulz et al. (2018), who document a large increase in the number
of donors with the provision of a list of five charities. Unlike their study, the
list negatively affects the donation amount conditional on donating in the
present study. In short, while they show a large increase in the realized level
of donation, this study does not.
Finally, I bring evidence in favor of emotions as a trigger for the decision
to donate, but at the same time shed light on possible contextual differences
when changing the “choice architecture”. I find that facilitating the dona-
tion decision, at least in the online context, likely crowds out the intrinsic
motivation to donate.
2.2 Experimental Design
The data for this study comes from a large online study, which consisted of
several different experimental tasks.37 The design of the main experimental
tasks are reported in Kistler et al. (2017). They ran the experiment at three
distinct points in time (henceforth: waves) in August 2013, October 2017
and December 2017. They invited 4000 students to participate in the online
experiment from two different locations: the University of Hamburg and the
University of Magdeburg. A total of 1,338 students completed the online
experiment; 842 students from the University of Magdeburg and 496 from
the University of Hamburg. 52% of the participants were females and the
mean age was 24 years (SD = 4.00).
In this experiment, all the previous tasks mentioned above were incen-
37The participants played, in order, a public goods game, a property rights game, an
honesty elicitation game, a risk elicitation game, and finally the charity stage.
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tivized. For each task either a randomly picked group of participants or a
subject, depending on the task, received their/her earnings. Participants
knew that they could potentially earn a considerable amount, i.e., on aver-
age 400€ among those who received money. At the end of the online study,
participants passed through the charitable giving stage, which is split into
three distinct steps. This design intends to mimic reality. For instance, in
many online donation platforms or when making bank transfers, the deci-
sion is split in different steps. In the first step, participants had to indicate
whether they would be willing to donate parts of their potential earnings to
a charity. The first decision is binary (yes/no). In the second step, they had
to indicate the amount, conditional on having said “yes” in the previous step.
The two first steps are the same across treatments. In the third step the
experimenters implemented the following treatments:
• Control group
• Short list (List Short)
• Long list (List Long)
• Drop-down short list (DD Short, only in Wave 1 and 3)
• Drop-down long list (DD Long, only in Wave 2 and 3)
In this third step, only the presentation of the possible charities, to which
participants could donate, varies. In all treatments, no choice was enforced.
Participants could always specify a charity that was not listed. In the drop-
down treatments, the blank field to specify a charity of their choice was only
visible after clicking on the drop-down button. Moreover, participants did
not know whether they would have the short or the long of charities before
clicking on the drop-down button.
In the short list treatments, the participants could choose between four
major charities: WWF, Amnesty International, The Red Cross, Doctors with-
out borders (treatments List Short and DD Short). In the long list treat-
ments, they could choose among 20 charities. In addition to the charities
from the short list, the list contained a number of minor charities: UNICEF,
DKMS, Deutscher Tierschutzbund, Kinderhospiz, SOS Kinderdorf, Aktion
Kleiner Prinz, Terre des hommes, World Vision, Save the Children, Plan inter-
national, Welthungerhilfe, Kindernothilfe, adventiat, DGzRS, Transparency
International, Weisser Ring (treatments Long list and DD Long).38 The dif-
ference between the already displayed lists (List Short and List Long) and
38Some of the charities mentioned here operate only in Germany and therefore have
only a German name. The distinction between major and minor charities is artificial and
accounts for the amount of donation a charity receives each year.
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the drop-down treatments (DD Short and DD Long) was that participants
had to click to see the list. The participants saw the entire list, without
scrolling down in all the list treatments.39
After the donation decision, the experimenters implemented three extra
stages: trust in the charities, a cognitive reflection test, and the possibility
to opt-out.
At the time of the experiment, it was made sure that none of the charities
listed were involved in a scandal. Furthermore, trust questions to control that
the charities listed did not have an adverse effect were implemented. On a
4-points Likert scale, participants rated their trust in all the charities present
in the short list plus two extra ones from the long list: Terres des Hommes
and Deutscher Tierschutzbund.40
In addition to the charity question, participants also had to take the
cognitive reflection test (CRT, Frederick 2005). The CRT evaluates an indi-
vidual’s ability to revise an intuitive but wrong first answer with a correct
reflexive one. Intuition, which is also called System 1, is defined as a quickly
executed deliberation. A typical CRT question is: “A baseball bat and a ball
cost together 1.10 euros. The baseball bat costs 1 euro more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost (in cents)”. A subject who answers 10 cents
presumably relies more on fast heuristics, than a subject who comes up with
the correct answer (5 cents). After answering a set of three CRT questions,
subjects are classified as intuitive types if they provide a wrong answer 2 out
of 3 times (intuitive types).
At the very end of the experiment, subjects entered a stage where they
could reconsider their donation decision. The opt-out stage allowed partici-
pants that agreed to donate to a charity to modify the amount they intended
to donate. Screenshots of the experiment are shown in the appendices.
2.3 Hypotheses
A strict reading of the standard economic theory predicts no donation in an
anonymous environment like in this experiment. Thus in order to explain
donation from citizens, I need to assume some sort of social preferences.
A potential explanation for donations comes from the concept of pure
altruism. Pure altruists value the utility of other people positively. However,
39The experimenters specifically told participants to not use a smartphone, but, even if
they did, the exact same screen, as on computer, appeared.
40The experimenters asked the trust questions in Waves 2 and 3 in all treatments.
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under the neutrality hypothesis, pure altruists gain no additional utility from
transferring money themselves. For pure altruists government transfers to
others crowd out donations. In this theory, public funding, through lump-
sum taxes, is Pareto optimal and is the best possible choice for pure altruists.
According to this theory, donating to a private charity is puzzling.
Due to the lack of explanatory power of the theory of pure altruism, An-
dreoni (1989; 1990) introduces the concept of the warm-glow of giving. The
warm-glow hypothesis posits that utility is generated by the act of donating,
rather than the effect it has on the receiver’s utility. In short, giving brings
to the giver a sense of joy and satisfaction. These impure altruists, who may
be motivated both by pure altruism and by the warm-glow of giving, can
choose to donate to a private charity. This theoretical framework can also
explain the donation to inefficient charities. For instance, people might favor
an identifiable victim (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997) rather than giving to a
charity which would maximize the marginal return (MacAskill 2015). Over-
all, the warm-glow theory explains donations to private charity as well as
donations from impure altruists.
The warm-glow is mostly based on an intrinsic motivation to donate.
Since donating does not rely on any return from the receivers, it is not a
strategic decision. The utility of an agent comes solely from giving.
While the warm-glow theory focuses on the intrinsic motivation to donate,
there are also extrinsic motivations to donate. For instance, DellaVigna, List,
and Malmendier (2012) show that peer pressure increases donation and that
participants are concerned about their self-image, but care about the cost of
signaling (Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2013). Apart from norms and reputation,
people may also donate for purely financial reasons such as a tax reduction.
The donation decision is a function of both intrinsic and extrinsic moti-
vation. More precisely, a participant will donate if the utility she gets from
giving surpasses the cost, which could be cognitive and monetary. The util-
ity is derived from different sources - intrinsic and extrinsic - such as the
‘warm-glow”, signaling, peer pressure, and financial incentives.
The hypotheses I will forward all concern the extensive margin as em-
pirical findings from developmental psychology (Blake and Rand 2010; Liu
et al. 2016) and from a previous experiment on charitable giving (Schulz et al.
2018) suggest that the process governing the donation decision is different
for the decision to donate, “yes” or “no”, and for the amount.
The most extreme assumption of the warm-glow theory, where the utility
is generated merely by donating, predicts no difference between the treat-
ments. However, any relaxation of this assumption, such as impure altruists
with mixed motives - warm-glow and pure altruistic - predicts that the pres-
ence of the list of charities increases charitable giving as the agent has a lower
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cost - the transaction cost - to give to a charity and can still feel the joy of
giving. The lower cost increases the extrinsic motivation and the intrinsic
motivation is assumed to be unchanged.
The main hypothesis (H1) is essentially a replication of the surprisingly
large treatment effect documented by Schulz et al. (2018), who provide a list
of five charities and this list almost doubles the number of donors without
changing the mean amount conditional on donating. The list is a nudge41
that pushes participants to donate.
Hypothesis 1 Providing participants with a list increases charitable giving.
The list increases the number of donors and does not affect the donation
amount conditional on donating.
The design of the experiment manipulates two dimensions, the length
of the list and the visibility of the list with a drop-down button. The four
different treatments enable me to investigate the underlying mechanism. I
challenge two hypotheses giving different predictions regarding the length of
the list: cognitive cost (H2) and emotional arousal (H3). In other words, do
participants increase donations because it is easier or because the list triggers
an emotional response? The cognitive cost hypothesis predicts that the short
list will trigger the highest level of donation and that the long list will trigger
a choice overload for the participants, thus reducing the level of donations.
The emotional arousal hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts an increase in
the level of donations with the list visible vs. non-visible and, eventually, a
slight increase with a longer list as participants have a higher probability of
finding a charity that matches their preferences in the long list than in the
short list.
The cognitive cost hypothesis is based on the assumption that the pro-
vision of the list renders the donation easier. Put differently, it is less de-
manding, cognitively, to choose a charity than to think about one. However,
when participants have too many choices they need to engage in a reflection
to decide which charity to pick. The necessity to reflect discourages some
participants from donating. The short list reduces the opportunity costs,
which increases the extrinsic motivation to donate. This hypothesis is sup-
ported by empirical findings in consumer behavior. Gourville and Soman
(2005) and Iyengar and Lepper (2000) argue that having too many choices is
cognitively more demanding than having only a few. For instance, Iyengar
and Lepper (2000) find a strong decrease in the consumption of ice cream,
41see Thaler and Sunstein (2008)
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from 30% to 3%, when shifting from 6 flavors to 24. This burden of choice
reduces consumption and satisfaction. Chernev (2003) finds that a large set
of choices induces even less consumption when the subjects have no strict
preferences before choosing. Furthermore, Schwartz (2004) points out that
dissatisfaction is prevalent when too many choices are available, which, in
charitable giving, could be interpreted as a decrease in the impression of ef-
fectiveness. Intuitively, the burden of choice might act through two channels:
the impression of effectiveness and the difficulty to choose. One might have
the impression, when faced with too many charities, that picking one involves
not picking many others, but also, being rather ineffective, because there are
too many needs.
Hypothesis 2 Providing a short list will bring the highest increase in the
number of donations (extensive margin) and the long list leads to a lower
increase than the short list (List Short vs List Long and DD Short vs DD
Long). The relation between the number of charities (0, short, long) and the
density of donations has an inverted U-shape.
The emotional arousal hypothesis predicts that seeing the list triggers
donation, but does not predict, to the best of my knowledge, a decrease in
donations between the short and the long list. If anything, the longer the
list, the higher the probability of matching someone’s personal preferences.
Broadly speaking, the list is a reminder of the good you can do. Subjects
may associate the names of charities with concrete needs. The list is one step
down from abstract to concrete. Avoiding thinking about real needs might
be easier without a list than with a list, as it would probably even be harder
with pictures. The giver might have more warm-glow when he sees the list,
perhaps because the victims are easier to identify (Jenni and Loewenstein
1997). The list is assumed to increase the intrinsic motivation to donate. In
line with Kogut and Ritov (2005a), Kogut and Ritov (2005b), and Small et
al. (2007), I expect that when individuals experience an emotional response
they are more willing to donate or to be altruistic. The list might also nudge
participants to donate as they may want to reduce the cognitive dissonance
between how altruistic they perceive themselves to be and their actions.
In line with this hypothesis, the drop-down button is a means to avoid
the emotion triggered. If participants want to preclude themselves from the
thought of concrete needs, they can simply not click on the drop-down button.
Andreoni et al. (2017), Grossman (2014), and Grossman and van der Weele
(2017) show that participants who expect to be asked to make decision, can
strategically avoid the information or even avoid taking the decision. In the
drop-down treatments, I expect participants who do not want to donate to
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strategically avoid seeing the list. Therefore, these drop-down treatments
should mitigate the treatment effect of the list.
Hypothesis 3 Providing a list will increase donations. The length of the
list does not decrease the number of donors. Furthermore, the drop-down
treatment mitigates the treatment effect (List Long vs DD Long and List
Short vs DD Short)
Some of the features of the design, such as the CRT, the choices of the
charities, and the opt-out option, call for additional predictions.
In line with the choice overload literature, the inverted U-shaped pattern
should be more pronounced with participants that rely on fast heuristics.
Relying on fast heuristics is a way to preclude the use of the frontal cortex,
which is a strong energy consumer. Intuition is less demanding as it is faster
and because the provision of a list demands less effort to the participants,
those who tend to succumb to fast heuristics should respond more strongly
to the treatment variation.
Participants could also specify a charity of their choice, but the provision
of the list should increase the crowding-out effect of charities not listed. Fol-
lowing the same logic as above, finding a charity, not in the list, is cognitively
demanding and the longer the list the more effort it requires to find a charity
name that is not on the list. Charities that do not make it on the list have
a very low chance of being chosen. Both the CRT and the crowding out of
charities not listed are a replication of the study by Schulz et al. (2018).
Finally, the opportunity to opt-out at the end of the experiment offers the
participants the possibility to revise the donation decision. In the opt-out
stage, participants do not face the list of charities. Therefore, if participants
felt forced to donate in the donation stage, they have the opportunity to opt-
out, and without the list, they can preclude themselves from thinking about
concrete needs. Since participants have social preferences and altruistic types
should be equally prevalent in the no-list condition and the list conditions,
the extra donors nudged by the “choice architecture” (Thaler and Sunstein
2008) in the list conditions should change their decision to donate. Therefore,
I expect that more participants in the list conditions opt-out compared to
those in the no-list condition.
2.4 Results
The charitable giving stage takes place at the end of a larger experiment,
which consists of several tasks. I need to check whether the randomization
into treatments of the charity stage succeeded. In Table 2.4, I report the
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p-values from a multinomial logistic regression. I elicit social preferences by
the behaviors of the participants in the previous tasks. I also compute their
payoff or their expected payoff as they sometimes did not receive payoff feed-
back (indicated by E in the table). The category “Other” in the table is
self-reported by the participants or coded by the experimenters. Social pref-
erences, payoff, all tasks, and “other” are separate multinomial regressions to
avoid possible confounds. As suggested by most of the reported p-values, the
randomization succeeded (for further analyses on the randomization check,
see section 2.7.1 in the supp. material).
Randomization check
Long List Short List
Short List Long List Drop-down Drop-down
Social Pref.
Risk-taking 0.199 0.053+ 0.176 0.142
Probability to lie 0.504 0.333 0.000∗∗ 0.305
Contributing 0.828 0.206 0.046∗ 0.012∗
Property game - Steal 0.849 0.097+ 0.433 0.291
Property game - Plant 0.198 0.071+ 0.609 0.126
Payoff
PGG E(Payoff) 0.813 0.945 0.143 0.058+
Risk game payoff 0.051+ 0.060+ 0.513 0.398
Honesty game payoff 0.898 0.339 0.479 0.301
PG E(Payoff) 0.398 0.288 0.832 0.269
All Tasks Expected Payoff 0.385 0.660 0.202 0.073+
Other
Location 0.543 0.150 0.160 0.981
Female 0.855 0.711 0.208 0.683
Survey Wave 0.955 0.332 n.a. n.a.
This table reports the p-values given by a robust multinomial regression. The dependent
variable is each treatment compared to the control group. The categories: social prefer-
ences, payoff, all tasks and other are independent multinomial logistic regressions. N.a.
indicates that these cases are ruled out by design, i.e, drop-down treatments are only run
in some waves. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.1: Multinomial logistic regression on each treatment - base: Control
group
I observe that in the baseline treatment 36.4 percent of respondents de-
cided to donate some of their earnings, while in the four list treatments, on
average 47.0 percent of respondents donated to a charity. The difference is
significant (p < 0.01). All the p-values in this section are the results of Wald-
tests in OLS models. Figure 2.1 shows the increase in the extensive margin
in all the treatments compared to the control group.
75
The propensity to donate - Extensive margin
000
054 018
The y-axis is the fraction of participants that decide to donate to a charity. The p-values
indicated between each bar are the result of a two-sided Fisher exact test.
Figure 2.1: Bar charts - Binary decision to donate
However, the donation amount conditional on donating shifts, signifi-
cantly (p < 0.05), from 25.88% in the control group to 20.65% in treatments
with the list. Figure 2.2 shows the decrease in the amount, the intensive
margin, conditional on donating.
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The y-axis represents what percentage of potential earnings in the previous tasks a par-
ticipant is willing to give conditional that she agreed to donate. The p-values indicated
between each bar are the result of a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
Each bar displays the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2.2: Bar charts - Donation amount conditional on donating
For the regression analysis, I pool the data from all waves and both
locations.42 In Table 2.2 the dependent variable is either the binary decision
to donate (Donate), the donation amount conditional on donating (Amount),
or the realized level of donation, which is the propensity to donate times
42I use OLS in my regression tables to interpret coefficients. Alternatively, I tested the
hurdle model with two tiers proposed by Cragg (1971), plus tested a logistic regression for
the binary decision to donate and a truncated model for the amount, all produce equivalent
significance levels with less interpretable coefficients.
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the amount (Aggregate).43 The main coefficient of interest, list44, is always
positive and significant (p < 0.05) for the binary dependent variable donate.
This means that the number of donors increases. However, at the same time,
the main coefficient of interest is always negative and significant (p < 0.05)
for the donation amount conditional on donating. Note that the test for joint
significance of the regression “Amount” is insignificant, suggesting a possible
type I error. However, in simpler linear regressions controlling independently
for the different treatments, the test for joint significance is significant (p <
0.01). This suggests either a confound or an under-powered study. Therefore,
the results of the list on the amount donated conditional on donating should
be taken with caution. Assuming this is due to a lack of power, the double
effect, propensity times the amount, sums as virtually no difference in the
realized level of donation (Aggregate). The lack of an overall effect casts
some doubt over the strong results reported in Schulz et al. (2018). This
means that charities should not take it for granted that the list treatment
increases donations. To conclude, I find no evidence in favor of H1, that the
list increases donations.
As the number of donors is substantially higher in Wave 3 and as the
donation decision takes place at the end of some other tasks, apart from the
randomization checks, I run separate analyses per waves and per location
and find that results are robust with respect to these extra analyses (see
supplementary material, Tables S2.1, S2.2, S2.3, and S2.4).
I check whether the trust in the charitable organizations explains dona-
tions and find that trust in the charitable organization was positively cor-
related with the decision to donate and the donation amount.45 Moreover,
on average the trust in the charities was relatively high with means ranging
from 2.85 to 3.34 on a 4-points Likert scale. Therefore, I can partially rule
out the possibility that a charity in the list produced an adverse effect.
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of amounts conditional on donating. In-
43The different regressions are heteroskedasticity-robust. Due to the low number of
possible clusters, I do not cluster standard errors per waves and locations. According to
Cameron and Miller (2015), the minimum number of clusters should be 20 for this option
to be reliable. However, I still include wave and locations fixed effects which captures most
of the variability across clusters.
44This dummy variable identifies all treatments with a list: Short List, Long List, DD
Short, and DD Long.
45For instance, the coefficients of correlations - R - with the binary decision to donate
are from 0.08 to 0.17 for charities in the short list and from 0.08 to 0.25 for the charities
in the long list.
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Extensive Margin, Intensive Margin & Aggregate
Dependent variable: Donate Amount Donate Amount Aggregate
List 0.108∗∗ −5.483∗ 0.093∗ −5.239∗ −0.011
(0.039) (2.508) (0.041) (2.614) (1.425)
Long list 0.029 −0.748 0.060 −1.226 0.657
(0.031) (1.570) (0.043) (2.136) (1.348)
Long list x Drop-down −0.065 1.034 −0.855
(0.063) (3.112) (1.946)
Drop-down −0.061+ 1.538 −0.029 1.011 −0.151
(0.033) (1.666) (0.045) (2.424) (1.440)
Wave 2 0.056 −2.466 0.064+ −2.602 0.326
(0.036) (2.015) (0.037) (2.048) (1.171)
Wave 3 0.097∗∗ −0.884 0.100∗∗ −0.949 1.927+
(0.035) (2.010) (0.035) (2.037) (1.165)
Location 0.057∗ −1.639 0.057∗ −1.653 0.397
(0.029) (1.431) (0.029) (1.432) (0.894)
Female (dummy) 0.009 −0.347 0.010 −0.357 0.024
(0.027) (1.464) (0.027) (1.468) (0.880)
Constant 0.293∗∗ 27.717∗∗ 0.289∗∗ 27.797∗∗ 8.569∗∗
(0.037) (2.836) (0.037) (2.864) (1.443)
F -test 4.1 1.3 3.7 1.2 0.5
Prob > F 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.324 0.839
R2 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.019 0.003
N 1,336 599 1,336 599 1,336
Notes: OLS estimates. I used a two-tiered model which consists of a binary decision to donate at the first
level and a given amount at the second level. All the independent variables are dummy variables. Long list
is a dummy indicating the long list feature (in List Long & DD Long treatments), Drop-down stands for the
drop-down feature (in DD Short & DD Long treatments), Long-list x Drop-down controls for the interaction
of the long list and the drop-down feature. The column aggregate is the decision times the amount. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.2: OLS estimates
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terestingly, it shows that the median donor shifts, significantly, her donation
from 25% of her potential earnings in the no-list condition to 20% in the list
conditions (p < 0.05).46
The distribution of amount - Intensive margin - List and no-list conditions
Mean amount - List: 25.88
 
Mean amount - No-list: 20.66
 
Median amount - List: 25
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The grey dashed line represents the control treatment where no list was provided. The
vertical dash grey line is the median amount donating conditional on donating. The black
line groups all treatments in which the list was provided. The vertical black line is the
median of the list treatments. The bandwidth of these kernel density figures is computed
using the Silverman’s rule of thumb (Silverman 1986).
Figure 2.3: Kernel density plot - The donation amount conditional on donat-
ing
This suggests that the treatment variation affects the propensity to do-
46I run a quantile regression with the quantile at 0.5. The dependent variable is the
donation amount conditional on donating and the independent variable is the dummy
variable, list, which indicates the presence or absence of the list.
80
nate, but attracts only small donations. This is in line with Altmann et al.
(2019) who find similar results in a comparable setting. They find that pro-
viding default options for the amount does not increase the realized level of
donations. Their results and this study challenge previous empirical evidence
that the donation decision is governed by two processes, one for the binary
decision and one for the amount donated.
The length of the list, as identified by the “Long List” dummy variable in
Table 2.2, produces a significant difference on neither the extensive nor the
intensive margin. This result does not support the cognitive cost hypothesis.
I thus reject H2.
On the other hand, Figure 2.1 shows the increase in the extensive margin
and at the same time no significant difference between the short list and the
long list treatments. This is in line with the predictions on the emotional
arousal. Moreover, as Table 2.2 shows, the drop-down treatments produce
a slight decrease, albeit marginally significant(p < 0.1), in the number of
donors. I find evidence to confirm H3.47
As mentioned in the hypothesis, additional explanatory variables of the
design allow me to investigate further hypotheses. I expected participants
that rely on fast heuristics to be more sensitive to the treatment variation. I
report in Table 2.3 the effects of the treatment variation on deliberative par-
ticipants, which were participants who reported 2 out of 3 correct answers in
the CRT. I include interactions with the deliberative dummy and a dummy
variable for the missing CRTs. Missing CRTs could be the sign of very dili-
gent participants, that do not want to give wrong answers or of very lazy
participants that do not bother to answer.
As Table 2.3 shows, the results are not in line with the prediction and are
even qualitatively the opposite.48 In this table, the independent variables are
47Unfortunately, the number of times someone clicked on the button was only recorded
for the long list drop-down treatment but not for short list drop-down treatment. Indeed,
all the participants that donated clicked, as this is a prerequisite. From further analyses,
once they clicked, they are slightly more willing to donate and donate slightly more com-
pared to the long list treatment without the drop-down. This would suggest that clicking
on the drop-down button nudge participants to donate more. Since there is no significant
difference between these two treatments when I do not restrict to participants that clicked
on the button, it would suggest that some participants strategically avoid the donation de-
cision by not clicking. Nonetheless, I believe there are other reasons for not clicking which
are difficult to disentangle from the strategic avoidance one, such as laziness or rush.
48If I include the control variables, the only marginal significant effect vanishes, as the
control variables are correlated with the deliberative variable and capture part of the effect.
In the dataset, the variable men and deliberative are correlated which shows that a higher
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the same as in Table 2.2. Schulz et al. (2018) find that deliberative partici-
pants are less sensitive to the provision of the list. However, the interaction
with the list tends to show the opposite, although not significantly, to their
result.
Cognitive Reflection Test
Dependent variable: Donate Amount Donate Amount
List 0.105∗∗ −5.266∗ 0.094 −8.753+
(0.039) (2.507) (0.077) (5.194)
Long list 0.040 −0.997 0.007 3.256
(0.031) (1.529) (0.060) (2.642)
Drop-down −0.032 1.512 −0.055 3.530
(0.031) (1.536) (0.060) (2.742)
deliberate 0.050 0.993 0.012 0.411
(0.031) (1.608) (0.069) (5.345)
deliberate x List 0.011 4.555
(0.090) (5.944)
deliberate x Long list 0.047 −6.094+
(0.070) (3.196)
deliberate x Drop-down 0.032 −2.396
(0.070) (3.274)
CRT missing −0.153 41.216
(0.184) (28.534)
Constant 0.325∗∗ 24.955∗∗ 0.355∗∗ 25.409∗∗
(0.038) (2.480) (0.061) (4.821)
F -test 3.9 1.9 2.2 2.0
Prob > F 0.004 0.112 0.026 0.048
R2 0.011 0.014 0.013 0.037
N 1,336 599 1,336 599
Notes: OLS estimates. I used a two tiers model that consists of the first tier as the binary
decision to donate and the second to the amount donated. I do not include control variables in
this regression. As mentioned, I classify a participant as deliberative if she gave two or more
correct answers in the CRT. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01.
Table 2.3: OLS estimates
proportion of men are deliberate compared to women, but this is not my concern here. My
focus is on the deliberative characteristic and not on its distribution among the gender.
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In a similar vein, U. Gneezy et al. (2009) find, in a review of the litera-
ture, that, while females and males are equally prosocial on average, female
subjects are more sensitive to changes in the context. I test gender effects
and interactions with the treatments in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. I find that both
genders are equally prosocial. However, I find no interaction on the extensive
margin between gender and the treatments variations and only a marginally
significant (p < 0.1) interaction effect on the intensive margin. In particu-
lar, I find that female subjects react more strongly to the list and the long
list treatments than male subjects. The effect is robust only for the long
list when I control for deliberative participants. These results should be
considered with caution since the tests for joint significance are marginally
significant or insignificant.49 Along the same line, DellaVigna, List, Mal-
mendier, and Rao (2013) also find no particular gender effect on donation
decisions but find that women donate less when they can strategically avoid
being asked. However, the point estimates of the interaction between the
drop-down and the female dummy have mixed signs (Female x Drop-down),
suggesting that female subjects do not strategically avoid the ask to donate
more than male subjects.
Along the same lines, I test whether social preferences predict donation
decisions and whether there are heterogeneous responses to the treatment
variations. I inferred participants’ social preferences based on their behav-
iors in the experimental tasks they played before the charitable giving stage.
In particular, I inferred participants’ propensity to lie, to steal, to protect,
their cooperative behavior, and their risk preference. I find that, indeed,
social preferences matter for the donation decision. I find that the number
of donors and the amount they donate is slightly higher among those who
contributed more in the public goods game before the charitable giving stage.
Furthermore, those who have a higher tendency to lie and steal, donate less
often, and when they do, they donate a lower amount, albeit the effect is only
either marginally significant or insignificant. However, I essentially find no
heterogeneous responses to the treatment variations when testing interactions
between treatments and social preferences. Among the few significant results,
I find an interaction between the tendency to take risks and the drop-down
treatments (p < 0.05) and a marginally significant interaction between con-
49As there are slightly more intuitive women than men, I control that the effect was not
explained by this characteristic. While, in the long list treatments, the marginal increase
in the donation amount is robust to this extra specification, the effect is not robust in the
short list treatments.
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The propensity to donate - Extensive margin - Investigation of gender
interations
Dependent variable: Donate: yes = 1, no = 0
List 0.107∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.100+
(0.040) (0.052) (0.040) (0.040) (0.057)
Long list 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.029 0.027
(0.031) (0.031) (0.043) (0.031) (0.044)
Drop-down −0.052 −0.052 −0.052 −0.045 −0.041
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.043) (0.045)
Female (dummy) 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.013 0.002
(0.027) (0.060) (0.035) (0.035) (0.060)
Female x List 0.007 0.015
(0.067) (0.079)
Female x Long list 0.006 0.005
(0.056) (0.061)
Female x Drop-down −0.015 −0.021
(0.056) (0.061)
Wave 2 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Wave 3 0.094∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Location 0.057∗ 0.057∗ 0.057∗ 0.057∗ 0.057∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant 0.294∗∗ 0.297∗∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.297∗∗
(0.038) (0.046) (0.039) (0.040) (0.046)
F -test 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.6
Prob > F 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004
R2 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
N 1,334 1,334 1,334 1,334 1,334
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is always the binary decision to donate. Apart from those
dummy variables for the treatment variation, I include the female dummy and the interactions with the
different treatments. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.4: OLS - Gender interaction
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The donation amount - Intensive margin - Investigation of gender
interations
Dependent variable: Amount donating (in percentage of potential earnings)
List −5.520∗ −8.789∗∗ −5.428∗ −5.478∗ −7.818∗
(2.249) (2.993) (2.246) (2.251) (3.235)
Long list −0.794 −0.817 −3.399 −0.829 −2.690
(1.601) (1.599) (2.246) (1.603) (2.338)
Drop-down 1.364 1.320 1.243 0.386 1.255
(1.727) (1.725) (1.726) (2.362) (2.435)
Female (dummy) −0.318 −5.703 −2.423 −1.046 −5.723
(1.475) (3.577) (1.948) (1.901) (3.580)
Female x List 6.444+ 4.659
(3.901) (4.494)
Female x Long list 4.858+ 3.505
(2.941) (3.190)
Female x Drop-down 1.803 −0.020
(2.969) (3.185)
Wave 2 −2.374 −2.314 −2.214 −2.356 −2.215
(1.986) (1.983) (1.985) (1.987) (1.986)
Wave 3 −0.810 −0.661 −0.643 −0.753 −0.582
(1.903) (1.902) (1.902) (1.906) (1.906)
Location −1.572 −1.575 −1.471 −1.594 −1.501
(1.512) (1.509) (1.511) (1.513) (1.512)
Constant 27.754∗∗ 30.405∗∗ 28.668∗∗ 28.105∗∗ 30.327∗∗
(2.253) (2.764) (2.317) (2.328) (2.767)
F -test 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.5
Prob > F 0.133 0.085 0.085 0.175 0.130
R2 0.019 0.023 0.023 0.019 0.025
N 598 598 598 598 598
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the donation amount conditional on donating. Apart from those
dummy variables for the treatment variation, I include the female dummy and the interactions with the different
treatments. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.5: OLS - Gender interaction
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tributing in the public goods game and the list treatments (p < 0.1). Both of
these interactions are solely significant for the donation amount conditional
on donating and the point estimates are negative. In other words, those who
tend to take risks donate less when they are in the drop-down treatments
and those who contributed more in the public goods game also donate less
when they are in a treatment with a list. Risk-takers might donate less in the
drop-down treatments because of a lower emotional sensitivity (Nicholson et
al. 2005). This explanation is in line with H3. As for those who contributed
more in the public goods game, they might be more intrinsically motivated
to donate, i.e., more than the lower contributors, and when they face the
list, it withdraws more of their intrinsic motivation. I discuss this hypothesis
in Section 2.5. I report the methodology for eliciting the behaviors in the
supplementary material in Section 2.7.1, the regression outputs testing social
preferences in Tables S2.6 and S2.5, and the tests for interactions in Tables
S2.7 and S2.8.
The presence of the list increases the crowding out of charities not listed.
Figure 2.4 shows the percentage of participants that choose a charity that
was in either the short or the long list. I control that this shift could not
be explained by the set of choices and this is partially the case, but the
differences remain very significant (p < 0.01).50 The crowding out effect of
charities not listed is likely explained by the fact that the charities in the list
conditions are the most well-known and it probably becomes difficult to find
another charity name.
50i.e., subjects, in the short list, entering a charity name that is in the long list, or
subjects, in the control group, entering a charity that is in the short or long lists.
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Control List Short List Long DD Short DD Long
Only in the long list In the short list
The grey bars represent the charities that were in the short list and were chosen by
participants. The black bars represent those that were in the long list. As the long list
contains the names of the charities in the short list, the grey bars always overlap the
black bars. The density of choices is conditional on donating.
Figure 2.4: Bar charts - Choice of a charity
At the end of the experiment, participants had the opportunity to opt-
out of their charitable decision. This stage was exempt from anything that
would trigger an emotional arousal. Therefore, I expected that those that
were nudged by the list would modify their donation decision. I find that
10.3% of the participants who decided to donate revise their amount by
reducing the amount they intended to give by 7.46% (p < 0.05, paired t-test)
on average. Nevertheless, there is no difference across treatments. I do not
observe significant differences in the opt-out stage between participants in
the no-list condition and the list-conditions. In other words, participants
possibly nudged by the list mostly stick with their previous choice. This
is likely explained by the will to avoid cognitive dissonance or because it
demands less reflection to not change the amount they intended to give.
Overall, the results suggest that cognitive cost is not the dominant mech-
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anism in the binary decision to donate to a charity, but that the shift in the
number of donors is mostly explained by the emotional arousal provoked by
the list.
2.5 Discussion
In this experiment, I observe a backlash of using the nudge. By providing
a list and therefore, shaping part of the decision, the donation amount con-
ditional on donating decreases. The “warm-glow” theory states that it is
intrinsic motivation that leads individuals to donate. As participants donate
less, the provision of the list likely reduces their intrinsic motivation. The
list likely renders donating cognitively easier but also crowds out the intrin-
sic motivation. Back in the 70s, Deci (1976) investigated the negative effect
of external changes. He developed the theory of the hidden cost of rewards
and showed that intrinsic motivation can be undermined by external rewards.
More recently, Frey and Jegen (2001), reviewed the motivation crowding out
theory51 and emphasized two linked effects in principal-agent settings, the
relative price effect having an impact on the crowding out of intrinsic mo-
tivation. In general terms, a higher extrinsic motivation, such as a higher
wage, can diminish intrinsic motivation. Intuitively, if an external change
reduces the effort an individual needs to put into accomplishing a task, then
the intrinsic motivation is no longer necessary. I postulate that a change in
the choice architecture, with the provision of the list, is an external modifi-
cation that simplifies the donation decision, at least cognitively. Therefore,
the intrinsic motivation to donate is cut back.
Frey and Jegen (2001) also reviewed the existence of two channels that can
undermine intrinsic motivation. Both are due to extrinsic control. The first
channel, the impression of control, impairs subjects’ self-determination. The
“choice architecture” possibly displays a willingness to control the decision of
the participants. As, the locus of control shifts from inside - the participant -
to outside - the experimenter - the subjects reduce their intrinsic motivation.
The second channel, it decreases subjects’ self-esteem. Due to the im-
pression of being controlled, subjects perceive that their motivation is under-
valued.
In both processes, the impression of being controlled is a key factor, and
the provision of the list of charities is in line with these findings. Falk and
Kosfeld (2006) confirm in a principal-agent setting the cost of control. They
51This theory is related to the cognitive evaluation theory, see Deci and Ryan (1985).
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find that the increase of control decreases the effort the agents put into a
task. Control is interpreted as a signal of distrust and therefore undermines
intrinsic motivation. Along the same lines, the provision of a list of charities
could be interpreted as pushing participants into a quasi forced donation,
which would reduce their intrinsic motivation.
My results support the findings of a relative dependence between intrin-
sic and extrinsic motivation. The overall results indicate that an increase
in extrinsic motivation leads to a crowding out of intrinsic motivation. As I
observe no difference at the realized level of donation, one might suggest that
the increase in the extrinsic motivation is approximately equal to the decrease
in the intrinsic motivation. However, this does not mean that the lower cost
of choosing a charity compensates for the decrease of intrinsic motivation.
There might be other extrinsic mitigating factors. For instance, DellaVigna,
List, and Malmendier (2012) show that peer pressure increases donations
and that participants are concerned about their self-image, but care about
the cost of signaling (Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2013). Since, I do not con-
firm the findings of Schulz et al. (2018), that the list increases donations, I
suppose that the online context might undermine the extrinsic motivation
compared to the offline context in their experiment. It could be that the will
to enhance one’s self-image is not sufficient to compensate for the crowding
out of intrinsic motivation. In this online setting, participants, although not
anonymous, might perceive their signaling to be too costly compared to the
same payoff for their self-image in a face-to-face context. In short, I assume
that participants’ intrinsic motivation is reduced by the increase in extrinsic
motivation. Nevertheless, in contrast to Schulz et al. (2018), who observe
that the increase in extrinsic motivation does not produce a significant de-
crease in intrinsic motivation, in this online context, the will to enhance the
self-image is likely insufficient to compensate for the decrease of intrinsic mo-
tivation. I find support for this hypothesis in Grossman (2015) and Tonin
and Vlassopoulos (2013), who experimentally manipulate the cost of signal-
ing to enhance the self-image possible payoff and investigate the impact on
giving. They find that donation is correlated with the self-image. In this
nudge experiment, the motivation to appear altruistic is already undermined
by the context. Moreover, they implemented an architectural change that
might induce an appearance of control. Thus, it is possible that it becomes
even more costly to enhance one’s self-image. Donating, from an external
standpoint, could be attributed to the architectural change rather than an
89
altruistic act.52 Finally, I confirm previously cited findings that the donation
decision is influenced by intrinsic, but also extrinsic motivation.
Before closing the discussion, I shall mention limitations. In this experi-
ment, I cannot preclude that the cognitive cost plays a role in the propensity
to donate, but it remains marginal with respect to the emotional response as
I do not observe the decrease in donation expected in the long list treatments.
Moreover, a between-subjects design offers limited information regarding the
motivation behind the donation decisions. For instance, it does not allow
me to investigate the constituting elements of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation,
such as the respective weights of improve self-image or to feel the warm-glow
of giving.
52I postulate here a possible interaction of the treatment with the online context, which
would be channeled through the motivation to increase one’s self-image. In general terms,
the signaling is even costlier in the list treatment and this might not be the case in face-
to-face interactions.
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Finally, this experiment has important external validity as the context is
highly similar to online platforms. The generalization of the results might
be limited quantitatively due to the subject pool which consists only of stu-
dents, but not limited qualitatively. Quantitatively, it remains possible that
students have a different propensity to donate compared to the general pop-
ulation. For instance, students might have lower wages and thus donate less
or they might be more sensitive to donations and, thus donate more. These
concerns are solely on the level of donation, but not the qualitative effect of
the treatment variations. Firstly, according to Druckman and Kam (2011),
students do not intrinsically pose a problem for the external validity of ex-
perimental inferences. Secondly, since this study focuses on the treatment
variation, only an interaction between the subject pool and the treatment
variation would bias the results. There seems no obvious reason why stu-
dents should differ in their reaction to treatment variations discussed in this
study.
Another aspect of the external validity is that online charitable donations
are substantial and growing, 15% in 2016 and 17% in 2017.53 However, with
respect to policy implications I bring disappointing news. The provision
of a list, although increasing the number of donors, likely crowds out the
intrinsic motivation to donate resulting in virtually no effect on the realized
level of donation. Moreover, charities that do not make it on the list have
a very low chance of being selected. Finally, I believe nudges in the context
of charitable giving should be carefully studied before they are implemented
otherwise there is a considerable risk that the choice architecture undermines
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Translation from top to bottom: If you are selected and therefore get paid, would you
be willing to give part of your earnings to a charitable organization ? If you agree, what
percents (of your earnings) would you be willing to give. If you agree, to which organization
would you like to give that money to?
Figure A2.1: Screenshot - Control treatment
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Short list treatment
Translation: same as in the control treatment, except that participants can also select
between 4 options.
Figure A2.2: Screenshot - Short List
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Drop-down long list treatment
Translation: same configuration as the control group. In the drop-down list, on the top:
"please choose" and at the end: "Other organization". If the subject clicks on this last
option, a blank space appears where she could enter another organization name.
Figure A2.3: Screenshot - DD Long
Cognitive Reflection Test 1
Translation: a baseball bat and a ball cost together 1.10 euros. The baseball bat costs 1
euro more than the ball. How much does the ball cost (in cents) ?
Figure A2.4: Screenshot - CRT 1
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Cognitive Reflection Test 2
Translation: in a lake there are water lilies, the area of water lilies doubles every day. After
48 days, the lake is overgrown with water lilies. How many days does it take for half of
the lake to be overgrown with water lilies?
Figure A2.5: Screenshot - CRT 2
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2.7 Supplementary material
The supplementary material is structured as follows: (i) randomization checks,
(ii) investigation of social preferences, and (iii) investigation of the income
effect.
2.7.1 Randomization checks
Because the donation decision is the final stage of other previous games. I
provide the p-values of a multinomial logistic regression in the manuscript
in Table 2.4. As some of the variables are significant, I provide, here, ad-
ditional analyses to confirm the independence of social preferences, payoffs,
age, gender, and waves to the treatment variations of the experiment.
In the social preferences category, risk-taking is the percentage of poten-
tial earnings a participant decides to put on a lottery game with the possi-
bility of gaining 2.5 times the amount put on the lottery with a probability
of .5.
The probability to lie is derived from the honesty game, where a partic-
ipant has to report the number of heads in a series of 16 flips. I assume
that participants who reported a number of heads under or equal to 8, did
not lie (ρL = 0). If they reported a number higher than 8, I calculated the




Where PB is the probability of obtaining 8 heads out of 16 flips, PX is the
probability obtaining the number of heads reported, and ρL is the probability
to lie. Another possible computation is to take the number reported, which
is the exact same as the honesty game payoff, which is also tested in the
following regressions.
In the property game, participants gather carrots. Each carrot gathered
returns 1 experimental currency unit (ECU). Participants have three possi-
bilities: plant, steal, or protect. A participant has to decide how to allocate
7 units between these 3 possibilities. She knows that every unit allocated
to planting returns 1 ECU. However, another participant can steal carrots
if she does not have sufficient protection. Each carrot, successfully stolen,
also returns 1 ECU. In order to successfully steal a carrot, a participant has
to invest more in stealing than the other participant in protecting. Every
additional unit invested in stealing, than the other participant in protecting,
returns 1 ECU.
Contributing is derived from the public goods game. It is the amount
in ECU, from 0 to 100, a participant decides to donate to a public good.
99
The participant knows that every unit sent to the public account will be
multiplied by 1.6 and then divided between the 4 members of the group.
The payoff is always expected, as it is only a participant or a group of
participants that will be sorted out to receive the payment. Nevertheless, in
some games, the participants receive feedback regarding their performance
and in others, they do not.
In the public goods game (PGG), participants do not receive feedback,
therefore, I indicate expected payoff (E(Payoff)). As the experimenters asked
participants what is their belief about the average contribution of the other
members of the group, I can calculate the expected payoff following this
function:
Ei(Payoff) = 100− ci + 25
∑4
j=1 ci + Ei(cj)
The expected payoff of player i is a function of her contribution (ci) to the
public goods game and her belief about the others’ contributions Ei(cj).
In the risk game, participants receive feedback, therefore, I indicate payoff.
The payoff is given by the following function:
Pi = ri × 2.5× p
The payoff (Pi) is given by the amount invested in the lottery (ri) multiplied
by 2.5 and the binary outcome (p) whether the person wins or loses.
In the honesty game, the payoff is again not expected as the participant
receives exactly the amount he reports.
In the property game, the payoff is expected, as it depends highly on
the behavior of the other participant one is matched with. Assuming a
uniform distribution of strategy, I simulated the average payoff dependent
on a participant’s strategy.
The overall payoff in all tasks is simply the addition of the payoffs and
expected payoffs in each of the previous games.
Since there is some significance in Table 2.4, I run each regression from the
main paper separately per wave and per location. In Table S2.1, I investigate
the social preferences. I run each regression with the same dependent variable:
the binary decision to donate. Each regression keeps only a subsample of the
overall dataset. In other words, I keep only Wave 1 for the first regression,
then only Wave 2, etc.
I see that although I lose significance for the main coefficient of interest
- the list - the treatment effect remains qualitatively the same. By taking a
sub-sample, the study becomes under-powered to test the different treatment
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The propensity to donate - Extensive margin - Robustness checks
Dependent variable: Donate: yes = 1, no = 0
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Magdeburg Hamburg
List 0.076 0.085 0.108 0.092+ 0.144∗
(0.064) (0.071) (0.077) (0.049) (0.066)
Long list 0.129∗ 0.042 0.018 0.035 0.027
(0.063) (0.072) (0.046) (0.039) (0.051)
Drop-down 0.015 −0.136+ −0.044 −0.082∗ −0.033
(0.064) (0.075) (0.050) (0.041) (0.054)
Contributing 0.002∗ −0.001 0.000 0.001+ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Risk-taking 0.000 −0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Probability to lie −0.158 −0.160∗ −0.199∗∗ −0.207∗∗ −0.116+
(0.122) (0.072) (0.056) (0.052) (0.066)
Property game - Steal −0.044+ 0.029 −0.060∗ −0.032+ −0.014
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024)
Property game - Plant −0.015 0.040∗ −0.008 −0.001 0.020
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018)
Female (dummy) −0.012 0.001 0.003 −0.020 0.050
(0.050) (0.054) (0.045) (0.035) (0.048)
Location 0.042 0.136∗ 0.047
(0.053) (0.057) (0.043)
Wave 2 0.085+ 0.161∗
(0.045) (0.069)
Wave 3 0.176∗∗ 0.129∗
(0.047) (0.063)
Constant 0.294∗ 0.264+ 0.486∗∗ 0.299∗∗ 0.187
(0.130) (0.136) (0.130) (0.096) (0.132)
F -test 2.2 2.2 3.1 4.1 2.0
Prob > F 0.018 0.018 0.001 0.000 0.024
R2 0.052 0.058 0.057 0.052 0.046
N 410 369 530 827 482
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is always the binary decision to donate. Apart from the
dummy variables for the treatment variation, I include variables for the behaviors in the previous games.
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S2.1: OLS - Social preferences
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variations. Nevertheless, for none of the above coefficients, the sign goes in
the opposite direction, suggesting that the results in the main paper is driven
by a wave or a location.
Regarding social preferences, the probability to lie is significant in the
majority of the regressions. This suggests that participants that lie also do
not donate. Moreover, participants that decide to invest more in stealing
tend to also donate less often. Overall, this shows that social preferences
seem to matter in the decision to donate
In Table S2.2, I still investigate social preferences, however this time on
the percentage of potential earnings a participant decides to donate condi-
tional on donating.
The statement is essentially the same, as the main coefficient of interest
goes in the expected direction. In these regressions, due to the low number
of observations, the coefficients are often even less significant.
In Table S2.3, I investigate a possible income effect. Participants that
earned more during the previous game might be more willing to donate as a
form of reciprocity. But as this table shows, this is not the case here.
In Table S2.4, I still investigate the income effect, however, the dependent
variable is always the donation amount in percentage of potential earnings
conditional on donating. Again, the statement is essentially the same, as the
coefficient goes in the expected direction.
As the significance level is dependent on the number of observations in
the next section I run regressions with the whole dataset.
2.7.2 Social Preferences
One might be concerned with the low number of observations in the robust-
ness checks. Therefore, I run the regression for social preferences with the
overall dataset (Tables S2.5 and S2.6).
I find that the probability to lie in the honesty game and the decision
to steal in the property game are both negative and significant (p < 0.01)
in explaining the decision to donate. This confirms that some preferences
matter for the decision to donate.
As for the donation amount conditional on donating, the amount con-
tributed in the public goods game is a significant (p < 0.01) predictor for
amount in the donation decision. The more a participant contributed in
the public goods game, the more she donated. The probability to lie also
predicts the donation amount, albeit the correlation is marginally significant
(p < 0.1). A higher probability to lie is associated with lower amounts. In
contrast to the claim in the paper about different processes in the donation
decision, here, it seems that in the donation decision, the binary decision and
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The donation amount - Intensive margin - Robustness checks
Dependent variable: Amount donating (in percentage of potential earnings)
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Magdeburg Hamburg
List −4.157 −5.471 −6.124 −6.519∗ −4.716
(4.670) (3.405) (4.053) (3.117) (3.229)
Long list −2.706 −2.433 −0.261 −1.090 0.387
(3.889) (3.212) (2.361) (2.252) (2.271)
Drop-down −2.134 8.190∗ 0.637 0.670 2.122
(4.132) (3.520) (2.541) (2.452) (2.361)
Contributing 0.123∗ 0.033 0.103∗ 0.097∗ 0.082∗
(0.060) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039) (0.035)
Risk-taking 0.013 0.040 −0.034 0.003 0.008
(0.062) (0.043) (0.041) (0.039) (0.037)
Probability to lie −10.154 −4.622 −0.904 −2.455 −2.605
(10.067) (3.727) (3.150) (3.648) (3.016)
Property game - Steal 1.436 0.530 −1.934 0.298 −1.059
(1.696) (1.232) (1.447) (1.141) (1.181)
Property game - Plant 1.121 1.180 0.203 0.868 0.411
(1.209) (0.935) (0.886) (0.792) (0.803)
Female (dummy) 1.831 −0.350 0.356 −0.232 1.378
(3.347) (2.478) (2.275) (2.079) (2.188)
Location −6.236+ −0.424 0.444
(3.650) (2.564) (2.247)
Wave 2 −3.063 3.167
(2.789) (3.160)
Wave 3 −2.446 3.072
(2.761) (2.976)
Constant 13.868 15.981∗ 21.481∗∗ 19.351∗∗ 14.346∗
(9.463) (7.123) (6.538) (6.113) (6.251)
F -test 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.7
Prob > F 0.135 0.142 0.074 0.033 0.078
R2 0.094 0.089 0.064 0.059 0.076
N 159 166 264 351 238
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the donation amount conditional on donating. Apart from the variables
for the treatment variation, I include variables for the behaviors in the previous games. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S2.2: OLS - Social preferences
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The propensity to donate - Extensive margin - Robustness checks
Dependent variable: Donate: yes = 1, no = 0
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Magdeburg Hamburg
List 0.175 0.097 0.082 0.045 0.202∗
(0.185) (0.071) (0.078) (0.064) (0.078)
Long list 0.040 0.048 0.012 0.008 0.031
(0.214) (0.072) (0.047) (0.048) (0.057)
Drop-down 0.191 −0.152∗ −0.030 −0.041 −0.092
(0.216) (0.075) (0.051) (0.051) (0.061)
Overall E(Payoff) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female (dummy) 0.042 −0.011 0.027 −0.002 0.036
(0.145) (0.053) (0.045) (0.042) (0.053)
Location −0.073 0.138∗ 0.034
(0.156) (0.057) (0.044)
Wave 2 0.054 0.286∗
(0.091) (0.141)
Wave 3 0.138 0.271+
(0.093) (0.139)
Constant −0.038 0.328∗∗ 0.355∗∗ 0.322∗∗ −0.010
(0.261) (0.093) (0.098) (0.114) (0.157)
F -test 1.0 2.0 0.5 0.7 2.4
Prob > F 0.420 0.062 0.814 0.641 0.022
R2 0.131 0.032 0.006 0.009 0.043
N 48 369 530 570 377
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is always the binary decision to donate. Apart from
the dummy variables for the treatment variation, I include the variable for the overall expected payoff.
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S2.3: OLS - Income effect
104
The donation amount - Intensive margin - Robustness checks
Dependent variable: Amount donating (in percentage of potential earnings)
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Magdeburg Hamburg
List −22.958 −5.771+ −5.513 −5.459 −8.690∗
(21.955) (3.426) (4.068) (3.568) (3.869)
Long list 16.451 −1.508 −1.112 −0.507 −0.053
(18.011) (3.181) (2.381) (2.582) (2.532)
Drop-down −15.266 7.087∗ 0.791 0.757 4.610+
(20.347) (3.496) (2.562) (2.765) (2.687)
Overall E(Payoff) 0.049 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.014+
(0.066) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Female (dummy) 9.773 −0.723 0.814 0.317 1.424
(14.492) (2.453) (2.287) (2.289) (2.466)
Location −19.025 −0.330 0.426
(17.355) (2.565) (2.232)
Wave 2 −2.454 11.578
(5.516) (9.565)
Wave 3 −1.161 11.983
(5.479) (9.455)
Constant 11.163 21.287∗∗ 20.594∗∗ 23.647∗∗ 7.381
(35.986) (4.360) (5.084) (6.712) (10.966)
F -test 0.8 1.4 0.9 0.6 1.9
Prob > F 0.619 0.220 0.486 0.742 0.076
R2 0.364 0.050 0.021 0.017 0.066
N 15 166 264 252 193
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is donation amount conditional on donating. Apart from the
dummy variables for the treatment variation, I include the variable for the overall expected payoff. Standard
errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S2.4: OLS - Income effect
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The propensity to donate - Extensive margin - Investigation of Social
Preferences
Dependent variable: Donate: yes = 1, no = 0
List 0.106∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.111∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
Long list 0.028 0.028 0.035 0.028 0.033
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Drop-down −0.055+ −0.053 −0.053 −0.061+ −0.063+





Probability to lie −0.181∗∗ −0.172∗∗
(0.040) (0.041)
Property game - Steal −0.031∗ −0.025+
(0.014) (0.014)
Property game - Plant 0.008 0.005
(0.011) (0.011)
Wave 2 0.056 0.058 0.102∗∗ 0.059+ 0.109∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Wave 3 0.088∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.155∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
Location 0.058∗ 0.057∗ 0.063∗ 0.061∗ 0.068∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Female (dummy) 0.012 0.013 0.007 −0.000 0.007
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Constant 0.222∗∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.239∗∗
(0.047) (0.046) (0.038) (0.072) (0.077)
F -test 4.2 3.5 5.9 4.6 5.3
Prob > F 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.025 0.021 0.034 0.031 0.046
N 1,334 1,334 1,334 1,309 1,309
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is always the binary decision to donate. Apart from the dummy
variables for the treatment variation, I include the variables for each derived social preference in the previous
games. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S2.5: OLS - Social preferences
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The donation amount - Intensive margin - Investigation of Social
Preferences
Dependent variable: Amount donating (in percentage of potential earnings)
List −5.843∗∗ −5.474∗ −5.451∗ −5.264∗ −5.613∗
(2.217) (2.251) (2.245) (2.258) (2.242)
Long list −0.611 −0.757 −0.731 −0.647 −0.528
(1.578) (1.603) (1.599) (1.616) (1.603)
Drop-down 1.097 1.363 1.324 1.404 1.185





Probability to lie −4.161+ −2.182
(2.305) (2.374)
Property game - Steal −0.731 −0.345
(0.814) (0.817)
Property game - Plant 0.964+ 0.683
(0.566) (0.567)
Wave 2 −1.600 −2.219 −1.385 −2.036 −0.968
(1.964) (1.998) (2.056) (1.989) (2.055)
Wave 3 −1.193 −0.781 0.354 −0.932 −0.516
(1.877) (1.904) (2.005) (1.909) (2.011)
Location −1.087 −1.584 −1.284 −1.575 −1.074
(1.493) (1.512) (1.517) (1.530) (1.527)
Female (dummy) 0.222 −0.150 −0.345 −0.192 0.243
(1.458) (1.493) (1.472) (1.506) (1.511)
Constant 20.622∗∗ 26.673∗∗ 27.759∗∗ 23.160∗∗ 18.211∗∗
(2.764) (2.693) (2.249) (3.985) (4.329)
F -test 3.8 1.5 1.8 2.4 2.9
Prob > F 0.000 0.167 0.072 0.012 0.001
R2 0.049 0.020 0.024 0.035 0.058
N 598 598 598 589 589
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the donation amount conditional on donating. Apart from the dummy
variables for the treatment variation, I include the variables for each derived social preference in the previous games.
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S2.6: OLS - Social preferences
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the donation amount are two different processes. Here, the results tend to
confirm that the decision to donate is more influenced by social preferences
than the amount conditional on donating.
In Tables S2.7 and S2.8, I report the point estimates and the significance
levels of interactions between social preferences and treatment variations.
These tests for interaction effects are similar to the tests of interaction for
gender in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. The main differences are the interaction tested
and the female control variable.
The propensity to donate - Extensive margin - Social preferences
interactions
List Long list Drop-down
Contributing in PGG 0.001 −0.001 0.001
Probability to lie −0.013 −0.072 −0.022
Risk-taking 0.000 −0.001 −0.000
Protect 0.031 0.004 0.023
Steal 0.007 0.023 −0.012
Notes: OLS estimates. I report the point estimates of all interactions for each derived
social preference in the previous games with the treatment variations. The dependent
variable is always the binary decision to donate. Each preference is an independent
regression with control variables, i.e., treatments, waves, location, female, and the
preference. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S2.7: OLS estimates - Interactions
As mentioned in the result section, most of the interactions are insignif-
icant except for two interactions on the donation amount conditional on do-
nating. The first one is between risk-taking and the drop-down treatments,
and the second one is between contribution in the public goods game and
the list treatments. The first result suggests that risk-takers tend to donate
less when they are in the drop-down treatments, possibly due to a lower emo-
tional sensitivity (Nicholson et al. 2005). The second result suggests that
higher contributors donate less when they are in a list treatments, possibly
because they are intrinsically more motivated to donate in the first place
compared to lower contributors and that facing the list withdraws more of
their intrinsic motivation.
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The donation amount - Intensive margin - Social preferences interactions
List Long list Drop-down
Contributing in PGG −0.118+ −0.038 −0.040
Probability to lie 6.258 −2.637 6.930
Risk-taking −0.099 −0.079 −0.119∗
Protect 2.230 0.924 1.485
Steal 0.006 0.082 0.341
Notes: OLS estimates. I report the point estimates of all interactions for each derived
social preference in the previous games with the treatment variations. The dependent
variable is always the donation amount conditional on donating. Each preference is an
independent regression with control variables, i.e., treatments, waves, location, female,
and the preference. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S2.8: OLS estimates - Interactions
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2.7.3 Income effect
In Tables S2.9 and S2.10, I use expected payoffs from the previous games
as explanatory variables for the binary decision to donate or the amount
donated conditional on donating. I find that the (expected) payoff is playing
a role. However, in the honesty game, the expected payoff probably also
reflects social preferences, therefore, it is likely a confound, as it also goes in
the same direction.
This might also be the case for the property game as planting returns
the highest profit on average. Therefore, it goes in the same direction as
the social preference to plant. In both cases, social preferences are hard to
disentangle from income effects. As the overall expected payoff is dependent
on these two games, the same might hold. The overall expected payoff is
significantly (p < 0.05) correlated with the amount.
After controlling for social preferences and income effect, the main coeffi-
cient of interest, which is the list, remains significant (p < 0.05 or p < 0.01).
I can, therefore, conclude, that although some of the behaviors and profits
from previous games might explain the donation decision it remains often
marginal with respect to the treatment manipulation of the list.
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The propensity to donate - Extensive margin - Investigation of Income
Effect
Dependent variable: Donate: yes = 1, no = 0
List 0.107∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.112∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.048) (0.040) (0.049)
Long list 0.029 0.029 0.017 0.024 0.013
(0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.031) (0.037)
Drop-down −0.054+ −0.051 −0.048 −0.062+ −0.058
(0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.033) (0.039)
PGG E(Payoff) 0.000
(0.000)
Risk game E(Payoff) 0.000
(0.000)






Wave 2 0.055 0.055 0.115 0.059 0.129+
(0.036) (0.036) (0.076) (0.036) (0.076)
Wave 3 0.092∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.171∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.076) (0.035) (0.077)
Location 0.057∗ 0.056+ 0.063+ 0.056+ 0.061+
(0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.034)
Female (dummy) 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.017
(0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.028) (0.033)
Constant 0.254∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.446∗∗ 0.054 0.172+
(0.054) (0.040) (0.097) (0.097) (0.092)
F -test 3.4 3.5 4.3 4.4 2.3
Prob > F 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019
R2 0.020 0.021 0.034 0.026 0.019
N 1,334 1,334 972 1,309 947
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is always the binary decision to donate. Apart from the
dummy variables for the treatment variation, I include the variable for the expected payoff for each game.
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S2.9: OLS - Income effect
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The donation amount - Intensive margin - Investigation of Income Effect
Dependent variable: Amount donating (in percentage of potential earnings)
List −5.915∗∗ −5.465∗ −6.310∗ −5.238∗ −6.957∗∗
(2.227) (2.250) (2.563) (2.262) (2.602)
Long list −0.495 −0.825 −0.763 −0.862 −0.332
(1.586) (1.602) (1.767) (1.615) (1.805)
Drop-down 1.042 1.375 2.807 1.350 2.560
(1.711) (1.728) (1.902) (1.735) (1.933)
PGG E(Payoff) 0.020∗∗
(0.005)
Risk game E(Payoff) −0.008
(0.009)






Wave 2 −2.043 −2.404 −0.076 −2.258 0.509
(1.966) (1.986) (4.609) (1.985) (4.639)
Wave 3 −0.916 −0.843 0.840 −0.867 1.357
(1.883) (1.903) (4.556) (1.911) (4.592)
Location −1.368 −1.476 0.335 −1.692 −0.060
(1.496) (1.516) (1.648) (1.523) (1.668)
Female (dummy) 0.381 −0.412 0.101 −0.022 0.590
(1.471) (1.479) (1.624) (1.491) (1.669)
Constant 19.671∗∗ 28.239∗∗ 31.569∗∗ 14.655∗∗ 19.967∗∗
(3.117) (2.322) (5.746) (5.328) (5.487)
F -test 3.2 1.5 1.8 2.3 1.6
Prob > F 0.002 0.156 0.067 0.018 0.111
R2 0.041 0.020 0.032 0.031 0.029
N 598 598 454 589 445
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the donation amount conditional on donating. Apart from the
dummy variables for the treatment variation, I include the variable for the expected payoff for each game. Standard
errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S2.10: OLS - Income effect
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3 Chapter 3





Does gender equality increase or decrease gender differences in
values? While some studies find that economic prosperity and more
gender equality, as measured from gender differences in reproductive
health, empowerment, and economic status, is associated with less
gender differences in values, others find the opposite association. Us-
ing the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey over
a period of 35 years, with 508,707 observations, I show, first, that
more gender equality and economic growth are unambiguously associ-
ated with less gender differences in life-situations as measured in the
surveys. Second, the effect of the evolution of gender equality and
economic growth on differences in values depends on the level of the
analysis. In the cross-country analysis, I show a robust divergence
of values, while on the within-country analysis, more gender equality
leads to fewer differences. This puzzle is robust to additional controls
like ecological stress factors and several cultural differences. The re-
sults suggest that, despite numerous claims to the opposite, the causal
link between gender equality and gender differences in values is not
yet well understood in the literature.
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3.1 Introduction
The development of gender policies in many countries has led to an increas-
ing interest in understanding gender differences, their source, and variance.
Whether women and men are inherently different in their values is of interest
to fundamental research, as well as to policymakers and the general public.
One interesting aspect is the question of whether an increase in gender equal-
ity leads to more or less differences in values between men and women. Using
data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Sur-
vey (EVS), I reanalyze the relationship between gender equality and gender
differences in values.
In this paper, I contrast two hypotheses. The social role theory predicts
that gender differences in values decrease in more gender-egalitarian countries
(Eagly and Wood 1999; Gneezy et al. 2009). In this hypothesis, the division
of labor is assumed to be the main cause of gender differences. This division
is then supported by socialization, self-categorization, and self-stereotyping
(Wood and Eagly 2012). Overall, the values are derived from social roles. As
they are culturally constructed, the gender gap in values reflects the gap in
roles.
The major competing theory, the resource hypothesis, predicts that ac-
cess to sufficient material resources leads to more gender differences. The
values are assumed to be intrinsic (Buss 1995; Geary 2010) and their man-
ifestation is a matter of opportunity. Material resources are a prerequisite
that removes the gender-neutral goal for subsistence, which leaves a scope for
the expression of gender differences (Almås et al. 2016; Haushofer and Fehr
2014; McLoyd 1998; Tanaka et al. 2010). While economic growth indicates
less overall competition for resources, greater gender equality might even be
a better predictor for gender differences in values as it implies easier access
to resources for women (Duflo 2012; Inglehart 2015; Inglehart and Norris
2003).
I study two dimensions: life-situations and values. I separate both these
categories into two subcategories: for life-situation, whether items are sub-
jectively or objectively measured; and for values, whether they point towards
the respondent (self-centered) or towards others (general statements). I
demonstrate that, while gender differences for life-situations unambiguously
decrease with growing economic wealth and gender equality, the correlation
with values is sensitive to the level of the analysis. In a cross-country in-
vestigation, the correlation is positive supporting the resource hypothesis
(divergence of values between male and female values), whereas on a within-
country level the correlation is negative, this time supporting the social role
theory (convergence).
114
The results challenge studies supporting the increase of gender differ-
ences with more gender equality and economic prosperity (Falk and Hermle
2018; Mac Giolla and Kajonius 2019), but also those supporting convergence
(Donnelly and Twenge 2017; Konrad et al. 2000). My findings particularly
complements those of Connolly et al. (2019), who find both convergence, in
the within-country analysis, and divergence, in the cross-country analysis, of
gender differences in values. However, while they focus on the evolution of
value priorities such as achievement, benevolence, power, stimulation, and
universalism with respect to the evolution of gender equality from 2002 to
2016, I extend their research to a broader set of values54 over a longer period
of time (1981–2014). I also demonstrate that the indexes of economic growth
and gender equality are valid proxies to measure life-situations, as these in-
dexes systematically correlate with the categorization of this dimension in
the WVS and the EVS.55 I finally investigate the possibility of a sampling
bias and tackle possible endogeneity issues in the model. I find that the diver-
gence of values with respect to more gender equality and economic prosperity
is robust to sub-sampling and alternative specifications in the cross-sectional
analysis. I end up with a puzzle, where either the cross-country analysis still
suffers from endogeneity or the within-country analysis is unable to capture
the effect of the evolution of gender equality and economic prosperity due to
a sampling bias or the limited variation of the indexes within countries.
3.2 Methods
The method section is structured in two parts: (i) the gender differences
coefficients from the WVS and the EVS, and (ii) the indexes of emancipation
and GDP.
3.2.1 Four measurements for gender differences
For my analysis, I use a combined dataset of the longitudinal World Values
Survey (WVS) and the longitudinal European Values Survey (EVS). The
54For instance, differences in religious beliefs, abortion perception, gender roles, national
priorities, and child values priorities.
55Life-situations measured in the WVS and the EVS correlate with gender equality
indexes. In short, any increase reported in the gender equality index correlates with a
convergence in life-situations between men and women in the surveys. While I show the
validity of the WVS for investigating life-situations, other studies show the correlation of
the WVS to preferences (Kistler et al. 2017) and for specific values, such as sexism (Brandt
2011).
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WVS and the EVS associations started in 1981 to ask participants a large
set of questions (henceforth: items) regarding, mostly, values to study their
impact on social life. Since then, they have exceeded 500,000 participants,
110 countries, and the survey continues to accumulate observations. The
surveys have evolved over the years. They have made major changes 6 times,
named waves, but some items are recurrent, such as the following item:
• “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it




Homosexuality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
There is a large overlap between the WVS and the EVS. I focus on the WVS
items as I seek to target comparable subjects across a wide distribution of
growth domestic product (GDP) and gender equality indexes (see section
3.5.4 in the supp. material for summary statistics of the WVS and the
EVS.).
Classification of the survey items. I develop a classification along two
major dimensions: life-situations and values. The former category groups
the survey items where the respondents report their life-situations in a broad
sense (access to resources, perception of the quality of life, social mobility,
etc.), the latter investigates values (including beliefs and preferences). In
sum, the life-situations category answers the general question of “how is life?”
and the values category answers “what do you think of life?”. Ultimately, I
subdivided life-situations into two categories: objective and subjective mea-
sures; and values, also into two categories: self-centered value statements
and general value statements. The final classification four categories can be
summarized as follows:
• Life situation, objective (LSO). Questions about the circumstances
in which the respondent lives and his habits. The qualifier “objective”
56This question is item “V203” from Wave 6 of the WVS.
116
refers to items that could be easily verified by an external observer.
Examples are questions about income, work hours, church going habits,
or memberships in organizations.
• Life situation, subjective (LSS). Questions about the circumstances
in which the respondent lives, but which are open to subjective inter-
pretation by the respondent. The answers are typically difficult or
impossible to verify by an external observer. Examples are: “How
satisfied are you with your life?” or “Are you satisfied with your job?”.
• Self-centered value statements (SCVS). This category contains
questions about self-reflexive value statements. In other words, the
values refer to the respondent directly. Examples are: “Rate your
confidence in the government” or “Are you a religious person?”.
• General value statements (GVS). This category refers to value
statements which are not directly linked to the respondent, but to
society (or humanity) in general. In other words, this category contains
items asking “How should the world be?”, or “How should one act?”
Examples are: “Is it justifiable to cheat on taxes?” or “The government
should reduce environmental pollution”.
While, in many cases, the allocation of the survey items to these four cate-
gories is fairly obvious, others leave room for interpretation. For instance, the
item: “Rate your confidence in the government” is in the self-centered value
statement category but might be interpreted as a general value statement
or a life-situation subjective statement. Nevertheless, I deliberately add this
item in the SCVS category, because it refers to the respondent. This was a
strict criterion for the coders. The reason for this classification is that it is
speculative to know what respondents may associate this item with. Partic-
ularly, there are reasons to suspect that the framing matters, i.e., whether
the government can be trusted or the impact on someone’s life are different
questions than whether you trust your government. The ambiguity of the
classification bears the risk that the allocation of survey items to categories
may be used to influence the outcome of the analysis. In order to bind my
hands in this regard, I followed standard practices and hired two research
assistants to code the survey items according to the above categorization
(see section 3.5.3 in the supp. material for the complete instructions I gave
them). Following the procedure of a coordination game proposed by Houser
and Xiao (2011), I paid the coders a bonus depending on the consistency in
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their categorization.57 I randomly selected a set of questions from the overall
survey items and took the categorization from the coder 1 and coder 2 of
these randomly selected items and then I matched both coders’ categoriza-
tion. The research assistants received a bonus each time their categorizations
corresponded. I calculate Cohen’s Kappa coefficients to measure the inter-
rater agreement. Overall, I obtain 79.6% of agreement (p = .000). The raters
were not informed about the hypotheses and I ensured that they would not
know each other. If the two raters agree on the classification of an item, then
I use it as is. For the 20.4 percent of the items, the two coders did not agree.
To resolve these cases, I hired a third research assistant to make the call be-
tween the two suggestions. I use this final coding for the analyses in the main
paper (see section 3.5.10 in the supp. material for robustness checks). The
following table shows the classification of the items in the different categories.
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Number of items 137 61 335 320
The data types. In the WVS, the items are either ordinal or categorical.
The type of data calls for different computations. I have a majority of ordinal
items (69.5%)58 and some categorical items (30.5%). For the ordinal items,
I calculate a simple probabilistic measure of gender differences (Klotz 1966).
In particular, I calculate the probability that a randomly drawn female
subject from the same country, the same wave, and for the same item chooses
a higher option than a randomly drawn male subject, plus the probability at
random that both gender choose the same option (henceforth: P(♀≻♂)). If
yf (ym) is a randomly drawn female (male) observation from the same wave,
country and item, then P(♀≻♂) = P(yf > ym) + 12 P(yf = ym). If f is the
vector of relative frequencies of all female options in yi ∈ {0, . . . , 1}, and m
for male options, then P(♀≻♂) = fQm′ , with:
57Houser and Xiao (2011) introduced a method to classify natural language messages
based on a coordination game. In this game, participants have to classify messages accord-
ing to some given instructions. The payoff is dependent on the coordination rate between
participants. Since participants have incitive to coordinate, their best strategy is to follow
the instructions.
58This includes those that I rescaled to ordinal and binary items as I use the same
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I end up with a probability (P(♀≻♂)) that I use as a coefficient for gender
differences. Because identical distribution in the options gives a probability
of 0.5 (50%), any deviation from this value indicates that one gender has a
higher (lower) occurrence of higher (lower) options than the other. As my
main interest is not which gender is stochastically larger in a given item, I
use the absolute deviation from 0.5 as the main coefficient (henceforth: |C|
= |P(♀≻♂) − 0.5|).
The computation of this coefficient follows the logic of the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, where monotonicity is assumed. The following artificial example









0.5× 0.3× 0.5 = 0.075 0.5× 0.5× 0 = 0 0.5× 0.2× 0 = 0
Indifferent
0.2
0.2× 0.3× 1 = 0.06 0.2× 0.5× 0.5 = 0.05 0.2× 0.2× 0 = 0
Agree
0.3
0.3× 0.3× 1 = 0.09 0.3× 0.5× 1 = 0.15 0.3× 0.2× 0.5 = 0.03
The relative frequencies of each gender for each option of the ordinal
responses appear in the first column and the first row. In each cell of the table,
I calculate the product of the relative frequencies. As I choose to calculate the
probability that women choose a higher or equal option than men, I sum all
the cells where the women option is higher than the men option, respectively
weighted 1 and the ties weighted 0.5. I get an overall probability of 0.455.
Intuitively, the effect size provided by this computation is the probability that
a randomly picked female respondent chooses a higher or equal option than
another randomly picked male respondent in the respective country and wave
for a given item. This example would give me a coefficient of gender difference
of 0.045 (|C|) for the analysis (|C| = |0.455 − 0.5|). A major advantage is
that this measure is not sensitive to any monotonic transformation (T. N.
Bond and Lang 2019).
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For the categorical items, I use Cramer’s V (Cramér 1946) computation.




min(k − 1, r − 1)
Where ϕc is the Cramer’s V, χ2 is the Pearson chi-square statistic, n is
the number of observations, k the number of columns, and r the number of
rows.
This coefficient has the advantage of being bounded between 0 (no as-
sociation between the two subgroups) and 1 (perfect association). I choose
Cramer’s V over the chi2 statistic, because the asymptotic expectations of
the χ2 statistics is proportional to the sample size, and the estimator will be
biased by the differences in n. Cramer’s V is insensitive to sample sizes as it
corrects the estimator by dividing it by a multiple of the sample size (Agresti
and Kateri 2011).
The Coefficient |C| from the ordinal data is bound between 0 (no differ-
ence) and 0.5 (completely different), I multiply this coefficient by 2. I made
the above adjustments to obtain comparable coefficients. Nonetheless, I still
control for the type of data in the regression model.59 This multiplied coeffi-
cient has the advantage of being easy to interpret as it is a measure of gender
differences where zero means no difference and one means maximum gen-
der differences. In the paper, I report the gender differences in percentages
(henceforth Cn).
For the four dependent variables (LSO, LSS, SCVS, and GVS), I calculate
one gender coefficient Cn per survey item, per country, and per wave.
3.2.2 GDP and emancipation indexes
For the indexes, I draw inspiration from Falk and Hermle (2018) and gather
the following indexes: the gender inequality index from the UN, the gender
equality index from the World Economic Forum, and the gross domestic
products from the UN. These are the main indexes in the analyses.
In the second part of the result section, I gather indexes to account for
an omitted variable bias. I tackle three possible sources of omitted variables:
ecological stress and two sources of cultural differences.
I first use indexes based on the ecological stress hypothesis proposed by
Kaiser (2019) taken from Fincher et al. (2008). I specifically gathered the in-
59As I use a fixed effect model for each survey item, it controls for the item type.
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dex of pathogen prevalence (historical and contemporary), and the Hofstede
individualism score. The historical pathogen prevalence indicators are esti-
mates based on atlases published between 1944 and 1961. They are based on
nine classes of pathogens detrimental to human reproductive fitness: leish-
manias, trypanosomes, malaria, schistosomes, filariae, leprosy, dengue, ty-
phus and tuberculosis. Contemporary pathogens indicators are based on the
GIDEON database on infectious diseases and consist of the scores of seven
classes of pathogens: leishmanias, trypanosomes, malaria, schistosomes, filar-
iae, spirochetes, and leprosy. The Individualism score is based on a research
project on cultural differences reported in Hofstede et al. (2005). Still in line
with the ecological stress hypothesis, I also gather the historical food access
score from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This indicator is
the average food supply, in kcal/capita/day, from 1961 to 1984. These in-
dicators are at the country-level. Lastly, I also gather contemporary food
access which I match with the corresponding country and the year of the
WVS/EVS surveys.
Second, I gather Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, which includes the indi-
vidualism index that I use in the ecological stress analysis. The others are
power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. I do not use the
long-term orientation index, which is part of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions,
because it has been included only recently in the list of dimensions and is
reported for a relatively low number of countries. Power distance defines
societies with rather rigid hierarchical structures. Masculinity is typical of
more competitive societies that favor material success. Lastly, uncertainty
avoidance refers to the high density of rules and laws, such that most out-
comes can be predicted. There is also a belief in a one and only truth on the
religious and philosophical level. These variables are matched at the country
level.
Third, following Welzel (2013), I compute means of different secular in-
dicators from the WVS. Unlike most of the previous indexes of ecological
stress factors and cultural dimensions, which are variables at the country
level, these latter variables are averages at the country and wave level com-
puted from the respondents of the WVS. I specifically compute means of
defiance, disbelief, relativism, and skepticism. Defiance refers to a low level
of respect for authority and a general defiance towards the government or
the country. Disbelief indicates a low level of religious beliefs and practices.
It is also indicative of the overall importance of religion. Relativism refers to
a low level of conformism to the norms of the country. Lastly, Skepticism is
an inverse trust indicator towards the government, the police, and the army.
This last list of indicators should be considered with caution since they come
from the same dataset as the one I use to compute the coefficient for gen-
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der differences. The observations are not independent and therefore their
explanatory power could be biased.
I then use these indexes in the different regressions to show the correlation
with the WVS/EVS coefficient. I end up with four different regressions for
each one of the categories per index.60
As an example, the ordinal item given in the beginning of methods section
on page 116 from the WVS on homosexuality gives on average a coefficient
of 4.3% gender difference at the 25th percentile of the Gender Equality In-
dex from the United Nations (UN) and 7.2% gender difference at the 75th
percentile of the same index. There is a difference of 2.9 between the two
percentiles, which is equal to an increase in gender differences for this item
of more than 65% between the 25th and the 75th percentile.
3.2.3 Models
In line with Falk and Hermle (2018) and Mac Giolla and Kajonius (2019) who
report a divergence of values with more gender equality, I (i) investigate the
cross-sectional variation of gender equality on values and life-situations in the
Model 1 (M1). Then, I (ii) analyze, in line with Donnelly and Twenge (2017)
and Konrad et al. (2000) who report convergence of values with respect to
more gender equality, the longitudinal effect of gender equality on values in
Model 2 (M2). I also control for the longitudinal effect of these variables on
life-situations. Both these investigations follow the work of Connolly et al.
(2019), who report both divergence and convergence of values with respect
to more gender equality. Finally, I (iii) investigate, following Hofstede et al.
(2005), Kaiser (2019), and Welzel (2013), other country-specific variables to
account for omitted variable biases in Model 3 (M3).
In a series of regressions, I estimate the effect of indexes of gender equal-
ity, economic prosperity (GDP), or other country-level variables on the four
measures of gender differences: LSO, LSS, SCVS, and GVS.
In Model 1, I estimate the cross-sectional effect of gender equality or
economic prosperity on gender differences in life-situations and values.
Cnict = β0 + β1Etc + β2Zi + uict (1)
Where β2Zi is the fixed effect term for each survey item i. It captures
unobserved invariant heterogeneities across the survey items; β1Etc is the
60See section 3.5.7 in the supp. material for the exact sources of these indexes.
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index of either gender equality or economic prosperity across different years
t and per country c. The dependent variable Cnict is the normalized coefficient
Cn of gender differences. Each observation is an absolute gender difference
per item, per wave, and per country; u is the error term.
Model 2 (M2) is an extension of Model 1, where I estimate the effect
of the evolution of gender equality or economic prosperity over time. I in-
clude country dummies to control for the cross-sectional variability. Overall,
this model analyzes the longitudinal effect of gender equality and economic
prosperity.
Cnict = β0 + β1Etc + β2Zi + β3Dc + uict (2)
Where β3Dc are dummies for each country c. It captures unobserved
invariant heterogeneities across all countries.
Model 3 (M3) is an extension of Model 1, where I test multiple other
country-level variables to test alternative explanations for the cross-sectional
variability in gender differences on values.
Cnict = β0 + β1Etc + β2Zi + β3Ec + ...+ βnZc + uict (3)
Where β3Ec and βnZc are country-level variables of ecological stress, indi-
vidualism, religiousness, etc. M3 aims to capture the unexplained variability
in gender differences across countries. Note that for some explanatory vari-
ables we observe variation over time, such as the contemporary access to food
supply, Welzel’s cultural dimensions (thus: β3Ect).61
61As a reminder, the matching procedure used for those variables is mentioned in the
footnotes of all the tables of M3.
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3.3 Results
The combined dataset from the WVS and the EVS contains 111 countries
including very populated countries such as China, India, and the USA, to
smaller States, such as Iceland, Malta, and Luxembourg. As measured by
the UN, gender equality, on a scale from 0, no gender equality, to 1, perfect
gender equality, ranges from 0.17, in Yemen, to 0.95, in the Netherlands and
Sweden. Turkey has the highest increase in the dataset with 0.27 points,
starting from 0.36 in Wave 2 to 0.64 in Wave 6. While some countries were
part of the WVS only for one wave, such as Lebanon, others were present
for each wave, such as the USA. Note that, we can only observe variation in
the gender equality index for those countries which are present in the WVS
in multiple waves.62
As for gender differences in the categories, on average, there is 8.53 per-
centage points gender differences for objectively measured life-situations and
5.15 percentage points for subjectively measured life-situations. The averages
in values are of a similar magnitude with a mean of 5.81 percentage points for
self-centered value statements and 5.27 percentage points for general value
statements. While the means of gender differences are relatively low, there is
a significant amount of variability within a country. For instance, the Nether-
lands display gender differences, first in life-situations objective items from
0.02 percentage points to more than 66.93 percentage points, and second,
from 0.01 percentage points to 22.88 percentage points for different items in
general value statements. Note finally, that while unsurprisingly the greatest
gender difference for a life-situation objective item is in Yemen with 94.88
percentage points, more surprisingly, the greatest gender difference in a gen-
eral value statement item is in Jordan with 50.15 percentage points, a country
which scores 0.47 on the UN Gender Equality Index (see Section 3.5.1 in the
supp. material for a complete list of countries, their respective means, and
variability).
My inferential investigation brings mixed results. They are dependent on
whether I investigate on a cross-country level (M1) or a within-country level
(M2). On a cross-country level, the correlation is in line with the resource
62Although there is no guarantee regarding gender specific differences in response rate,
which would lead to a sampling bias, there are reasons to suspect that the problem is
of minor importance. Firstly, the WVS committee imposes sampling methods before
data collection (see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp). Secondly, ac-
cording to tables in Section 3.5.1 in the supplementary material, there seems to be no
systematic gender differences or number of respondents in response rate across countries.
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hypothesis, that access to sufficient material resources increases gender dif-
ferences in values. On the other hand, on a within-country level, I confirm
the social role theory, that gender differences are a construct of the cultural
environment. Both these theories posit causal relationships. Given these
mixed results, I tackle a possible selection bias and an endogeneity issue in
the cross-sectional analysis (M3).
Specifically, I first report the cross-sectional variation of gender equal-
ity and economic prosperity in life-situations and values (M1). Second, I
investigate their longitudinal effect (M2). Third, I investigate a possible se-
lection bias, and finally, three possible sources of omitted variable bias in M1:
ecological stress factors and two sources of cultural differences (M3).
Before discussing the effect of gender equality and economic prosperity
on values, one might question the validity of these indexes to explain gen-
der differences. To address this concern, I show with the joined measure of
life-situations (LSO and LSS), that these indexes capture realities measured
by the WVS/EVS well.63 With one exception, all the following tables show
the significant (p < 0.01) negative correlation of the life-situation with the in-
dexes both on the cross-country level and the within-country level, even when
adding additionnal controls in M3.64 In other terms, more gender equality
and economic growth unambiguously decrease differences in life-situations
between males and females.
Moreover, there are reasons to suspect that changes in gender equality
do not impact, at least not to the same extent, all types of values. For
instance, items about gender roles in a society should be more influenced
by the evolution of gender equality than other ones, such as whether it is
justifiable to keep money found. This assumption serves as a falsification
test to investigate whether gender equality or economic prosperity are good
measures of the evolution of values.
I compute ratios of the evolution of values according to evolution in gen-
der equality. I end up with the items that change the most on the UN Gender
Equality Index and the ones that change the least. I find that items, such
as “Is it justifiable to keep the money you have found”, “Whether you think
63The systematic significant correlation also accounts for the viability of the WVS to
capture gender equality.
64The exception is in Table 3.6, where the LSS coefficient is not significant and with the
opposite sign. I explain this result by the overlapping of the SCVS and the LSS categories.
As reported by the coders, some items of the WVS were sometimes hard to classify in one
or the other category. Another reason might be that these items tend to be subject to
greater variability as they focus on the respondent. See also Footnote 70
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we should put more emphasis on the development of technology”, and “Who
would you not like to have as neighbors: immigrants” are the least impacted
by changes in the UN Gender Equality Index. On the contrary, items such
as “How often do you discuss political matters with friends”, “Is homosexu-
ality justifiable”, and “Who would you not like to have as neighbors: heavy
drinkers” are the most impacted. Based on these results, it seems reasonable
to assume that the UN Gender Equality Index is a good proxy to investigate
changes in values.
3.3.1 Cross-country analyses - M1
In Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, I report the results of regressions from M1 of
the different main indexes on the absolute gender difference. The dependent
variable is always the coefficient of gender differences (Cn). I run separate
regressions for each of the four categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). The inde-
pendent variables UN and WEF gender equality indexes are bound between
0 and 1. The log GDP per capita ranges from 3.52 to 12.13.
As mentioned, I observe a systematic negative coefficient for both types
of life-situations, but a systematic positive coefficient for both types of values.
In a cross-country analysis, gender differences in values tend to increase with
more gender equality and economic growth. The joined measure of values,
SCVS and GVS, is significant (p < 0.01) and positively correlated with the
indexes in all tables65.
In all regressions in the main paper, I include fixed effects for survey
items. The main reason for the fixed effects model for the survey items is
that some items were only asked in some countries and therefore might bias
the estimates.66 The other reason is that some items have more options
than others and therefore might be subject to greater heterogeneity.67 This
might drive the overall effect in one direction or another. Therefore, by
accounting for item fixed effects I get a more consistent estimate.68 I do not
65Except again for the WEF index. As explained above, the reason is likely the ambi-
guity in the allocation of survey items to these two categories, see Footnote 64.
66For instance, “Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as
neighbors? Shia” was only asked in Guinea (wave 5, item V 4310).
67For example, some items are on a ten-point scale and others are binary.
68One might be concerned with the necessity to include fixed effects or random effects
for years, as the computation of the indexes might vary over time, either in a fixed way or
randomly. The result from a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test returns p = 0.005 which suggests
the use of a fixed effects model, therefore in the supp. material, I include year fixed effects
(see Table S3.18 and S3.19 in the robustness checks). I deliberately did not include year
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Gender Equality Index (UN) - Cross-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −4.747∗∗ −2.282∗∗ 2.205∗∗ 2.066∗∗
(0.388) (0.422) (0.202) (0.156)
Constant 11.358∗∗ 6.482∗∗ 4.659∗∗ 3.971∗∗
(0.275) (0.302) (0.142) (0.110)
F -test 150.0 29.2 118.8 174.6
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.004
N 10006 3762 19031 23647
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from the
United Nations on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent
variable on the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each survey item.
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.1: OLS estimates - M1
GDP (UN) - Cross-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Log GDP per capita in US dollars −0.312∗∗ −0.156∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.302∗∗
(0.041) (0.048) (0.021) (0.016)
Constant 10.620∗∗ 6.336∗∗ 4.869∗∗ 2.667∗∗
(0.369) (0.433) (0.191) (0.146)
F -test 57.9 10.3 40.0 338.0
p 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
R2 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.007
N 13291 4415 24748 30825
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the log GDP from the United Nations on
the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on the different
categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each survey item. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.2: OLS estimates - M1
127
Gender Equality Index (WEF) - Cross-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - WEF −18.800∗∗ −12.583∗∗ −0.783 2.057∗∗
(1.391) (1.843) (0.778) (0.642)
Constant 20.082∗∗ 13.772∗∗ 6.165∗∗ 3.776∗∗
(0.958) (1.260) (0.535) (0.441)
F -test 182.8 46.6 1.0 10.3
p 0.000 0.000 0.314 0.001
R2 0.020 0.017 0.000 0.000
N 5870 1710 9423 11497
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from
the World Economic Forum on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the
independent variable on the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). As this index reports values only
from 2006 to 2014, I only include observations from the WVS in the corresponding years. I include fixed
effects for each survey item. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.3: OLS estimates - M1
cluster at the country, country and wave, or country and item level in the
main paper as the use of clustering depends on different assumptions about
the dependencies of the observations. Nevertheless, in Section 3.5.8 of the
supplementary material, I investigate the stability of my results with respect
to clustering and find that the results are robust to most of the clustering
adjustments.
3.3.2 Within-country analyses - M2
The evidence in favor of the resource hypothesis is robust to these specifi-
cations, i.e., clustering and year fixed or random effects. However, as soon
as I control for country fixed effects, the correlation between the index and
the GVS or the SCVS category shifts sign. In Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, I
report the regressions of M2 for the different indexes on the categories and
include country fixed effects. The correlations are now negative and signifi-
cant (p < 0.05 or p < 0.01) between the indexes and the GVS and the SCVS
fixed effects in the main paper as it certainly captures a substantial part of the real effect
of the gender equality indexes or GDP index.
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categories.69 The life-situation dimension (LSO and LSS) remains negatively
correlated with more gender equality or economic prosperity, and in most of
the tables, the coefficients are significant at the 1% level.70
Gender Equality Index (UN) - Within-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −7.352∗∗ −8.087∗∗ −4.154∗∗ −3.490∗∗
(1.845) (1.942) (0.868) (0.667)
Constant 15.042∗∗ 8.966∗∗ 10.065∗∗ 6.634∗∗
(1.396) (1.621) (0.662) (0.505)
Dummy Country Y es Y es Y es Y es
F -test 12.4 7.2 20.3 32.5
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.038 0.122 0.057 0.072
N 10006 3762 19031 23647
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from the
United Nations on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent
variable on the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include dummy variables for each country
and fixed effects for each survey item. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.4: OLS estimates - M2
As there is a general upward trend of gender equality and the GDP in
each country, I test in Table 3.7 that the variable year is also negatively
correlated when I control for country fixed effects. I find that the correlation
is again significant (p < 0.01) and negative.71
This suggests that the prior results showed above, in the cross-country
analysis, are biased and that the coefficient estimates are inconsistent. The
results likely suffer from a problem of endogeneity. Before tackling a possible
69The loss of significance for some categories is related to footnote 64.
70In Table 3.6, most of the coefficients are insignificant. The main reasons are likely to
be the low number of observations in time, since this index only recorded values from 2006
to 2014, and the rather small variability of the values over time.
71The UN and WEF Gender Equality Index are positively correlated with time. This is
also true for the GDP. In other words, every year, on average, countries tend to be more
and more gender-equal and also richer. Note, that I do not account here for inflation,
which might bias the GDP values. It is worth noticing that when I do not control for the
country fixed effects I observe a negative coefficient between the indexes and years in the
dataset. This is explained by the fact that in the early days of the WVS (wave 1,2), there
was a high prevalence of rather gender-equal countries and rich countries compared to the
last waves.
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GDP (UN) - Within-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Log GDP per capita in US dollars −0.625∗∗ −0.518∗∗ −0.634∗∗ −0.295∗∗
(0.108) (0.133) (0.056) (0.044)
Constant 13.491∗∗ 8.326∗∗ 11.496∗∗ 6.643∗∗
(1.014) (1.324) (0.518) (0.403)
Dummy Country Y es Y es Y es Y es
F -test 13.5 6.5 21.0 31.7
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.044 0.109 0.049 0.063
N 13291 4415 24748 30825
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the GDP from the United Nations on
the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on the different
categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include dummy variables for each country and fixed effects for each
survey item. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.5: OLS estimates - M2
Gender Equality Index (WEF) - Within-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - WEF −9.901 12.798 −3.623 −7.905∗
(8.183) (11.751) (4.090) (3.483)
Constant 12.769∗ −2.855 7.706∗∗ 9.841∗∗
(5.465) (7.928) (2.739) (2.331)
Dummy Country Y es Y es Y es Y es
F -test 7.9 5.1 13.1 23.8
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.043 0.170 0.067 0.101
N 5870 1710 9423 11497
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from
the World Economic Forum on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the
independent variable on the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). As this index reports values
only from 2006 to 2014, I only include observations from the WVS in the corresponding years. I include
dummy variables for each country and fixed effects for each survey item. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.6: OLS estimates - M2
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Time trend - Within-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Year −0.063∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.048∗∗ −0.024∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 134.695∗∗ 86.349∗∗ 102.526∗∗ 51.632∗∗
(16.504) (20.058) (8.484) (6.799)
Dummy Country Y es Y es Y es Y es
F -test 13.2 6.3 20.6 30.5
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.042 0.102 0.049 0.061
N 14320 4769 26686 33239
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of each year on the
coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable
on the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include dummy variables for each
country and fixed effects for each survey item. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1,
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.7: OLS estimates - M2
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omitted variable bias, I investigate the sampling bias by restricting the data.
The extreme case would be that I have in the data a vast majority of single
observations from countries that display a very high positive correlation of
gender equality/GDP and gender differences in values and only a minority
of countries with multiple observations over time and with a wide range of
values in the indexes that have a negative correlation. This would be a good
example of a Simpson’s paradox (Blyth 1972). This concern is fueled by the
great difference in the participation rate of countries. For instance, the USA
participated in all waves (six waves), while Tanzania participated only once.
3.3.3 Robustness of paradox to sub-samplings
To investigate the sampling bias, I restrict the data to a subsample of coun-
tries that have observations in the first wave (1981–1984) and the last wave
(2010–2014) of the WVS. The cross-country analyses (M1) still show diver-
gence of gender differences in values and the within-country analysis (M2)
convergence (see Table S3.13 in the supp. material for the regression).
Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between the absolute gender differences
in LSO and GVS categories and gender equality as measured by the UN
Gender Equality Index. The figure contains only countries that were present
in Wave 1 and 6. While the figure always shows a decrease in gender differ-
ences in life-situation (LSO) with an increase in gender equality or passing
time, changes in gender differences in values are not systematic. The USA,
Australia, Japan, Sweden, and Germany tend to support divergence, while
Spain, Argentina, and very slightly the Netherlands support convergence.
The robustness of the results - showing both divergence (M1) and conver-
gence (M2) of gender differences in values - with this sub-sampling suggests
that M1 is still biased by some omitted variables that the country fixed effect
specification captures (M2). Another piece of evidence in the same vein is
provided by restricting the sample to culturally similar countries. I restrict
the data to specific areas provided by the UN72 and find that correlation
coefficients (R) between the indexes and gender differences Cn tend to be
larger. For instance, the correlation between the UN Gender Equality In-
dex and the coefficient for gender differences is 0.13 if I restrict the sample to
countries in Western Europe73and 0.14 for countries in North Africa74. These
72https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/
73Western Europe is composed of Belgium, Austria, France, Germany, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in the WVS/EVS dataset.
74Northern Africa is composed of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia in the
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The scatter plot displays the absolute gender difference in percent on the y-axis and the
values from the Gender Equality Index from the UN on the x-axis. The graph dots are
means of the absolute gender differences per country and per year.
Figure 3.1: Gender equality and gender differences for selected countries
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values are larger than correlation among all countries (0.07). This suggests
that countries close to each other geographically share some similarities, such
as cultural or historical origins, which otherwise likely increase noise in M1.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report the regression outputs when the dataset contains
only western European countries. While the loss of significance for some
categories is likely attributed to the small variance and the low number of
observations, the main story of convergence and divergence of values holds.
Gender Equality Index (UN) - Western Europe countries - Cross-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN 0.599 1.365 −0.641 9.383∗∗
(3.418) (3.902) (1.989) (1.701)
Constant 6.851∗ 2.909 6.823∗∗ −2.404
(2.966) (3.354) (1.724) (1.472)
F -test 0.0 0.1 0.1 30.4
p 0.861 0.727 0.747 0.000
R2 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.017
N 975 428 1861 2273
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from
the United Nations on the coefficient Cn. This regression includes only countries from Western Europe.
Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on the different categories
(LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each survey item. Standard errors in parentheses. +
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.8: OLS estimates - M1
Interestingly, the coefficients in the regression models of GVS in the cross-
country analysis and of the SCVS in the within-country analysis are sub-
stantially larger when I restrict the dataset to western European countries
compared to the overall dataset. In line with the previously mentioned cor-
relation coefficients, it suggests that changes in the UN Gender Equality
Index produce more gender differences in values in culturally similar coun-
tries. Furthermore, although more coefficients are insignificant, the paradox
of convergence and divergence of values is robust to this sub-sampling. I find
similar results using other restrictions to culturally similar countries, such
as North Africa, South America, and North America. Overall, these results
WVS dataset.
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Gender Equality Index (UN) - Western Europe countries - Within-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −35.835∗∗ −24.985∗∗ −15.749∗∗ 1.086
(6.823) (8.813) (3.583) (3.168)
Constant 38.646∗∗ 24.765∗∗ 19.842∗∗ 4.804+
(5.788) (7.317) (3.016) (2.659)
Dummmy Country Y es Y es Y es Y es
F -test 7.7 3.0 6.7 7.4
p 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
R2 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.017
N 975 428 1861 2273
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from
the United Nations on the coefficient Cn. This regression includes only countries from Western Europe.
Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on the different categories
(LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include dummy variables for each country and fixed effects for each survey
item. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.9: OLS estimates - M2
show that cultural differences matter but that restricting the dataset does
not allow to eliminate the paradox. In short, the issue of endogeneity in
the models is still a concern. Therefore, in M3 I investigate three potential
sources of this endogeneity: ecological stress and two different sources of
cultural differences.
3.3.4 Investigation of omitted variables - M3
First, following the hypothesis and evidence of Kaiser (2019), I test whether
ecological stress is the main predictor of gender differences. The causal re-
lationship hypothesized by Kaiser is as follows: countries that face a high
prevalence of pathogens tend to be more collectivist75 and display a lower
degree of gender differences. This causal relationship is in line with the re-
source hypothesis. As collectivism leaves less scope for deviant behaviors,
75Collectivism refers to societies that display a high respect for traditions and a high
degree of xenophobia. Both are means of protection. For instance, food traditions, such as
the use of tannin, reduce the spread of pathogens. Collectivism is opposed to individualism
where deviant behaviors are less reprimanded and the society is more open to others.
135
there are less opportunities for self-expression. Moreover, in more individual-
ist countries, subjects tend to self-stereotype themselves through cross-gender
comparisons, while in collectivist countries the comparison is made with the
same gender. These social comparison processes increase gender differences
(Guimond, Branscombe, et al. 2007; Guimond, Chatard, et al. 2006). I test
if ecological stress predicts the differences in values.
In Table 3.10, I report the effect of ecological stress factors on absolute
gender differences in values (M3). While, historical pathogen prevalence
ranges from −1.29 in Canada, to 1.28 in Nigeria or Ghana, the contemporary
measure ranges from 24, in Albania and Germany to 46 in Burkina Faso.
The historical values are z−scores and the contemporary ones are the sums
of seven classes of pathogens. As for individualism, values range from 6 in
Guatemala, to 91 in the USA, and values for the food supply from 1308
kcal/capita/day in Burkina Faso, to 3809 kcal/capita/day in the USA. The
range is similar for the historical food supply. As an illustration, the most
individualist country, as measured by this index, is the USA. This country
had a relatively low prevalence of historical pathogens (−.86) and a relatively
high historical food supply (3192.09). Nevertheless, on average, this country
displays only slightly more gender differences, with 5.47% for GVS than the
overall average at 5.27%.
In the estimates based on the UN Gender Equality Index, I find that
even with these additional control variables, more gender equality is still as-
sociated with divergence of values between males and females. Ecological
stress controls substantially increase the R2 of the Model. The effects of the
different ecological control variables are mixed in this multilinear regression.
While a higher prevalence of historical pathogens tends to increase diver-
gence, contemporary pathogens tend to decrease divergence. The effect of
food supply is also rather mixed. However, taken separately, all these eco-
logical stress variables are in line with the ecological stress hypothesis and
are highly significant (p < 0.01, see section 3.5.9 in the supp.material for the
independent regressions). The ecological variables are dependent and corre-
lated, which might explain why I do not observe significant results for all of
these variables in Table 3.10, that is societies tend to be more individualistic
because of a lower prevalence of pathogens. This causality implies that that
individualism is not independent of pathogen prevalence.
The robustness of divergence of values with respect to more gender equal-
ity including these additional variables suggests that the within-country level
analysis captures more cross-country variability than the ecological stress
factors. This suggests that other omitted variables explain the difference in
values or that this is the true effect of gender equality, which points towards
divergence of differences.
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Ecological stress indicators - Cross-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −13.662∗∗ −2.112+ 0.170 2.316∗∗
(1.048) (1.188) (0.579) (0.437)
Pathogen Prevalence (Historical) 1.574∗∗ 0.562∗ 0.651∗∗ 0.173+
(0.244) (0.246) (0.138) (0.102)
Pathogen Prevalence (Contemp.) −0.381∗∗ −0.068+ −0.099∗∗ −0.027+
(0.035) (0.038) (0.019) (0.014)
Individual. (Hofstede) 0.013+ −0.007 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
Food Supply 0.002∗∗ −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Historical Food Supply −0.002∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 28.404∗∗ 6.686∗∗ 6.877∗∗ 3.323∗∗
(1.623) (1.809) (0.889) (0.676)
F -test 39.9 2.7 32.6 50.9
p 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000
R2 0.026 0.010 0.019 0.021
N 3073 1204 6168 7640
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from the United
Nations on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variables on
the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each survey item. Both indicators
of pathogens and the historical food supply indicator are matched at the country level. The remaining control
variables are matched with the corresponding country and wave. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1,
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.10: OLS estimates - M3
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Second, I investigate cultural differences. I use Geert Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions to control for cultural differences that might explain gender dif-
ferences in values (M3). While, there is some evidence for gender differences
in competitive or cooperative behaviors (Croson and Gneezy 2009; Knight
and Chao 1989; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Niederle and Vesterlund 2011;
Peshkovskaya et al. 2018), these cultural dimensions are overall proxies of
competition and cooperation across cultures (Hofstede et al. 2005). Thus,
the true effect of more gender equality could be culturally influenced, such
as, for instance, rising competition between men and women for the same job
or, on the contrary, leading to more overall gender cooperation. I use these
indexes to investigate these possible channels.
In Table 3.11, I report the OLS estimates. In terms of variation, for
instance, power distance ranges from 11 in Australia, to 104 in Malaysia. All
the other coefficients of this cultural source have similar variations. As an
illustration, Japan has the highest score in masculinity (95), a relatively high
score in uncertainty avoidance (92), and on average 6.04 gender differences
in the GVS category.
Power distance and masculinity tend to decrease gender differences in
values. In other words, societies that tend to have well defined hierarchical
structures and that favor personal and material success tend to have lower
gender differences in values. Both of these indicators would suggest that
competition hampers the manifestation of gender differences. On the con-
trary, individualism and uncertainty avoidance are associated with more gen-
der differences. Individualism is an indicator of societies that allow general
differences between individuals, which might enhance gender differences. Un-
certainty avoidance, because it is an indicator of societies that have a high de-
gree of security, might lead to less competition between both genders. There
might be a lower possibility for high competition if there is general security.
I also assume that stronger rules settle more situations where competition
would otherwise prevail. All these point estimates support the hypothesis
that cooperation or competition explain gender differences in values.
However, in contrast to the previous hypothesis that ecological stress
factors predict gender differences in values, the current hypothesis is that
gender equality either raises competition or cooperation between genders. In
other words, more gender equality should interact with indicators of com-
petition and cooperation. In Table 3.12, I report the regression outputs of
interactions between the UN Gender Equality Index and Geert Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions and find that gender equality tends to amplify compe-
tition or cooperation which would then explain gender differences in values.
In other words, I find support for different channels with respect to more
gender equality. On one hand, more gender equality leads in some cases
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to more cooperation between both genders, and in other cases, it increases
competition between both genders. The explanation of why some societies
display an increase in cooperation or competition is still a matter of omitted
variables.
In the estimates based on the UN Gender Equality Index, I find that
this index is robust to these additional control variables in explaining gender
differences in values, but the coefficients are lower, suggesting that some of
the variation previously explained by gender equality is henceforth explained
by cultural differences. Note finally, that the inclusion of these additional
control variables increases, again, the R2.
Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions - Cross-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −4.687∗∗ −2.095∗∗ 1.440∗∗ 1.321∗∗
(0.597) (0.638) (0.323) (0.253)
Power Distance −0.028∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.029∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Individual. (Hofstede) −0.003 −0.004 0.011∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Masculinity −0.004 −0.015∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Uncertainty Avoidance 0.011∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 12.601∗∗ 7.495∗∗ 4.880∗∗ 5.787∗∗
(0.686) (0.714) (0.378) (0.294)
F -test 17.5 6.9 84.0 141.4
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.008 0.011 0.023 0.030
N 5958 2341 11615 14393
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from the
United Nations on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent
variables on the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each survey item.
All the control variables are matched at country level, except for the index of gender equality from the
UN. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.11: OLS estimates - M3
Third, I investigate other cultural differences taken from Welzel (2013).
In Table 3.13, I report the OLS estimates. While conformism is associated
with the presence of stronger norms (Asch 1951) and that collectivist soci-
eties, where deviant behaviors are less tolerated, are also associated with
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Geert Hofstedes cultural dimensions - Cross-country - Interactions
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −3.562∗∗ −0.468 1.546∗∗ 2.525∗∗
(0.853) (0.891) (0.477) (0.372)
Power Distance x GE-UN −0.039∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.037∗∗ −0.038∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
Individual. x GE-UN −0.000 −0.001 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
Masculinity x GE-UN −0.006 −0.016∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Uncertainty Avoidance x GE-UN 0.020∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 11.360∗∗ 5.836∗∗ 4.649∗∗ 4.224∗∗
(0.412) (0.435) (0.217) (0.171)
F -test 19.1 5.7 88.8 151.9
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.009 0.009 0.024 0.032
N 5958 2341 11615 14393
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from the
United Nations on the coefficient Cn. GE-UN stands for the UN Gender Equality Index. This table includes
control variables from Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and the interactions with the Gender Equality
Index. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variables on the different categories
(LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each item of the WVS. All the control variables are matched
at the country level, except for the index of gender equality from the UN. Standard errors in parentheses. +
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.12: OLS estimates - M3
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conformism (R. Bond and Smith 1996), Welzel (2013) developed indicators
of general emancipation to such norms. Thus, less pressure from the norms
should be associated with more gender differences.
In Table 3.13, disbelief and defiance, which are indicative of a low level
of religious belief and low respect for authority are associated with more gen-
der differences in values. These indicators support the hypothesis that less
pressure from the norms leads to more gender differences in values. However,
skepticism, which is indicative of a general distrust, is ambiguously associ-
ated with more gender differences in self-centered values (SCVS) but with
less gender differences in general values (GVS). Furthermore, albeit the coef-
ficients are above significance levels, relativism, which is indicative of a lower
level of conformism, is also associated with less gender differences in values.
According to Welzel (2013), all of these variables are indicators of emanci-
pation and, even though the effects of these indicators are ambiguous, they
mostly suggest that emancipation is associated with more gender differences
in values. However, these indicators should be taken with caution as they
are not independent of the gender coefficient.
As for the effect of gender equality, the UN index is still significant (p <
0.01) and positively associated with gender differences in values in the GVS
category. The loss of significance in LSS and SCVS is likely a similar issue
of ambiguity in the classification (see Footnote 64).
3.3.5 General remarks
Overall the results show both convergence and divergence of gender differ-
ences in values with respect to gender equality. These correlations depend on
whether I use country fixed effects or not. Moreover, the divergence of values
with respect to more gender equality and economic prosperity is robust to
alternative specifications. I end up not making a causal claim but suggest
that further investigation is needed to tackle the issue of possible omitted
variables.
This research is an empirical study with the limitations that arise in such
cases. The analyses cannot reveal the complexity of the reality nor all the
heterogeneity in values. It remains an investigation which approximates the
underlying mechanism in the evolution of values.
As another limitation to this research, one should note that the evolution
of within-country gender equality is often fairly small. For instance, the
average evolution of the UN Gender Equality Index, in all the countries, is
only of 6.14 percentage points. I also compute the range ratio of each index.
The range of the UN Gender Equality Index is 2.89 times greater in the cross-
country than in the within-country analysis. As for the two other indexes,
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Welzel Cultural dimensions - Cross-country
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −4.148∗∗ −2.203 1.019 2.433∗∗
(1.461) (1.474) (0.686) (0.541)
Relativism −6.880∗∗ −5.366∗ −1.095 −1.298+
(1.971) (2.125) (1.028) (0.782)
Defiance 2.236 −3.274 1.516 2.178∗∗
(1.972) (2.116) (0.954) (0.725)
Disbelief −1.972∗ 2.433∗ 2.624∗∗ 0.548
(1.000) (1.106) (0.502) (0.381)
Skepticism −6.050∗∗ −0.829 1.842∗ −2.335∗∗
(1.783) (1.942) (0.906) (0.695)
Constant 18.038∗∗ 10.274∗∗ 3.806∗∗ 4.641∗∗
(1.173) (1.299) (0.570) (0.433)
F -test 15.6 4.9 26.7 43.9
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.014 0.026 0.016 0.023
N 2918 1015 5697 7069
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from the
United Nations on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent
variables on the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each survey item.
The index of gender equality from the UN is matched with the corresponding country and year of the
survey. The remaining control variables are matched with the corresponding country and wave of the
survey. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.13: OLS estimates - M3
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the range ratios are 1.69 for the UN log GDP and 3.30 for the WEF Gender
Equality Index. Due to this rather small variability of values in the indexes
in the within-country analyses, it is also possible that the within-country
results are not based on solid grounds.
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3.4 Conclusion
I end up with a puzzling correlation between the effect of gender equality
and values. I show both convergence and divergence of gender differences in
values with respect to more equal social and economic life-situations.
Even if the correlation, suggesting divergence, in the cross country analy-
sis is very convincing and robust to many alternative estimation methods, it
still fails to make it through when I control for the country fixed effects. The
question arises of whether gender equality indexes, such as those I use in this
study, are able to capture a perceived reality or if the correlation is spurious.
Nonetheless, this concern is partially rejected as the negative correlations
between the life-situation dimension in the WVS/EVS and the indexes are
almost always unambiguous and very significant.
The results finally support no particular causal relationship on the contro-
versial link between values and social/economic life-situations. Nonetheless,
I note that more variation in the within-country gender equality index would
help to make a causal claim on gender differences in values, but finding an
instrumental variable seems more promising since there is likely a latency
between the evolution of gender equality and its possible impact on gender
differences in values.
My contributions are the use of a very broad set of values, an analysis
of longitudinal data over more than 30 years and I confirm, with the cate-
gorization of the life situations, that the WVS/EVS are attractive datasets
for the elicitation of social differences and inequalities. I finally contribute
to the growing literature that investigates gender differences in values and
preferences (Connolly et al. 2019; Costa et al. 2001; Falk and Hermle 2018;
Kaiser 2019; Schmitt et al. 2008; Schwartz and Rubel 2005), but conclude
with an unsolved puzzle of whether gender differences in values increase or
decrease with respect to more gender equality or economic prosperity.
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3.5 Supplementary material
The supplementary material is structured as follows: (i) tables of descriptive
statistics, (ii) the instructions I gave to the research assistants, (iii) the com-
putation of the coefficient from the WVS and the EVS, (iv) the classification
of the items, (v) methodological concerns with the computation of ordinal
reported items, (vi) the different indexes, (vii) the different clustering, (viii)
additional analyses, (ix) and robustness checks.
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics
In this section, I include descriptive tables of the dataset from the WVS/EVS.
Precisely, I report the means for the main indexes for each country: the UN
log GDP in million US$ (log GDP), the UN Gender Equality Index (GE-
UN), and the one from the WEF (GE-WEF). Then, I report the means of
gender differences for each category (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I also report
the average percentage of female respondents, the maximum variability for
each index (Log GDP, GE-UN, GE-WEF), and the categories (LSO, LSS,
SCVS, GVS). The maximum variability is given by taking the maximum
value of the variable in the dataset minus the minimum value observed in
the same category/index. Finally, I report the average number of respon-
dents/observations per wave and the number of times a country was present











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Hired research assistants received the following instructions for the catego-
rization of the WVS items:
For this task you will have to code a large number of survey questions
into categories. The questions stem mainly from the World Values Survey,
one of the largest international survey studies. For each questionnaire item
you have to indicate (i) whether the item refers to the life-situation of the
respondent or whether it is a value statement and (ii) indicate whether the
question refers to a list of categories such as religion.
The data source for the coding is the official documentation of the World
Values Survey, waves 1 to 6. We provide the list of survey items in the excel
sheet QuestionsSetsCoding.xls. It contains a unique question code (under
the column VARCODE), which is stable across waves, a short label and the
precoded “Group 1”, “Group 1 - Second Choice”, “Group 1 - Comments” and
other columns you will have to fill in with 0 (negative, no) and 1 (positive,
yes). You should code all variables visible in the sheet according to the coding
scheme which we explain in more detail below.
The “Labels” column will provide you with a short description of the
question. However, this is not sufficient to code the items. That is, you
will need to check the question in the printed PDF provided. The questions
are in the same order as in the excel file (QuestionsSetsCoding.xls). The
variable SOURCE indicates the wave number of the World Values Survey
(W6 to W1), the variable VARCODE indicates the variable number in the
respective document.
3.5.3 Coding the variables
You will have to code the questions in the File QuestionsSetsCoding.xls. The
different columns contains the categories you have to use. The categories are
divided into two groups.
Group 1: The column Group 1 contain a drop-down list with the possibil-
ities described below. All items must be specified into one of the following
categories.
• Technical. This category refers to questions which do not measure
respondents’ answers. For instance, the wave number, the respondent
ID, or the date of the interview. Moreover, every observation made by
the interviewer is in this category.
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• Life situation, objective. Questions about the circumstances in
which the respondent lives and his habits. The qualifier “objective”
refers to items that could—in principle—be verified by an external ob-
server. Examples are questions about income, work hours, church going
habits, or memberships in organisations.
• Life situation, subjective. Questions about the circumstances in
which the respondent lives, but which are open to subjective interpre-
tation by the respondent. The answers are not easily verifiable for an
external observer. Examples: “How satisfied are you with your life?”,
“Are you satisfied with your job”. The answers to these questions are
open to interpretation, such that an external observer might perceive
them differently.
• Self-centred value statement. This category contains questions
about self-reflexive value statements. In other words, the values are
self-centred and directly concern the subject himself. Examples: “Rate
your confidence in the government” or “Are you a religious person”.
• General value statement. This category refers to value statements
which are not directly linked to the respondent, but to the society (or
humanity) in general. In other words, this category contains items
asking about “How should the world be”, or “How should one act?”.
Examples: “Is it justifiable to cheat on taxes” or “Government should
reduce environmental pollution”.
Excluding the technical category all the categories from group 1 are di-
vided between two major groups: life circumstances (which includes: life-
situations objective and subjective) and values (which includes: self-centred
value statement and general value statement). The former group investigates
the life quality on a broad sense (“How is life”) and the latter, preferences
and values on a broad sense (“What do you think about life”).
For some questions time gives another clue on how to distinguish between
life-situations and values. If the question is about past behaviors (did you. . . ),
then you should classify it as a life-situation. If it is conditional or about
future behavior (would you. . . ), then you should classify it as a self-centered
value.
As some ambiguity remains for the categorisation of the questions in
group 1, you can optionally specify a second choice. You may also leave
a comment for the categorisation of group 1, under the column “Group 1 -
Comments” if necessary. On the following page you will find a table with fur-
ther examples for the categories. Please go carefully through these examples
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and use the table as a reference when coding the variables. In many cases





People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and the world.
For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you used it last week or
did not use it last week to obtain information newspaper
During the past year, did your family, save money, just get by, spent some savings,
spent savings and borrowed money
Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization,
could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a
member of that type of organization? ... Political party ...
And for which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work?
Life situation, subjective
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?
Using this card on which 1 means you are completely dissatisfied and 10 means you
are completely satisfied where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a
whole?
To what degree are you worried about the following situations? Losing my job or
not finding a job
In your view, how often do the following things occur in this countrys elections?
Votes are counted fairly
self-centred value statement
On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you
would not like to have as neighbors?
Now Id like you to look at this card. Im going to read out some forms of political
action that people can take, and Id like you to tell me, for each one, whether you
have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any
circumstances do it
I d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell
me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not
very much or not at all?
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?
I see myself as someone who is reserved
Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate
for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat
like you, not like you, or not at all like you?
For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say
it is: Family
How proud are you to be French?
Now I would like to ask you something about the things which would seem to you,
personally, most important if you were looking for a job. Here are some of the things
many people take into account in relation to their work. Regardless of whether
you’re actually looking for a job, which one would you, personally, place first if you
were looking for a job?
A variety of characteristics are listed here. Could you take a
look at them and select those which apply to you?




Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which,
if any, do you consider to be especially important?
I would like you to indicate which of these problems you consider the most serious
one for the world as a whole?
Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.
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Group 2: The second group contains six categories that are not mutually
exclusive, i.e., an item can be coded in none, one, or more than one category.
If you want to code the item in a category mark a 1 in the respective column.
• Liberal/Authoritarian/Conservative/Progressive - G3: refers
to the questionnaire items that relate to the role of the state about in-
dividual freedom, openness to immigration, change of political systems,
and democratic values.
• Religion - G2: refers to the items that relate to religion on a broad
sense; spirituality is included.
• Trust - G2: refers to the items that relate to trust/confidence. For
instance: “How much do you trust strangers?”
• Altruism - G2: refers to the items about altruism/generosity. For
instance: “Do you donate money to charities”.
• Cooperation - G2: refers to all the items that relate to the relation
between the individual and the society which have a cooperative charac-
ter. This could be items about preferences or willingness to participate
in social movements, volunteering and the like.
• Redistribution - G2: Items related to views about the importance
of material wealth, the redistribution of wealth, and the justification
of wealth differences in general. Examples “Do the rich deserve their
wealth”, or “How important is it for you to be rich”.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE DO NOT HESI-
TATE TO CONTACT ME.
3.5.4 The coefficient from the WVS and the EVS
I use the longitudinal World Value Survey (available here http://www.
worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp. I combine it with the
European Value Survey (available here: https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/
GDESC2.asp?no=0009\&DB=E, page 9), but from this data, I keep only
the items that are the same as in the WVS. For a complete list of the items
see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
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The WVS & EVS in numbers
Summary Statistics WVS & EVS




N of items 1231
Av. N of questions per participant 243.24
This table reports summary statistics of the overall WVS and the EVS. It includes
technical variables and items only present in the EVS that I do not use in the analyses.
Table S3.4: Descriptive statistics
Computation I need to disentangle the data type for analysis purposes.
I identify the following types: categorical, binary, ordinal, and continuous.
I also add another category for the items that could be rescaled to ordinal.
For instance, the options in the item: “1 = approve, 2 = disapprove and 3 =
depends” could be interpreted as ordinal in the following order: 1 = approve,
2 = depends, 3 = disapprove. I drop the continuous items as the vast majority
of them are recorded by the interviewer. Apart from the item, “How many
children do you have” where I do not expect differences between males and
females, the remaining items are coded by the interviewer. In the main paper,
I discuss only ordinal items (which include, binaries and rescaled to ordinal)
and categorical items to facilitate the reading. The percentage of ordinal,
binary, and rescaled to ordinal is 69.5%. The percentage of categorical items
is 30.5%. These percentages include only the ones I use in the analysis,
therefore, not the technical items.
Ordinal items: For the ordinal, binary, and rescaled to ordinal items,
I use the computation proposed by Klotz. This computation provides a
coefficient (henceforth: Co) for gender differences. In the computation, I
plot the relative frequencies (e.g., the percentage of women who choose
option 1) of each gender for each option and per item in a matrix and
then compute the probability that the sample from one gender will choose
a higher option than the sample from the other gender. I, ultimately,
compute the absolute difference as follows: |C| = |Co − 0.5| and end up
with a coefficient that measures the absolute difference between males and
females not sensitive to monotonic transformation. As a robustness check
I compare the coefficient |C| to Cohen’s d and obtain a correlation of
97.5% (p = 0.000, from a Pearson’s correlation test). I did not use Cohen’s
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d as it computes differences in the mean and is subject to monotonic
transformation (see the next section for all concerns with the computa-
tion of ordinal variables). The coefficient |C| is normalized in the main
paper and I use Cn in percent as the dependent variable in all the regressions.
Categorical items: For the categorical variables, I use Cramer’s V
(Cramér 1946) computation. The given coefficient has the advantage of
being bound between 0, no association between the two subgroups, and 1,
perfect association. As mentioned in the main paper, as the asymptotic
expectation of the X2 statistics is proportional to the sample size, the
estimator will be biased by the differences in n. Cramer’s V, on the other
hand, is insensitive to sample sizes as it corrects the estimator by dividing
it by a multiple of the sample size (Agresti and Kateri 2011).
As the computation for ordinal data is bounded between 0 and 0.5, I
multiply the ordinal coefficient by 2. I end up with a coefficient that has the
same interpretation regardless of the data type. Therefore, 0 = no gender
difference, 1 = total gender difference. I always report the gender difference
in percent.
3.5.5 Classification of the items from the WVS.
I mentioned in the main paper that I hired two research assistants for the
coding of the items. Overall the kappa-statistic returns 79.6% of agreement
between the two research assistants. When they agreed I used their coding
as is, but in cases when they did not match I hired another research assistant
to make the call between the two classifications of the research assistants.
As I also had my own classification, I tested the agreement rate between each
research assistant and my classification. The kappa-statistic returns 79.6%
agreement between one of them and my original classification and 93.8% for
the other one and my classification. I did the coding myself as a robustness
check, but did not use it in the analysis. To assess the robustness of the
categorization, I report in the robustness checks section the regressions with
the categorization of both coders.
3.5.6 Ordinal analysis of data
Schroeder and Yitzhaki (2017) and T. N. Bond and Lang (2019) bring some
interesting criticism to the literature about the analysis of ordinal data that
I aim to answer in this section. Their argument mainly stems from strong
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necessary assumptions made on the characteristics of the ordinal data. They
argue that as long as the variance between the two subgroups is not equal and
that I cannot observe a first-order stochastic dominance, there exists a mono-
tonic transformation that reverses the conclusion. T. N. Bond and Lang focus
on some of the major findings in the happiness literature where researchers
investigate factors influencing the mean happiness. As researchers use mean
computations to infer which groups display a higher level of happiness, they
need to assume that the two subgroups have the same reporting function
(same cardinality) and that the gaps between the different options are equal
(interval interpretation of ordinal data). In their review of these major find-
ings in the happiness literature, T. N. Bond and Lang apply some monotonic
transformation to the happiness scale and reverse the primary conclusions.
For instance, an exponential function can reverse the conclusion depending
on the skewness of the data.
As a monotonic transformation influences the mean, Chen et al. (2019)
proposed to restore most of the findings in the happiness literature by shifting
the conclusion made on the mean happiness to the median happiness. A
similar methodology was earlier proposed by Allison and Foster (2004) with
a focus on self-reported health status. However, the proposition to shift from
the mean to the median is not entirely appropriate in my case as most of the
Likert scales used in the WVS have a restricted number of options. Therefore,
most of the gender differences would then vanish. For instance, most of the
variables are on a 3-point scales would result in a median of 2. Moreover, in
some cases, the differences can be overestimated, such as when the median
shifts from 1 to 2.
Nevertheless, I overcome the vast majority of these issues in my study.
First, the computation I use (see methods section and Klotz 1966) is not
sensitive to a monotonic transformation, as I do not compute means. The
only concern that holds in my computation is the possibility of a different
gender reporting function. For instance, men always report higher points in
the Likert scales. Nevertheless, I am not interested in whether one group has
a higher propensity or a lower propensity to choose higher or lower options
than another group. I am interested in the absolute difference. Therefore,
any difference in the reporting function needs to be systematic in order to
bias the estimate and would only quantitatively influence the result, but not
qualitatively. More precisely, it might change the absolute difference, but
then in no case, whether absolute gender differences increase or decrease
with more gender equality or economic prosperity.
As I am comparing the same subgroups in different countries, I am more
concerned with a systematic interaction between the gender and the culture
resulting in a difference in the reporting function. This may indicate that the
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difference I observe between the countries is a matter of culture. However, a
bias would occur if, and only if, there is a systematic correlation of one of the
indexes I use, such as the GDP or gender equality indexes on the reporting
of one gender and not the other. In the extreme case where the indexes only
impact one gender, then the story I want to tell would be different. However
in any more reasonable interpretation, even if there is a different interaction
effect of the indexes and the gender, it would only sum up again as a level
issue and then not change the story I want to tell.
One might also be concerned with the occurrence of bounded items cor-
related with the indexes I use as independent variables. For instance, both
genders might report systematically more extreme options in low GDP coun-
tries and the opposite in high GDP countries. This would explain why I
observe fewer or more gender differences in relation to indexes such as the
GDP. However, according to the categorization (LSO, LSS, SCVS, and GVS)
even in countries where I observe fewer differences in life-situations (LSO
and LSS), I observe more differences in the values (SCVS and GVS) in the
cross-country analyses. One should expect that if the reporting function is
culturally influenced, it should aslo hold across the categorization.
Finally, criticism regarding a different reporting function is dependent
on the number of measured items. As I combine many items from many
different countries, the reporting function of males and females should be
systematically different to bias the estimate. The more items and the more
countries, the less the reporting function is a concern.
3.5.7 Indexes
In the regression models, the choice of the indexes is mostly inspired by Falk
and Hermle (2018) and Hofstede et al. (2005), Kaiser (2019), and Welzel
(2013). I use the following indexes as independent variables.
• United Nations - Gender Inequality Index, from the Human Devel-
opment Report 2015. Values inverted to create an index of equality.
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GII
• WEF Global Gender Gap Index, from the World Economic Forum
Global Gender Gap Report 2015
http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/rankings/
combined with the 2013 one, which reports values from 2006 to 2013
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.
pdf.
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in US dollars and per year
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from the United Nations. https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Per+
capita+GDP&d=SNAAMA&f=grID\%3a101%3bcurrID%3aUSD%
3bpcFlag%3a1
• Historical and Contemporary Pathogen Prevalence. Taken from the
supplementary material of Fincher et al. (2008). https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2602680/bin/rspb20080094s06.pdf
• Hofstede Individualism score (2001). Taken from the supplementary
material of Fincher et al. (2008). https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC2602680/bin/rspb20080094s06.pdf
• Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions: power distance, masculinity,
and uncertainty avoidance taken from:
http://clearlycultural.com/geert-hofstede-cultural-dimensions/
power-distance-index/.
• Food access taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization: http:
//www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBSH.
• Historical food access taken from the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBSH. I calculate the
mean from year 1961 to year 1984 per country.
• Welzel indicators of defiance, defiance, disbelief, relativism, and skep-
ticism. For their computation, see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=welzelidx I compute the means of each of
these indicators per country and per wave.
I match the indexes of gender equality and economic growth with the
corresponding country and the corresponding year. For some indexes, such
as the UN Gender Inequality Index, there is no record for every year present
in the WVS. Therefore, I match the years with the closest year in the indexes
and when it was in between, I pick the above year.
For the index of pathological prevalence, individualism, food access, and
Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, I matched them with the country only,
as all of these variables have only one value in time.
For the cultural dimensions of Welzel, I compute the means per country
and per wave and matched them accordingly.
3.5.8 Clustering
In the main paper, I do not include any clustering. As mentioned above
the observations represent gender differences per item, per wave, and per
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country. This computation already decreases biases due to individual cross-
correlations. Nevertheless, I test different clusterings, which allows for other
cross-correlations and serial correlations.
The general trend in the literature is to cluster at the country level. How-
ever, there are at least three possible clusterings in this situation: country
level, country and wave, item and country. Different clustering implies dif-
ferent assumptions that I will discuss in this section.
The first clustering allows cross-correlations between the survey items and
between the waves. Whenever I cluster at this level, I lose the significance
level for some of the categories (GVS and LSS). The loss of significance might
be due to some overestimation of the standard errors as the regression might
overvalue the dependence between the survey items. Put differently, some
items relate to a more general value and their error terms in the regressions
are correlated. Even if, one can assume that some items might be related,
such as “Who would you not like to have as neighbors” and “Is it justifiable
to...”, some others are likely independent. For instance: “Belief about child
qualities” and “Belief about religion” refer to different values.
This clustering also allows for serial correlations. There are two compet-
ing arguments for serial correlation. The first argument in favor is that, since
values are likely derived from sources, these sources could evolve over time,
but they would not likely change drastically. As an example, a country’s
religious composition is likely to explain religious beliefs and the religious
composition is unlikely to change drastically in a short period of time. The
second argument in disfavor is related to different samplings over the years.
For instance, one wave may have focused on the south of the USA and an-
other wave on the north, where views differ. Note finally, that if this last
argument makes sense in the USA, it might not be generalized to smaller
countries. I report in Table S3.5 the regression of gender differences on the
UN Gender Equality Index. I lose the significance level due to the possible
limitations mentioned above.
The second clustering allows cross-correlations between the survey items.
This clustering assumes that observations are independent over time, but not
within the same wave. The main argument for this point is that within the
same country all values are somehow derived from the same “sources”. I men-
tioned, above, limitations of this argument. This clustering also assumes that
the respondents are different over time. I discuss above the pros and cons of
this assumption. In Table S3.6, I report the results from the same regression
as above, but with clustering at the wave and country-level. Unsurprisingly,
the coefficients have slighly higher significance levels. This is unsurprising
because smaller clusters allow for smaller correlations of the error terms.
The last possible clustering is at the country and item level. This re-
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Gender Equality Index (UN) - Cross-country - Cluster at the country level
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −4.747∗∗ −2.282 2.205∗ 2.066+
(1.609) (1.476) (0.914) (1.045)
Constant 8.321∗∗ 5.970∗∗ 3.032∗∗ 1.410+
(1.778) (1.087) (0.754) (0.716)
Item fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
R2 0.675 0.198 0.354 0.301
Clusters 89 89 89 89
N 10,006 3,762 19,031 23,647
Notes: OLS estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from the UN
on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on the
different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each item of the WVS. Robust
standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses. The F -test is not computed because the VCE is
not of sufficient rank to perform the model test. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S3.5: OLS estimates
Gender Equality Index (UN) - Cross-country - Cluster at the country and
wave level
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −4.747∗∗ −2.282+ 2.205∗ 2.066∗
(1.556) (1.357) (0.900) (1.012)
Constant 8.321∗∗ 5.970∗∗ 3.032∗∗ 1.410∗
(1.758) (1.009) (0.746) (0.693)
Item fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
R2 0.675 0.198 0.354 0.301
Clusters 172 128 202 236
N 10,006 3,762 19,031 23,647
Notes: OLS estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from the UN
on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on the
different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each item of the WVS. Robust
standard errors, clustered on country and wave level, in parentheses. The F -test is not computed because
the VCE is not of sufficient rank to perform the model test. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S3.6: OLS estimates
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gression allows for serial correlations over time, but assumes that the items
are independent from each other. For instance, the regression assumes that
views on homosexuality are unrelated to views on drug consumption, but
that views on homosexuality over time are correlated. I report in Table S3.7
this last clustering. All the coefficients of the UN Gender Equality Index are
significant (p < 0.01) as in the main paper.
Gender Equality Index (UN) - Cross-country - Cluster at the country and
item level
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −4.747∗∗ −2.282∗∗ 2.205∗∗ 2.066∗∗
(0.646) (0.600) (0.310) (0.232)
Constant 8.321∗∗ 5.970∗∗ 3.032∗∗ 1.410∗∗
(1.268) (0.509) (0.433) (0.253)
Item fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
R2 0.675 0.198 0.354 0.301
Clusters 6, 378 2, 490 10, 044 13, 558
N 10,006 3,762 19,031 23,647
Notes: OLS estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Gender Equality Index from the UN
on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on the
different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each item of the WVS. Robust
standard errors, clustered on country and item level, in parentheses. The F -test is not computed because
the VCE is not of sufficient rank to perform the model test. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S3.7: OLS estimates
Overall, clustering has advantages and disadvantages, but the major issue
would be if some serial correlation would not taken into account, such that
one country is over-represented in the data and would drive the effect. I
partially account for this issue in the main paper by restricting the data
to a sub-sample. Overall, except for the first clustering, which I believe
overestimates cross-correlations between the survey items, the significance
levels are similar to regressions without clustering.
3.5.9 Additional analyses
As mentioned, the regressions use the Cn I compute from the WVS and
the EVS as the dependent variable. For the independent variables, I use
the different indexes mentioned above. I control for fixed effects for the
different survey items. I include in this section only the regression tables not
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present in the main paper. I test whether pathogen prevalence (historical and
contemporary) explains gender differences in values independently. In Tables
S3.8 and S3.9, I report the regression outputs and show that the correlation
is negative and significant (p < 0.01). Countries that faced a high prevalence
of pathogen display lower gender differences in values. In Table S3.10, I
test if individualism explains gender differences in values and find a positive
correlation. These results are in line with Kaiser (2019). Finally, I test
whether historical and contemporary access to food supply explain gender
differences in values and the correlation is positive and significant (p < 0.01).
In short, countries that had and have better access to food tend to have more
gender differences, which is still in line with the ecological stress hypothesis.
Although these correlations are significant, the evolution of gender dif-
ferences remains difficult to explain. First, I lack data on the evolution of
individualism across societies, and second, the effect of pathogen prevalence
is not immediate. According to Kaiser (2019), there is an important latency
between changes in pathogen prevalence and a possible change in values.
Pathogen prevalence - Historical
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Pathogen Prevalence (Historical) 0.716∗∗ 0.035 −0.902∗∗ −0.961∗∗
(0.088) (0.097) (0.047) (0.036)
Constant 7.946∗∗ 4.826∗∗ 5.915∗∗ 5.162∗∗
(0.058) (0.065) (0.031) (0.024)
F -test 65.8 0.1 375.6 724.0
p 0.000 0.720 0.000 0.000
R2 0.005 0.000 0.010 0.015
N 11920 4102 22478 28031
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the pathogen prevalence (historical) on
the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on the different
categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each item of the WVS. Standard errors in
parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S3.8: OLS estimates
I run correlation tests between these ecological factors and the different
indexes and find that the UN Gender Equality Index correlates with the con-
temporary and historical pathogen prevalence, the Hofstede individualism
index, the food supply historical, and the contemporary food supply access
with the respective values, −0.73, −0.66, 0.59, 0.52, and 0.64. I get very
similar results when testing the correlation with the log GDP and slightly
lower coefficients for the WEF Gender Equality Index. These results sup-
port the ecological stress hypothesis that differences in environment shaped
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Pathogen prevalence - Contemporary
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Pathogen Prevalence (Contemp.) 0.073∗∗ −0.013 −0.114∗∗ −0.101∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006)
Constant 5.657∗∗ 5.092∗∗ 9.564∗∗ 8.402∗∗
(0.427) (0.438) (0.220) (0.169)
F -test 26.3 0.8 247.3 326.9
p 0.000 0.359 0.000 0.000
R2 0.006 0.000 0.013 0.013
N 6103 2147 11620 14349
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the pathogen prevalence (contemporary)
on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on the
different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each item of the WVS. Standard
errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S3.9: OLS estimates
Individualism score - Hofstede
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Individual. (Hofstede) −0.008∗∗ −0.013∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 8.072∗∗ 5.415∗∗ 5.234∗∗ 4.303∗∗
(0.137) (0.164) (0.076) (0.060)
F -test 11.1 20.8 144.9 365.0
p 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.009
N 10153 3469 19141 23866
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the Hofstede individualism
score on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent
variable on the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each item
of the WVS. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S3.10: OLS estimates
165
Food Supply - Historical
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Historical Food Supply −0.001∗∗ −0.000+ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 11.812∗∗ 5.614∗∗ 2.655∗∗ 2.845∗∗
(0.419) (0.443) (0.205) (0.162)
F -test 76.1 3.4 270.6 243.8
p 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.000
R2 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.005
N 10027 3529 18985 23618
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the historical food supply on
the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on
the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed effects for each item of the WVS.
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S3.11: OLS estimates
differences in values, however, due to the above-mentioned limitations (lack
of data over time and latency) the recent evolution of differences in values
cannot be attributed causally to these factors. In other words, gender dif-
ferences at the outset could be the cause of these ecological factors, but the
recent evolution (last 40 years) of these differences remains puzzling.
As in the main paper I show only the evolution of LSO and GVS with
more gender equality for countries present in Wave 1 and 6 in a scatter plot,
In Table S3.13, I report the regression of the UN Gender Equality Index on
the different categories. Therefore, the sample is restricted to countries that
were part of both Wave 1 and 6. This sub-sample allows me to investigate
the effect of the evolution of the index over an important period of time (at
least 26 years, before 1995 and after 2009). The convergence/divergence for
gender differences in values is robust to this sub-sample.
3.5.10 Robustness checks
The robustness checks are structured as follows: (i) the robustness of the
categorization, (ii) investigation of time inconsistencies of the indexes, and
(iii) robustness to sub-samplings, such as number of countries or number
of waves. The following regressions always report cross-country and within-
country analyses.
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Food Supply - Contemporary
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Food Supply −0.001∗∗ −0.000∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 10.413∗∗ 5.738∗∗ 3.623∗∗ 3.284∗∗
(0.352) (0.386) (0.180) (0.138)
F -test 56.3 4.8 189.0 223.1
p 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000
R2 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.003
N 13247 4421 24821 30967
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the food supply
(contemporary) on the coefficient Cn. Each regression independently tests the effect
of the independent variable on the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I
include fixed effects for each item of the WVS. Standard errors in parentheses. +
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S3.12: OLS estimates
Gender Equality Index (UN) - Wave 1 and 6
Dependent variable: Coefficient: % of gender differences
LSO LSS SCVS GVS LSO LSS SCVS GVS
Gender Equality Index - UN −1.981 5.300∗∗ 2.815∗ 4.446∗∗ −82.828∗∗ −33.319∗∗ −33.097∗∗ −14.482∗
(1.749) (1.965) (1.249) (1.054) (12.473) (11.759) (6.760) (6.034)
Constant 9.024∗∗ 0.264 4.644∗∗ 2.239∗ 59.080∗∗ 23.295∗∗ 26.667∗∗ 13.580∗∗
(1.481) (1.659) (1.052) (0.889) (7.661) (7.115) (4.144) (3.699)
Dummy Country No No No No Y es Y es Y es Y es
F -test 1.3 7.3 5.1 17.8 7.3 4.3 6.3 5.3
p 0.258 0.007 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.003 0.020 0.002 0.012 0.037 0.003 0.026 0.012
N 632 326 1071 1167 632 326 1071 1167
Notes: Fixed effects estimates. This table reports the effect sizes of the scatter plot in the main paper. These regressions include only the countries that were asked
both in wave 1 and 6. Each regression independently tests the effect of the independent variable on the different categories (LSO, LSS, SCVS, GVS). I include fixed
effects for each item of the WVS. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table S3.13: OLS estimates
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firstly, I test the sensitivity of the categorization by running the regression
of the main paper with each research assistant categorization (see Tables
S3.14 and S3.15 for coder 1 and Tables S3.16 and S3.17 for coder 2). I find








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Second, I investigate if indexes might have inconsistencies in their com-
putation. This test accounts for the possibility that the indexes could have a
random component, such as the measure of the index taking into account dif-
ferent indicators one year and not the others. As I include dummy variables
for each survey item in the fixed effect model, the R2 increases substantially.
However, this is an artificial increase, as it does not increase substantially
the validity of the model. Tables S3.18 and S3.19 show that the conver-
gence/divergence story holds even when I control for possible inconsistencies
in the indexes. I see, however, that I get lower coefficients and partially loose
the significance for some categories. This is probably due to part of the effect
being captured by the year dummies. As mentioned in the main paper, every
year, the values in these indexes increase for almost all countries. Therefore

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, I test whether the story holds if I restrict the data to a sub-sample
of countries and a sub-sample of survey items.
Table S3.20 and S3.21 report the regression where I restrict the survey
items only to those that were asked at least in 3 waves. This restriction
allows me to control that the effect I observe is not driven by some survey
items that were asked only once or twice. It allows me to investigate the
time trend of the survey items and also their evolution over a wider range
of values in the indexes since the more time passes the greater variance I











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tables S3.22 and S3.23 report the regressions when I restrict the survey
items to those that were at least asked in 60 countries. This sub-sampling
highly overlaps the previous sub-sampling, as most of the survey items that
were asked in at least 3 waves tend to be asked also in a lot of countries.
Nonetheless, this test allows me to get rid of some survey items that tend
to be asked frequently, but only in some parts of the world. I observe that
the distribution of gender equality in the world is not random. For instance,
when a country displays a high degree of gender equality, as measured by the
indexes, then an adjacent country usually displays a similar level of gender
equality. As some survey items are region specific (concerning only a small
number of adjacent countries with similar values in the indexes), I wanted
to control that these items were not driving the effect. Overall the diver-
gence/convergence story of gender differences in values with respect to an


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































My thesis has finally three very distinct chapters, which are all completely
different from the first proposal I had made. Although they all relate to deci-
sion making to some extent, they differ in research questions and methodolo-
gies. Therefore, Before I mention the meeting points of the research, I will
highlight the key elements of my thesis.
In a joint work with my supervisor, we elaborate a precise stereotype
elicitation mechanism in Chapter 1. While the measure of stereotypes helps
investigate how stereotypes influence attitudes and behaviors, their measures
are subject to biases. Assuming participants are aware of their stereotypes,
an obvious bias in measuring them is the social desirability one. Apart from
this bias, there is often room for measurement errors, such as due to un-
known behaviors baselines or overestimation of differences. Our design gets
partially rid of the former bias, since it is costly to express a socially de-
sirable stereotype, and because we provide participants with baselines and
outline estimated differences, we also reduce measurement errors. Finally,
using our elicitation mechanism, we find no systematic gender stereotypes
in cooperation, but a systematic overestimation of left-leaning individuals in
cooperation compared to right-leaning ones.
In Chapter 2, I investigate different underlying mechanisms in donation
decisions. Using an experiment on nudging (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), I am
able to some extent to disentangle, which mechanism dominates the decision
to donate. I find that this decision is mostly triggered by an emotional
arousal in contrast to a lower cognitive cost. However, I do not exclude that
the cognitive cost is playing a role, since, it likely decreases the intrinsic
motivation of participants to donate jointly with the impression of control
that this nudge sets. The joint mechanisms sum up to no difference on the
realized level of donation. The overall experiment shows that this nudge is
not a free lunch for charities, as suggested by previous research (Schulz et
al. 2018), but shows that more research is needed before implementing this
nudge in donation decisions.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the evolution of gender differences in values
with respect to economic growth and the increase in gender equality. Apart
from an obvious fundamental inquiry, this research has implications for pol-
icymakers. Assuming the intention is to reach gender equality, at least, in
economic outcomes, whether gender differences in values increase or decrease
with the economic/gender equality growth could lead to different policies. For
instance, if women and men tend to differ more and more in their job choices,
the “equal work, equal pay” policy is unlikely to reach gender equality in eco-
nomic outcomes. Nevertheless, I do not reach a definite answer in this chap-
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ter. While I unambiguously show that more gender equality and economic
growth decrease differences in life-situations between men and women, I show
conflicting evidence for differences in values. On a cross-country investiga-
tion, I find that gender differences in values increase, but on a within-country
analysis, they decrease. While these results suggest an endogeneity issue in
the cross-country analysis, the paradox is robust to additional specifications,
such as ecological stress factors and cultural differences. I conclude on a
puzzle and show that more research is needed, especially since it might have
important policy implications.
One of the common themes of all three chapters is the focus on gender.
While in Chapter 3, I use gender as a proxy to investigate differences in val-
ues, in contrast, in Chapters 1 and 2, I find no systematic gender differences
in cooperative behavior nor in altruistic behavior. Moreover, I find no sys-
tematic gender stereotypes in cooperation. These results contrast a common
social representation that gender is, first a good predictor of differences, and
second that people hold strong gender stereotypes. In other words, although
gender is a useful proxy to investigate behaviors, I find that gender differences
in effective and perceived behaviors are to a lesser extent than expected.
Furthermore, my research always highlights the pragmatic implications.
Precisely, the general study in behavioral economics goes often beyond fun-
damental research since it can have implications in public policies. In the
present case, knowing stereotypes might help to address them, investigating
the effect of choice architecture on donation can help increase the provision
of public goods, and investigating the evolution of values is likely a necessary
step before designing adequate public policies.
Finally, although I believe having a link to a possible policy implication
is valuable, the contributions I bring, are not exempt from general concerns.
The construction of knowledge in science is mostly incremental, such that new
findings are bases on other previous findings. However, without advocating
deeply for a replication crisis76, I end up with 2 out of 3 papers that relate
partially to this issue. In Chapter 2, I suppose that I do not replicate most
of the findings from Schulz et al. (2018), because of a different environment
(in university courses vs online). This suggests that findings in one context
cannot always be generalized. On the other hand, while in Chapter 3, I
replicate the findings from Falk and Hermle (2018), I show however that
the estimate of the effect of gender equality on gender differences in values
76The replication crisis is the observation that many previous research fail to be repli-
cated (Pashler and Wagenmakers 2012).
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is inconsistent. This shows that these relationships might be more complex
than expected. Overall, both chapters advocate for a precautionary principle
in research, especially if the findings have policy implications.
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